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This thesis examines the factors that influence the profitability of micro-life 
insurance firms in Nigeria and South Africa. In particular, the joint impact of 
cost efficiency, ownership structure, leverage and reinsurance together with 
other institutional factors, on the profitability of commercial micro-life 
insurance providers are investigated. The cost efficiency estimates are 
derived using two main frontier efficiency estimation techniques; data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) in a first-
stage analysis. Furthermore, a panel data feasible generalised least squares 
(FGLS) estimator, which helps to simultaneously control for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the sample data, is employed to 
test the research hypotheses. Using the FGLS estimator in a panel of 61 
firms over the period covering 2005 and 2010, the study supports as well as 
contradicts the results of prior studies.  
The present study finds that the economic insights derived using either DEA 
or SFA in the computation of cost efficiency, as well as its components – 
technical and allocative efficiency- are relatively similar. The empirical results 
further suggest that cost efficiency which is positively associated with 
profitability is significant for the business success of micro-life insurers. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates that the increasing use of leverage 
helps to improve profitability, while the increasing use of reinsurance reduces 
profitability. Contrary to expectations, the interaction between reinsurance 
and leverage decreases the profitability of micro-life insurance firms. The 
empirical results reveal no statistically significant relation between ownership 
structure and the profitability of micro-life insurers for all the stock-
ownership forms considered. On the other hand, the study finds that firm-
specific effects such as the company size, product mix, length of time of 
operations in the market (age), and macro-economic factors such as the 
average annual interest rates, are significant drivers of the profitability of 
micro-life insurers.  
The present study contributes potentially valuable insights on the 
performance of micro-life insurance operations, and its conclusions could be 
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of interest and relevance to local and multinational insurers and reinsurers, 
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Chapter 1  
Overview of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
Insurance plays a significant role in the development of emerging economies 
(Outreville, 1990). Han, Li, Moshirian, and Tian (2010) in their study of the 
relation between insurance development and national economic growth, 
contend that both life and non-life insurance play a relatively more important 
economic function in developing countries than they do in more developed 
parts of the world. However, formal insurance services are out of reach for 
millions of low income individuals (especially in developing countries) who 
are often the most at risk and least able to protect themselves during 
periods of economic shocks or crisis (Churchill, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). 
Insurance for low income groups in developing countries (so-called ‘micro-
insurance’)1 has been identified as a means by which the poor could access 
financial services to help mitigate losses resulting from unforeseen events 
such as the death of a family member, illness, and loss of income or property 
(Bester, Chamberlin, & Houggard, 2009).  
Micro-insurance is a risk protection mechanism for low income2 groups and 
an integral part of the growing international micro-finance industry that 
emerged in the 1970s (Churchill, 2007).Although the concept of micro-
insurance has been in existence for several decades (e.g. see Chapter 3, 
section 3.2), it is only in the past few years that it has come to be 
understood as a distinct line of business - with its own commercial potential 
as well as challenges. The micro-insurance industry has attracted 
                                                          
1Micro-insurance can be generally defined as the protection of low-income groups against 
specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and 




Swiss Re (2010) defines low income groups as households who subsist on incomes of US$4 
or less per day. Because of their limited private collateral, people living in poverty are clearly 
vulnerable to unanticipated life cycle risks such as death and disability (Churchill, 2007).  
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considerable interest  from various stakeholders such as the international 
(re)insurance industry, economic development organisations, charitable 
bodies, and regulators, because like its progenitor, micro-credit, it has been 
viewed not just as a tool for poverty alleviation but also as a viable business 
and economic development strategy for low income developing countries 
(Koven & Zimmerman, 2011). The market potential for micro-insurance is 
estimated to be up to 3 billion policies globally with annual growth rates at 
10% or higher (Lloyd's of London, 2009). In addition, the prospective in-
force business value of the micro-insurance market is estimated to be up to 
US$40 billion (Swiss Re, 2010). 
 Profitability has long been recognized to be a key operational and strategic 
objective for the contracting constituents of insurance firms and various 
external stakeholders (e.g., see Doherty & Garven, 1986; Grace & Hotchkiss, 
1995; Haley, 1995). Indeed, the achievement of sustained operational 
profitability is the main strategic objective of most local and international 
commercial insurance companies in the micro-insurance market who are 
seeking new growth opportunities away from saturated traditional insurance 
markets. Despite its huge market potential, the viability of many micro-
insurance schemes is still being questioned and not surprisingly so, given the 
low premiums, high administrative costs and poor levels of insurance 
infrastructure in developing countries (e.g., see Churchill, 2007; Cohen & 
Sebstad, 2005). In particular, because micro-insurance is by design a low-
premium product, the proportion of the premium that must go to pay for 
expenses (as opposed to payment for covered losses) is higher than in 
conventional insurance. This type of situation promotes adverse selection; 
therefore, any ability of the insurer to reduce per-policy costs is likely to 
yield great returns for ultimate operational sustainability and profitability.  
Prior reports and studies (e.g., Churchill, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; McCord 
, Steinman, & Ingram, 2012; Olaosebikan & Adams, 2013; Roth, McCord, & 
Liber, 2007) examine the key features of micro-insurance markets, and 
highlight the demand and supply-side factors affecting the business success 
and increased take-up of micro-insurance in developing countries. Some of 
the key issues include regulatory constraints, cost effective distribution 
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channels, risk assessment and pricing, market demand, consumer education, 
and role of reinsurers in capacity building. Churchill (2007) contends that 
regulation plays an important role in the effective supply of micro-insurance. 
However, imposing regulatory schemes of traditional markets or inadequate 
regulation could inhibit the growth of micro-insurance. Furthermore, Swiss 
Re (2010) reports that the identification and development of a cost-effective 
distribution model is crucial to the long–term success and sustainability of 
micro-insurance given the high administrative and operating costs involved 
in “reaching” the low income markets. Churchill (2006a) contends that 
profitability has been particularly difficult to achieve for voluntary micro-
insurance products, and highlights the importance of flexibility in product 
design to develop products which cater not only to the poor, but also to 
slightly higher income groups. Roth and Athreye (2005) argue that risk 
management issues such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and covariant 
risks are factors which have impeded the business success of micro-
insurance. These issues arise especially due to the lack of quality data which 
makes it challenging for micro-insurance providers to effectively assess and 
price risk. Thus, the bid to strike a balance between affordability and 
profitability results in the development of products that provide narrow 
coverage and limited benefits. 
Furthermore, McCord  et al. (2012) emphasise the importance of reinsurance 
in providing risk capacity and technical expertise in the low income market. 
They contend that most micro-insurers are operating at a small to medium 
scale especially in Sub-Saharan Africa due to lack of risk capital and limited 
access to cost-effective reinsurance and technical expertise. However, 
McCord, Bolero, and McCord (2005) argue that reinsurance is necessary for 
providing risk-spreading capacity. However, the regulatory and/or 
commercial requirement to hold ‘costly’ reinsurance could have a negative 
impact on profitability. Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig (2011) investigated the 
household demand for a micro-life insurance product (the so-called Anidaso 
(‘Hope’)) policy provided by the Gemini Life Insurance Company (GLICO) to 
350 households in Ghana. They found that consumer demand was directly 
motivated by the risk status of the insured (suggesting adverse selection 
issues), life-cycle (age) effects, educational levels, residence in the capital 
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city (where there may be better product information), and the existence of 
formal precautionary savings (which appear to reinforce rather than 
substitute for the demand for micro-insurance suggesting that issues such as 
financial literacy are likely to be important determinants of demand). Angove 
and Tande (2011) in a case-study of the profitability of commercial micro-
insurance providers, highlight the achievement of scale economies, reduction 
of acquisition and administrative costs, and claims costs as the main drivers 
of profitability. They demonstrate that the achievement of sustainable 
profitability is often an iterative process of continuously learning from the 
market, and making adjustments to the design and pricing of products. 
Despite the growing literature on micro-insurance, broader quantitative 
studies on the profitability of micro-insurance remain limited. The dearth of 
research on the financial performance of micro-insurance schemes has been 
largely attributed to lack of publicly available data as most micro-insurance 
providers do not distinguish micro-insurance data from that of conventional 
insurance business (Wipf & Garand, 2010). Biener and Eling (2011) were the 
first researchers to quantitatively examine the efficiency of micro-insurance 
programmes. Using data from 21 micro-insurance schemes provided by the 
Performance Indicators Working Group of the Micro-insurance Network, they 
considered financial performance from both the quantitative and social 
perspective, and suggest significant improvement potential in terms of the 
productivity and efficiency of the micro-insurance programs examined. The 
present study differs from that of Biener and Eling (2011) in that it focuses 
on commercial (formal) micro-life insurance providers, and also because a 
much larger proportion of micro-life insurers from two sub-Saharan African 
significant markets (i.e., Nigeria and South Africa) are analysed.   
Therefore, the present study seeks to address the gap in the literature by 
using panel data (2005-2010) drawn from the Nigerian and South African 
micro-life insurance industries to examine the quantitative factors that drive 
the business success and sustainable profitability of commercial micro-life 
insurance providers. Specifically, the two main research questions that will 
be investigated in this study are: 
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Research Question 1: Can micro-life insurance be profitable for commercial 
insurance providers? 
Research Question 2: What are the specific quantitative factors that drive the 
business success and sustained profitability of commercial micro-life 
insurance providers? 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
As noted above, the purpose of the present research project is to examine 
some of the quantitative factors that influence the profitability of micro-life 
insurers in Nigeria and South Africa. To achieve this aim, the study has four 
distinct objectives: 
1. To provide background information on the physical, economic, and 
regulatory environments within which micro-life insurers in Nigeria and 
South Africa operate, and also to compare the differences in the 
institutional environment between the two countries. 
 
2. To identify an appropriate theoretical framework by means of an 
extensive review of the micro-insurance, risk management, and 
financial economics literature so as to identify the possible factors that 
could influence financial profitability. 
 
3. To develop and empirically test hypotheses drawn from the selected 
theoretical framework by means of various statistical techniques such 
as univariate and multivariate analysis. 
 
4. To evaluate and discuss the empirical results, outline the key 
directions for future research, and elucidate the commercial and public 




1.3 Contributions of the Research 
The study should contribute to the existing body of literature in at least six 
principal regards as follows: 
1.  Compared to prior studies (e.g., Biener & Eling, 2011), the present 
study  uses a much larger dataset from Nigeria and South Africa, the 
two largest economies of sub-Saharan Africa, to examine the 
quantitative factors that drive the profitability/ business success of 
micro-life insurance firms (see chapter 5, section 5.2). The cross-
country analysis could further contribute new insights and highlight 
lessons that could be applied by micro-life insurance providers, 
particularly in Nigeria which has a much lower rate of insurance 
penetration than South Africa.  
 
2. The present study could help improve the understanding of the 
mechanics of successful mortality risk assessment and pricing in 
emerging markets. In particular, the study could provide insights on 
the key quantitative factors that drive the business success of micro-
insurance providers operating not only in sub-Saharan Africa but also 
in other parts of the developing world that have similar social and 
economic characteristics (e.g., Latin America and the Caribbean). 
This aspect of the research project could also enable multinational 
financial institutions and others (e.g., business consultants) to make 
more informed strategic decisions in emerging markets (e.g., with 
regard to prospective joint-ventures and acquisitions).  
 
3. Biener and Eling (2011) observe that large non-profit organizations 
which have been active in micro-insurance markets for longer 
periods are inefficient. Thus, empirical evidence linking period 
profitability to firm-specific factors, such as ownership structure, 
financial structure, amount of reinsurance, firm size, and so on, could 
better inform policyholders and shareholders as to whether a micro-
life insurance provider is likely to be able to meet its contractual 
obligations.  Such an insight could also enable prospective customers 
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and capital suppliers to make better insurance and investment 
decisions. 
 
4. The present study could provide new information about the 
persistency of business-in-force and so have potentially important 
commercial and public policy implications. For example, evidence 
indicating an inverse relation between the size of micro-life insurance 
firms and their profitability could suggest to industry regulators that 
the solvency position of smaller entities should be subject to closer 
scrutiny than that of larger operatives. Indeed, Kwon (2010) argues 
that governments need to more tightly regulate micro-insurance 
markets and invest in legal and financial infra-structure as a 
precursor to future growth and development. 
 
5. The focus of the present study is on the micro-life insurance market 
in Nigeria and South Africa. Lloyd's of London (2009) report that life 
insurance is the predominant line of micro-insurance business in 
developing countries. Biener (2013) contend that life insurance 
products are generally easy to provide relative to other business 
lines and more compliant with the fundamentals of insurability. For 
example, life insurance claims are easily verifiable using a death 
certificate (see section 1.5.2). Therefore, the analysis of the salient 
factors that influence the profitability of micro-life insurers could 
provide the opportunity to transfer successful approaches from 
micro-life insurance to other lines of micro-insurance business 
(e.g., agricultural insurance) which have low take-up rates. 
 
6. Prior studies (e.g., Cummins & Weiss, 2000) report that Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) are the two main approaches employed in frontier efficiency 
estimation (see Chapter 5, section 5.3). Furthermore, Eling and 
Luhnen (2010a) contend that inherent relative advantages and 
disadvantages with these two main approaches make it difficult to 
determine the most superior frontier estimation technique (again 
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see chapter 5, section 5.3). Unlike prior studies (e.g., Choi & 
Weiss, 2005; Greene & Segal, 2004) which employ only one 
estimation technique, the present study uses both the DEA and SFA 
frontier estimation techniques in the computation of the cost 
efficiency scores in the first stage of regression analysis. The use of 
the two frontier estimation approaches helps distinguish the effects 
of the chosen estimation method on the cost efficiency estimates 
derived, and also enable a more effective comparison of the main 
results than otherwise would be the case. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
To address the research questions, and achieve the stated aim and 
objectives of the research project, a combination of literature–based and 
empirical research methods are employed as follows: 
1. A search and analysis of the relevant literature leading to the selection 
of an appropriate theoretical framework to guide empirical analysis. 
 
2. A statistical analysis of panel data for the period 2005-2010, using 
data from published sources such as the annual reports and accounts 
provided by the insurance regulator in the two countries. For Nigeria, 
annual data are compiled by the Nigerian Insurance Association (NIA) 
and submitted to the insurance industry regulator – the National 
Insurance Commission (NIACOM). For South Africa, annual data are 
filed with the local insurance industry regulator – the Financial 
Services Board (FSB). In situations where data on micro-life insurance 
business are unavailable from published sources, the required data are 
obtained directly from internal company sources through authorized 
direct access and/or by interview with senior technical managers3. 
 
                                                          
3For Nigeria, data access was also provided by insurance board-level executives, who were   
members of the International Insurance Society (IIS), while the Reinsurance Group of 




3. The sample data is analysed using various statistical techniques, such 
as the frontier efficiency estimation techniques (i.e., DEA and SFA) in 
a first-stage analysis, and the feasible generalised least squares 
(FGLS) estimation technique in the second-stage4.  
1.5 Assumptions and Scope 
1.5.1 Assumptions 
The study is predicated on four main assumptions as follows: 
1. The managers of micro-life insurance companies in Nigeria and 
South Africa have the discretion to make decisions that maximize 
profits independently of industry regulators and other external 
constituents – for example, in terms of restrictions on premium 
rates that can be levied.  This assumption is deemed to be 
reasonable given the often cited limited regulatory structures on 
premium rates in emerging markets (e.g., Zou, Adams, & Buckle, 
2003). 
2. Profitability represents the main source of financial strength and 
condition of micro-life insurance companies given the limited 
scope of such companies (e.g., due to limited investment 
opportunities and asset management expertise) to diversify their 
investments and optimize risks and returns on retained assets 
(Swiss Re, 2012). 
3. In cases where it is difficult to assess the cost of micro-insurance 
business directly, assumptions are made around expense 
allocation. The expenses are allocated based on a ‘proportionate 
method’  in which management costs were allocated to the micro-
insurance business based on premium volumes (e.g.,see Angove 
& Tande, 2011) 
                                                          
4The frontier efficiency estimation techniques are described in section 5.3 and the rationale for 
employing FGLS estimation in the current study are described in chapter 5, section 5.7. 
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4. The data to be analysed are obtained from independently audited 
annual financial statement and reports submitted by the 
insurance companies to the insurance industry regulator –
NIACOM for Nigeria, and the FSB for South Africa. Additional data 
obtained from internal company sources are also subject to 
independent audit review. Therefore, the data to be used in this 
study are assumed to be reliable. 
1.5.2 Scope of the Project 
The scope of the project is defined in four key regards: 
1. The study focuses on commercial micro-life insurance companies in 
Nigeria and South Africa directly writing low premium, low coverage 
term life insurance 5  in three main business lines: savings–linked, 
credit-life, and funeral insurance.  
 
2.  The study focuses on micro-life insurance because in contrast to non-
life insurance policies (e.g., on crops, property, and health), life 
insurance is the predominant line of micro-insurance business in 
developing countries accounting for approximately 30% of policies sold 
as it is driven largely by the lending activities of micro-finance 
institutions (Lloyd's of London, 2009). Furthermore, Biener and Eling 
(2012) contend life insurance products are more compliant with the 
fundamentals of insurability and are thus generally easy to provide 
relative to other business lines. Life insurance policies have 
traditionally been more predictable because of the ease of the 
application of actuarial technology in determining premium levels and 
                                                          
5 Short-term life insurance is relatively easy to actuarially price and risk-manage compared 
with longer term life insurance products and pensions. For this reason, standard term life 
insurance products are more commonly offered by micro-life insurance companies in emerging 
markets, particularly to cover funeral expenses, and protect assets that provide lenders 
(micro-finance banks) with the collateral for granting personal and small business loans (i.e., 
so-called credit-life micro-insurance). Indeed, compared with other micro-insurance products, 
life insurance currently has the largest coverage and rate of take-up in developing countries 
(Roth et al., 2007). This is because the life of the main ‘bread-winner’ is often the main 




valuing liabilities. In addition, claims validation is relatively easy in life 
insurance, because the event that triggers coverage is death which is 
a fairly transparent and inevitable occurrence (Roth et al., 2007). In 
contrast, the underwriting performance of non-life micro-insurance 
companies is likely to be at greater risk of information asymmetry 
(i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard) problems and administrative 
difficulties (e.g., the difficulty of implementing effective fraud controls) 
thereby increasing business operating costs. This means that in 
theory, micro-insurance managers operating in the life insurance 
sector should be able to better manage their underwriting and 
administrative functions (e.g., minimize insurance fraud) and 
therefore maximize corporate profitability. These attributes of micro-
life insurance allows ‘potentially’ cleaner tests of the research 
hypotheses to be carried out. 
 
3.  The present study examines only commercial stock micro-life 
insurance providers in Nigeria and South Africa. This is due to the lack 
of publicly accessible data for other entities or ownership forms such 
as mutual companies, local co-operative groups, and burial/friendly 
societies. 
 
4. The proposed time span of the study covers 6 years; 2005-2010. The 
year 2005 is the earliest accounting period for which accurate data on 
micro-life insurance were available from public sources, while the 
latest year covered by the dataset that enables the analysis to be 
conducted in a timely manner is 2010. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
This chapter has introduced the background of the research project and 
specified the aims, objectives, motivation and scope of the study as well as 
the key assumptions underpinning the research. This section presents an 
outline of the remaining chapters of the thesis as follows: 
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Chapter 2: Institutional Background. This chapter provides information on 
the institutional environment in which Nigerian and South African micro-life 
insurance companies operate. Specifically, the chapter gives an overview of 
the economic and physical landscape of Nigeria and South Africa. The 
chapter also outlines the salient features of the local micro-life insurance 
markets as well as the proposed regulatory environment for micro-insurance. 
Furthermore, the advantages of conducting an empirical study on the 
determinants of the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South 
Africa are put forward in this chapter of the thesis. 
Chapter 3: Literature Review. This chapter introduces the theoretical and 
empirical literature relating to micro-insurance and the determinants of 
financial performance. In particular, the chapter describes the origin, 
definition and perspectives of micro-insurance, the micro-life insurance 
product-types, and the differences between micro-insurance and 
conventional insurance. Furthermore, the chapter examines prior research 
relating to financial performance of insurance firms, such as the literature on 
transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency problems. The 
insights drawn from the review of literature are then used to develop the 
research hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4: Hypotheses Development. This chapter summarises the key 
insights from the literature reviewed in chapter 3, and explains the rationale 
for the selection of the four main hypotheses that helps to address the 
research questions of the study, and direct the empirical testing conducted in 
chapter 6. 
Chapter 5: Research Design. This chapter discusses the rationale for the 
statistical analytical techniques employed in the study. Specifically, the 
sources of data, the definition of main variables, and the econometric model 
employed to test the research hypotheses are described in this chapter of 
the thesis. 
Chapter 6: Empirical Results. This chapter presents the results of the 
statistical analysis of the sample of Nigerian and South African micro-life 
insurers over the period 2005-2010. Specifically, the key aggregate features 
of the variables are described using the summary statistics (i.e., the mean, 
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median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum range, and number of 
observations). In addition, the Pearson/Spearman correlation analysis is also 
conducted to test the strength of the association between pairs of each 
variable. The FGLS estimation technique is further employed to determine 
the simultaneous effects of the explanatory variables on financial profitability 
while controlling for time-effects and firm-specific effects. Finally, robustness 
tests are conducted using several statistical techniques to ascertain the 
validity of the results obtained. 
Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions. This chapter summarises the research 
project and draws conclusions from the empirical analysis. The contributions 
of the study, and in particular, the potential commercial and public policy 
implications are assessed. Furthermore, the inherent limitations of the study 








This chapter provides information on the institutional environment within 
which commercial micro-life insurance providers in Nigeria and South Africa 
operate. Specifically, the chapter provides an overview of the institutional 
context in terms of the physical and economic landscape, nature of the 
micro-life insurance market, and the regulatory environment for each of the 
sample countries examined. In addition, the advantages of conducting an 
empirical study on the determinants of the profitability of micro-life 
insurance providers in Nigeria and South Africa are put forward in this 
chapter. 
2.2 Institutional Context 
Swiss Re (2010) reports that with approximately 600 million persons living 
on less than US$ 4 per day (about 20% of the world’s poor) sub-Saharan 
African countries would benefit significantly from micro-insurance initiatives. 
The report acknowledges that between 2006 and 2008 micro-life insurance in 
sub-Saharan Africa registered about 80% increase in covered lives with 
currently around 15 million policies in-force generating premium income of 
roughly US$257 million. Despite the increasing profile and economic 
importance of micro-insurance in sub-Saharan Africa,  McCord  et al. (2012) 
in a recent study show that micro-life insurance grew from about 15 million 
policies in 2008 to approximately 44 million policies in 2011. However, most 
of the growth came from South Africa, with just nine African countries 
accounting for over 90% of this take-up in micro-insurance coverage. On the 
positive side, there have been some important developments and 
innovations in the micro-insurance sector. For example, new micro-insurance 
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products tailored to the basic needs of low income people have successfully 
entered the market while educational initiatives by international financial 
institutions and other organizations have helped increase consumer 
awareness of micro-insurance in developing countries. Recent initiatives 
have also recognized the need to adapt regulation and infra-structure to 
facilitate the projected expansion of micro-insurance in the developing world 
(Churchill & Matul, 2012). The micro-insurance market still faces major 
institutional and economic challenges which have so far impeded the sector’s 
growth and raised questions as to its longer term sustainability. The general 
consensus from previous studies (e.g., Matul, McCord, Phily, & Harms, 2010) 
is that the long term success of micro-insurance is dependent on innovative 
supply chain strategies at the level of the insurance carrier (e.g., in terms of 
product development, distribution, coverage, policy administration and 
claims settlement) and infrastructural developments at the institutional 
environment level (e.g., supportive regulation and property rights 
legislation). The present study utilizes micro-life insurance data from two 
major sub-Saharan African countries - Nigeria and South Africa. The 
institutional contexts of each country are examined below. 
2.2.1 Nigeria 
Physical and Economic Landscape: 
Nigeria, an Anglophone country in West Africa with a geographical area of 
approximately 351,785 square miles, and current population of 
approximately 159 million people, is the most populous nation in Sub-Sahara 
Africa (accounting for approximately 81% of the region’s people) with around 
51 percent of the total population living in urban areas (World Bank, 2012a). 
The population comprises over 250 ethnic groups with Hausa, Igbo and 
Yoruba as the three main languages, and English as the official language. 
Nigeria is nearly equally divided between Muslims (50%) and Christians 
(48.2%), with the majority of Muslims mainly concentrated in the northern 
part of the country, while the Christians dominate the Middle-belt and 
Southern areas (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Nigeria’s main economic 
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activity is in agriculture and extractive industries such as mining, and oil and 
gas production (World Bank, 2012a). Nigeria, which is a member of the 
Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), is the world’s eighth 
largest oil producer, sixth largest oil exporter, and has the world’s sixth 
largest deposits of natural gas (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
According to the World Bank (2012a) figures, the gross domestic product 
(GDP) is US$ 228 billion with an annual GDP growth of about 8%, making it 
the second largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa after the South Africa. 
Despite recent economic growth, widespread poverty is still a major problem 
in Nigeria as approximately 85% of the population live on less than US$2 per 
day, with gini coefficient of 0.486. In addition, the World Bank (2012a) ranks 
Nigeria as a lower middle income country because the country is 
characterised by a thriving oil economy and high–income elite on the one 
hand, but with persistent poverty and rudimentary socio-economic 
development on the other hand.  
Micro-Life Insurance Market: 
Insurance in Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial era of the nineteenth 
century with the growth of commercial activities (e.g., shipping and banking) 
associated with the expansion of the British Empire (Osoka, 1992). By 1976, 
there were about 70 insurance providers in Nigeria consisting of 14 foreign-
owned and 56 indigenous companies. However, at this time most insurable 
risks were underwritten by foreign insurance companies, accounting for 
about 53% of total gross premiums while indigenous insurers accounted for 
only about 17% due to their limited underwriting capacity (Chibuike & 
Chikeleze, 2001). Since the late 1970s, new laws and regulations have been 
introduced by the Nigerian government over the last two decades or so to 
encourage local ownership of insurance companies (Osoka, 1992). As a 
result, today domestic investors hold approximately 60% of the 
shareholdings of insurers operating in Nigeria. Government intervention in 
the local insurance market also led to the growth of solely-owned indigenous 
                                                          
6 The gini coefficient is a measure of income disparity. The greater the coefficient is to 1, the 
greater the income variation between the rich and poor. 
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insurance firms. In 2005, following reforms of the Banking sector, Nigeria’s 
Federal Government along with insurance regulator, NAICOM began a 
process of overhauling the Nigerian insurance industry (Obaremi, 2007). The 
main objectives of the new reforms were: 
 To increase the low retention capacity of the industry that had stunted 
growth and expansion. 
 To conduct a consolidation exercise in order to produce companies 
capable of meeting claims obligations, and compete at the global level. 
 To attract foreign capital into the industry for enhanced premium 
growth and profitability. 
 To encourage the industry to realise synergies from mergers and 
acquisitions, in order to achieve superior product innovation, deeper 
market penetration and product distribution. 
Under the new reforms, new capital requirements were stipulated for 
insurance underwriters. The required minimum capital for life insurers was 
increased from N150 million (USD$0.96 million) to N2 billion (USD$12.76 
million), and composite insurers were required to operate life and non-life 
business segments as separate entities (Obaremi, 2007). The bid to meet 
the new guidelines resulted in a spate of mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry leading to a reduction in the number of firms from 104 to 71 post-
consolidation, consisting of 43 non-life insurance underwriters, and 26 life 
insurers. The consolidation exercise also boosted the industry’s capitalisation 
from N30 billion (USD$192 million) to N200 billion (USD$1.28 billion) 
(Obaremi, 2007). Despite the strengthening of the financial capacity of 
insurance firms due to the reforms in the industry, diminutive growth has 
been achieved post-consolidation. The insurance sector still only contributes 
approximately 0.72 percent to GDP, which is much lower than the African 
average of 3 percent and global average of 7 percent (Swiss Re, 2010). The 
poor performance of the insurance industry has been attributed to the flurry 
of mergers and acquisitions which were conducted with minimal due 
diligence, and the failure to address the core persistent (and historical) 
issues such as poorly developed distribution systems, poor public 
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perception/trust, lack of innovation in product development, and inability to 
attract and retain skill talent amongst others (Afrinvest West Africa, 2008). 
The Nigerian life insurance industry is currently made up of 26 firms, 
consisting of 8 specialised and 18 composite insurers. The penetration of life 
insurance is quite low and accounts for only 16 percent of total industry 
premiums. The low insurance penetration rates have been attributed to a 
lack of trust in the industry (Obaremi, 2007). Management and marketing 
expenses are disproportionately high and, well exceed the claims ratio which 
results in low value for consumers - see Figure 2.1. The share of life 
insurance premiums as a proportion of total new business is, however 
increasing. Indeed, premiums increased by about 70 percent between 2005 
and 2010 (see Figure 2.2), driven largely by the introduction of compulsory 
insurance such as company group life policies 7 , as well as increased 
competition from commercial banks (bancassurers).  On the other hand, the 
retail segment of the insurance industry has been relatively slow to innovate 
to meet the challenges of expanding into the low income segment. Despite 
the steady growth in incomes across the working population, only about 
1million out of the estimated 20million people in formal or informal 
employment hold personal insurance policies (Afrinvest West Africa, 2008).  
Nonetheless, despite the low level of insurance penetration in Nigeria, micro-
insurance is not a new concept. For example, in the 1980s, Nigerian insurers 
began to promote micro-insurance-type products known as ‘industrial 
insurance’ (or esusu) to low income groups. However, such products were 
often unsustainable due to difficulties associated with premium collection, 
lack of reliable systems of claims management, low rates of renewal, and a 
generally-held public mistrust of the value of insurance (Omar, 2007). The 
new wave of micro-insurance products is geared towards providing more 
value for customers through leveraging on technology to improve the 
payments system as well as the increasing use of the mobile phone network 
platform. 
  
                                                          
7 The Pension Reform Act (2004) stipulates compulsory group life polices for companies, in 
which in employers with five or more employees are required to take out a Life policy for each 
employee of up to about three times the total annual remuneration of the employee. 
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Figure 2.1: Nigeria: Claims and Expense Ratios for Life Insurers, 
2005-2010. 
 
Source: Nigerian Insurers Association (2011) 
Figure2.22: Nigeria: Life Insurance Premiums, 2005-2010. 
 
Source: Nigerian Insurers Association (2011) 
  





















The most popular micro-life insurance product is savings-linked policies, 
followed by compulsory credit life, and funeral insurance which is the least 
demanded (Churchill & Matul, 2012). Savings-linked (endowment) policies 
are the most common micro-life insurance product offered by formal insurers 
due to the strong savings culture, and a preference among the low income 
population for financial products that provide some payout regardless of 
whether a risk event occurs. Indeed, De Vos, Houggard, and Smith (2011) 
report that approximately 62% of Nigerian adults save in some way, with 
informal associations being the most effective and trusted entities accounting 
for about 25%, village associations account for about 12.6% while 
approximately 45% save in their homes. Furthermore, most micro-finance 
institutions (MFIs) provide compulsory credit life policies on the back of 
micro-loans to cover the risk of the death or default of the main borrower.  
There is a limited take up of funeral insurance especially among low income 
groups because compared to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., 
South Africa), the culture of a dignified (costly) funeral is not prevalent. 
Indeed, the social taboo of “planning for your own funeral” along with the 
relatively high Muslim population8 in Nigeria, means that individuals rely on 
family members to provide a decent (not necessarily costly) funeral. There is 
currently no regulation for micro-insurance in Nigeria, thus insurers are not 
required to separately report their micro-insurance business. However, 
micro-insurance business/products are included in the individual life business 
segment which accounts for about 20.5 percent of Life insurance business in 
Nigeria (see Figure 2.3). 
The distribution of commercial micro-life products in Nigeria is mainly 
through individual agents and/or brokers, and also through micro-finance 
institutions (MFIs). The distribution channels are dominated by insurance 
brokers who control a significant portion of both the life and non-life business 
segments. Currently, the Nigerian insurance industry consists of 577 
registered insurance brokers, 1,900 insurance agents and about 870 MFIs 
(Nigerian Insurers Association, 2011).   
                                                          
8 Life insurance is often deemed by many Muslims to be inconsistent with Islamic principles – 




Figure 2.33: Nigeria: Distribution of Life Insurance Business. 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013). 
Figure 2.44: Nigeria: Potential Distribution Channels for Micro-
Insurance. 
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However, given low premiums and high transaction costs, micro-insurance 
providers are increasingly establishing partnerships with alternative 
distribution channels in order to achieve the scale required for profitability9. 
De Vos et al. (2011) in a survey of Nigerian adults highlighted the potential 
channels for micro-insurance distribution. The use of mobile phone network 
either as a direct and/or alternative distribution channel is a potential 
powerful tool which could enable micro-insurance achieve the requires scale 
for profitability given that approximately 60 percent of adults own a mobile 
phone (see Figure 2.4). In addition, the mobile phone network could serve as 
a platform for the collection of premiums, especially in Nigeria which has 
inefficient and ineffective payment systems. Furthermore, existing platforms 
such as commercial banks and post offices could serve as potential 
distribution channels (De Vos et al., 2011). The World Bank (2012a) reports 
that there are about seven commercial bank branches and 11 automated 
teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adult. As shown in Figure 2.4, 30 
percent of the adult population has a bank account, while nearly 14 percent 
of people live near a post office. Figure 2.4 further reveals that 
approximately 12.4 percent of Nigerian adults receive electricity bills, thus 
the client-base of utility companies could also as potential targets for micro-
insurance providers. Finally, the aggregation of co-operative societies and 
village associations could also be explored by micro-insurance providers as 
potential channels for reaching low-income groups (De Vos et al., 2011). 
Regulatory Landscape 
Insurance in Nigeria is primarily regulated and supervised by the NAICOM 
under two Acts. The Insurance Act, No. 1 (2003) governs the licensing and 
operation of insurers, reinsurers and providers of related services while the 
National Insurance Commission Decree, No. 1 (1997) established the 
National Insurance Commission as the supervisory institution with the power 
of inspection, remedial and enforcement actions, and composition of fines 
                                                          
9  Alternative distribution channels are institutions which are traditionally not involved in 
insurance but have a large footprint and reputation in low income markets. Examples include: 
savings co-operatives, mobile network operators, utility companies and supermarket chains  
(Smith, Chamberlin, Houggard, Smit, & Carlman, 2010). 
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(International Monetary Fund, 2013). With the exception of the two 
government-owned entities, National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria 
(NICON) and the Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation (Nigeria Re), only firms 
incorporated as a limited liability company under the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (1990), are allowed to register as insurers. That is, there are no 
mutual or co-operative commercial insurance providers. Prudential regulation 
stipulates a minimum upfront capital of N2 billion (USD$12.76 million) for life 
insurance firms, and N5 billion (USD$31.9 million) for composite insurers. 
The minimum capital requirements for insurance firms in Nigeria are 
relatively high compared to other developing countries, and above the range 
(US$4-10 million) required for insurers operating in countries under the 
Solvency I regime. Furthermore, Nigerian insurance regulation stipulates that 
no more than 40 percent of the issued share capital of an insurer may be 
foreign owned (International Monetary Fund, 2013).  
 The regulation of reinsurance in Nigeria has been largely influenced by 
market development considerations. The history of reinsurance of risks in 
Nigeria is closely linked with the development of the insurance industry 
(Chibuike & Chikeleze, 2001). In 1976, following a recommendation of the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Reinsurance Corporation 
(African Re) was established in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The representatives of 
the 36 member states of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the 
AfDB signed an international agreement to cede a minimum of 5 percent of 
risks with African Re, with the aim of reducing the outflow of foreign 
exchange from the continent (Insurance Act No.1, 2003). This was followed 
by the Nigeria Reinsurance Decree of 1977, which saw the establishment of 
Nigeria Re by the government as part of efforts to retain reinsurance 
premiums locally and reduce the outflow of insurance funds. Under the 
decree, insurers were required to compulsorily cede 20 percent of their 
business to Nigeria Re. In addition, Nigeria Re had the right of first refusal on 
the remaining 80 percent before such businesses could be placed with other 
indigenous and/or foreign reinsurance companies. The decree has however 
since been repealed, following the industry reforms in 2005, which saw the 
privatisation of Nigeria Re, with government retaining a 49 percent stake 
(Chibuike & Chikeleze, 2001). Therefore, current insurance regulation 
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stipulates only the 5 percent mandatory legal cession to African Re. 
Furthermore, reinsurance with foreign firms is subject to the approval of 
NAICOM, in which insurance firms have to demonstrate that local 
reinsurance capacity has been exhausted. Foreign reinsurers are required to 
have a minimum financial strength rating of A- (Standard and Poor’s) or A 
(A.M. Best). Direct insurers are required to retain at least 5 percent of the 
risks to discourage ‘fronting of business’, while 100 percent of life insurance 
business risks are required to be retained in Nigeria (Insurance Act, 2003). 
The restriction on the placement of reinsurance with foreign reinsurers is a 
major factor in the slow development of the insurance industry (and in 
particular the life business segment) in Nigeria, as knowledge transfer 
opportunities provided by foreign reinsurers in terms of product 
development, and technical expertise cannot be overemphasised 
(International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
The Insurance Act 2003 permits composite insurance firms to operate in 
Nigeria. However, the life and non-life business segments must be operated 
as separate entities under different capital requirements. The Insurance Act 
2003 defines individual life, group life and pensions, and health insurance as 
the three categories of life insurance business. The introduction of new 
products into any class or category of insurance business is subject to a file-
and-use approach with approval from the NAICOM. Brokers, agents, and 
corporate agents are the main intermediaries recognised by the NAICOM. 
Insurance agents must possess a certificate of proficiency issued in the name 
of the individual applicant by the Chartered Insurance Institute of Nigeria 
(CIIN), be duly appointed by an insurer, and licensed by the NAICOM. 
Furthermore, only firms incorporated as a partnership or limited liability 
company under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990) are permitted 
to register as insurance brokers. Although, insurance broking firms have no 
minimum capital requirements, they are required to maintain a professional 
indemnity cover of whichever is greater of N10million (USD$0.06 million) or 
50 percent of its annual brokerage income for the preceding year. The 
Insurance Act 2003 does not specify any commission caps for the life 
insurance segment; however non-life businesses are subject to commission 
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caps of between 12.5-20 percent depending on the line of business sold 
(Insurance Act No.1, 2003). 
Other Regulation 
In 2009, the NAICOM introduced a three-year market development plan - 
the market development and restructuring initiative (MDRI) - in order to 
improve market efficiency and increase consumer protection (National 
Insurance Commssion, 2009). The MDRI was focused on four key issues: 
 Enforcement of the six insurance products made legally compulsory by 
the Insurance Act of 2003 and other ‘sister regulations’10. 
 Eradication of fake insurance institutions through the establishment of 
enforcement teams in all the 36-states of the federation monitor 
compliance with the compulsory insurance products etc. 
 Sanitisation and modernisation of the insurance agency system 
through the introduction of a network agency system, which would 
further help in the expanding insurance penetration as well as create 
employment opportunities. 
 Introduction of risk-based supervision to replace the compliance based 
methods of supervision in order to reduce stress and distress from the 
system.  
The objective of the initiative was to deepen and grow the insurance market 
in order to achieve an industry gross premium target of N1 trillion 
(USD$0.64 billion) in 2012 (National Insurance Commssion, 2009). In 
addition to the MDRI initiatives, the NAICOM in June, 2013, published draft 
operational guidelines for micro-insurance. The guidelines which are an 
addendum to the Insurance Act of 2003, aim to encourage commercial 
insurers to deepen their outreach to the low-income market through the 
reduction of regulatory costs/barriers and also to ensure consumer protection 
                                                          
10  The six compulsory insurance products covered under various legislations include: (a) 
Group life insurance- Pencom Act 2004; (b) Employers liability insurance –Workmen’s 
Compensation Act 1987; (c) Buildings under construction-section 64 of the insurance Act 
2003; (d) Occupiers liability insurance- section 65 of the Insurance Act 2003; (e) Motor third 
party insurance- section 68 of the Insurance Act 2003; and (f) Health care professional 
indemnity insurance- section 45 of the NHIS Act 1999 (National Insurance Commssion, 2009). 
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(National Insurance Commssion, 2013) - see Table 2.2 for details of the 
proposed operational guidelines. 
2.2.2 South Africa 
Physical and Economic Landscape 
The Republic of South Africa is located in the southern tip of Africa with a 
geographical area of approximately 468,556 square miles and a population 
of approximately 50 million people, of which 61 percent live in urban areas 
(World Bank, 2012a). The 2001 census reveals an ethnic population 
comprising of Black Africans (85%), Whites (9.6%), Coloureds/Mixed 
(8.9%), and Indians/Asians (2.5%). South Africa is a multilingual country 
with 3 main languages; English, Zulu and Afrikaans. The main religion is 
Christianity, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of the total 
population (Datamonitor, 2011). South Africa is the largest economy in 
Africa, with gross domestic product (GDP) at US$ 363 billion, and an annual 
GDP growth rate of about 3%. The main economic activity of South Africa is 
in agriculture, extractive industries such as mining, and financial services. 
The financial service sector which is well developed and sophisticated is the 
most lucrative of the sector of the South African economy accounting for 
about 66 percent of total GDP (World Bank, 2012a). Despite being the 
largest economy Africa, South Africa is characterised by a history of 
inequality and poverty. The gini coefficient at 0.63 is one of the highest in 
sub-Sahara Africa, and approximately 31 percent of the population live on 
less than US$2 per day (World Bank, 2012a). 
Micro-Life Insurance Market 
The complex and sophisticated state of the insurance market in South Africa 
can be traced back to its controversial history. The South African insurance 
market started in the early 1800s with foreign companies (mainly from the 
UK) operating through general agents, who usually accepted both long and 
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short-term policies. As the insurance market developed, foreign firms 
deployed full time representatives, and opened branch offices to oversee 
their South African operations (Robert, 2007). Foreign insurance firms 
maintained strong ties with their parent institutions, and operated in line 
with international best practices. In the 1970s, the Nationalist government in 
South Africa implemented a domestication policy in which foreign financial 
institutions were encouraged to partner with local companies rather than 
opening subsidiary branches. The policy also sought to allow local institutions 
and individuals the opportunity to acquire shares in wholly-owned foreign 
firms. Hence, towards the end of the apartheid era in 1994, foreign 
insurance subsidiaries were increasingly acquired by indigenous South 
African firms, as most foreign firms were forced to disinvest due to 
increasing pressure from parent firms (Robert, 2007). 
At 16 percent, South Africa has the highest penetration of insurance in the 
continent of Africa and in fact one of the highest in the world. Insurance 
penetration exceeds the emerging market average of 3.9 percent, and 
industrialised country average of about 9 percent (Swiss Re, 2010). The 
growth of the South African insurance industry can be attributed to the fiscal 
incentives that have supported the creation of funded company schemes and 
voluntary savings with insurance companies, as well as the achievement of 
high rates of return relative to those available on alternative fixed interest 
investments (Munro & Snyman, 1995). Although the financial services 
sector, and in particular the insurance industry, is well developed and 
sophisticated; in terms of products, services, and distribution infrastructure; 
there is a distinct divide between the intensively served high–income 
segment of the market and the low-income market (Robert, 2007). The 
traditional (formal) markets mainly serve the high-income segment while the 






The low-income segment rely on informal risk–pooling mechanisms such as 
mutual burial societies, funeral parlours and savings clubs commonly known 
as stokvels11. The informal market comprises of  about 80, 000 - 100,000 
societies serving  between 4 – 8 million individuals, and about 3,000- 5,000 
funeral parlours  providing funeral cover (Bester et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
government has consistently focused on policies which promote financial 
inclusion with agreed targets for insurance outreach by commercial insurance 
providers into the low-income segment of the market, and a drive towards 
the formalisation of informal risk-pooling mechanisms. 
The long-term (life) insurance market in South Africa consists of 75 insurers. 
The market is dominated by corporate insures with only one legally 
recognised mutual insurance provider - AVBOB. A number of burial societies 
(also known as friendly societies) are permitted to provide funeral insurance 
formally, within a limited space provided under the insurance legislation 
(Bester, Chamberlin, Houggard, Hobden, & Smith 2008). The penetration of 
long-term (life) insurance is higher than short term (non-life) insurance, and 
accounts for about 78 percent of total industry premiums (Datamonitor, 
2011). The life insurance market segment in South Africa is well known for 
its innovation in terms of product development. Indeed, life products such as 
universal life and annuity policies have their origins from South Africa (Munro 
& Snyman, 1995). The South African micro-insurance market is competitive 
with regard to pricing, and because entry barriers are relatively lower than 
exit barriers, the entrance of new players into the market in recent years has 
resulted in further pressure on premium rates. The premium income for life 
insurance grew by approximately 38 percent between 2005 and 2010 
(Financial Services Board, 2010) – see Figure 2.5. 
 
                                                          
11 Stokvels can be described as a type of credit union, or communal buying group, in which a 
group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common 
pool weekly, fortnightly or monthly to be drawn in rotation according to the rules of the 
particular stokvel (Lukhele, 1990). The origin of stokvels formerly known as ‘stock fairs’ in 
South Africa date back to the early nineteenth century from the rotating cattle auctions of 
English settlers in the Eastern Cape and existed as a gathering to promote  interaction, 
socialising and gambling among black farmers and labourers. These gatherings/fairs later 
evolved into meetings of a similar nature in black communities and now serve as the 
backbone for the provision of informal financial services to people in the poor black 
communities (Lukhele, 1990). 
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Figure 2.55: South Africa: Life Insurance Premiums, 2005-2010. 
Source: Financial Services Board (2010)    
The history of micro-insurance is traceable to burial societies (informal local 
community-based risk pooling mechanisms) and funeral parlours which 
provide unguaranteed cover and benefits in the form of a funeral service in 
the event of death. The informal market has vigorously developed to fill the 
traditional (formal) vacuum, and currently accounts for almost half of the 
total micro-insurance market usage by adults (Bester et al., 2008). In a 
similar vein, formal (commercial) insurers have also increasingly targeted 
low income groups, focusing mainly on product development and innovations 
which comply with the Financial Sector Charter (FSC).The FSC, which came 
into effect in 2004, is a voluntary commitment negotiated between the 
insurance industry and various stakeholders to achieve certain access 
targets 12  which ensure that insurance products and services (based on 
certain agreed standards) are more readily available to low-income earners. 
Hence, the so-called CAT (fair Charges, easy Access, and decent Terms) 
standards were developed based on the UK precedent of product standard to 
ensure fair charges, easy access, and decent terms (Bester et al., 2009).  
                                                          
12
The access targets for insurance under the FSC require that 6% of the low-income 
population have effective access to short-term (non-life) insurance, and 23% to long-term 
(life) insurance by 2014, which equates to 1.2 million short-term and 4.5 million policyholders 















The CAT standards were further incorporated into the Zimele principles13 by 
the Life Offices Association (LOA) for the accreditation of micro-life insurance 
products (Bester et al., 2008). The three main micro-life products offered by 
commercial insurance providers include funeral (assistance), credit life and 
savings-linked (endowment policies).  
The micro-insurance market in South Africa is different from the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa mainly because there is voluntary widespread demand for 
funeral cover attributed to the social and cultural necessity of a dignified 
(mostly costly) funeral even amongst low income individuals (Churchill & 
Matul, 2012).  Bester et al. (2009) report that funeral insurance dominates 
the market accounting for about 72 percent of the total micro-insurance 
market, and 93 percent of the voluntary market. Compulsory credit life 
policies are usually sold on the back of instalment or credit sales agreements 
on durable consumer goods, to cover the risk of default following the death 
of the main purchaser. Credit life policies are the second most common 
micro-life insurance products accounting for about 41 percent of the total 
micro-insurance market. The growth of the micro-credit market in South 
Africa is largely attributed to the increasing awareness and demand for 
credit-life policies. Savings-linked (endowment) insurance is the least 
common micro-life insurance product in South Africa. The limited supply and 
low demand of savings-linked products is attributed to the disproportionate 
tax burden for low income individuals, as well as the complexities 
surrounding the legal minimum surrender values that have to be provided in 
the case of early withdrawal (Robert, 2007). Although, there is currently no 
specific regulation for micro-insurance in South Africa, the FSC defines 
micro-insurance as insurance products targeted at low income households in 
                                                          
13
The Zimele principles (which literally means ‘to stand on one’s own two feet’ in the Zulu 
language), which was launched by the LOA in 2007, is the life insurance industry response to 
the FSC targets for the low income market.  Adherence to the Zimele principles enabled 
micro-insurance providers to meet their FSC targets. For a product to gain Zimele 
accreditation, customers have to be able to buy a policy, pay a premium, and/or amend a 
policy at least once a month within 40km of their residence. The Zimele accreditation also 
serves as a signal to customers in identifying products that are reasonable and trustworthy 
(Bester et al., 2008). 
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 ‘living standards measure’ (LSM) groups 1-514 (Bester et al., 2008). Funeral 
policies are provided under the assistance business category, while credit-life 
and savings-linked polices are provided under the life business category – 
see Figure 2.6. Under the FSC, formal (commercial) micro-life insurers are 
required to report the contribution of each class of business sold to the  low 
income market (i.e., LSM 1-5) as a percentage of total gross premium 
income in their annual reports (Financial Services Board, 2010). 
Figure 2.66: South Africa: Distribution of Life Insurance Business. 
 
Source: Financial Services Board (2010) 
The distribution of micro-life insurance products in South Africa is 
traditionally done through third-party intermediaries such as insurance 
brokers and agents. The sophisticated nature of the intermediary market can 
be attributed to the historical agency network operations of foreign insurance 
firms (Robert, 2007). The distribution/intermediary market is dominated by 
insurance brokers who control a significant portion of life business mainly 
serve the middle-high income individual segments of the market. The 
broker/agent channels have not been effective in targeting the low income 
market due to the high transaction costs involved in the distribution of 
micro-insurance. Thus, innovation in the distribution channel is crucial for the 
                                                          
14
The LSM is a tool developed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), 
which is used to segment the wider South African market according to individuals’ living 
standards. The tool uses location (i.e. rural vs. urban), ownership of household assets, and 
access to services to group individuals into one of ten LSMs through calculation of a composite 
indicator. LSM 1 is the lowest category containing the poorest individuals, while LSM 10 is the 
highest category containing the wealthiest individuals when ranked according to the composite 









successful supply and demand of micro-insurance products (Bester et al., 
2008). In South Africa, innovation in micro-insurance distribution has been 
facilitated by the generally strong payment systems, and the availability of a 
large and well-developed retail network. Some examples of innovative 
intermediary channels include independent and/or captive multifunction 
intermediaries (e.g., retailers, banks, funeral parlours/associations) and 
organised low-income groups (e.g., burial societies and stokvels). Innovative 
intermediary channels are able to target large client concentrations, reduce 
transaction costs, and enable the micro-insurance provider achieve the 
economies of scale which is vital for profitability (Bester, Chamberlin, Short, 
Smith , & Walker, 2006). 
Regulatory Landscape 
Insurance law in South Africa has its roots in the both the Roman-Dutch and 
English law due to the history and development of the insurance market 
(Robert, 2007). The life insurance industry in South Africa is primarily 
regulated by the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 (1998). The Financial Services 
Board (FSB) is the statutory body in charge of regulation and supervision of 
life insurers in South Africa. Under the Long Term Act, only public companies 
are allowed to register as insurers with the exception of AVBOB, a 
traditionally important player in the assistance business segment. AVBOB is 
the only mutual insurer permitted due to a special Act of parliament 
facilitated by significant political and operational support (Bester et al., 
2008). Furthermore, no insurer is allowed to have more than one license, 
and composite firms are not permitted. Prudential regulation stipulates a 
minimum up-front capital requirement of ZAR10 million (USD$1.3 million) for 
life insurance firms. There is no restriction on foreign ownership of insurance 
firms, and an insurer may be a wholly-owned subsidiary of a foreign 
company; however branches of foreign insurers are not permitted. The Long-
Term Act (1998) permits reinsurers to operate as composites requiring only 
one license for both long-term (life) and short-term (non-life) policies. Unlike 
Nigerian insurance firms which are legally required to cede 5 percent of their 
reinsurance premiums with African Re, insurance regulation in South Africa 
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stipulates no compulsory legal cession of reinsurance premiums. Insurance 
firms are permitted to cede reinsurance premiums to foreign reinsurers to 
the extent that the industry regulator, the FSB, agrees that the local market 
has insufficient capacity (Long Term Insurance Act No. 52, 1998). 
The business categories defined under the Long-Term Act (1998) include; 
assistance, disability, fund, health, life and sinking fund insurance. Although, 
product pre-approval is not required, insurers are mandated to register and 
report separately on each category of insurance policies. Health policies 
under the Long-Term Act (1998) are restricted to policies providing a fixed 
amount (non-indemnity) of cover on a defined health event usually in the 
form of personal and critical illness policies. However, any other policies in 
the form of indemnity benefits covering medical expenses are excluded and 
regulated separately under the Medical Schemes Act 131 (1998) (Bester et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, assistance policies (also known as funeral policies) 
are defined as a separate product category under the Long-Term Act (1998), 
and thus subject to different regulatory requirements. The regulatory 
requirements for assistance policies differ from other long-term product 
categories in the following aspects; 
 Assistance policies are subject to a maximum pay-out benefit of 
ZAR10, 000 (USD$1,300) on any one life. 
 There is no limitation on the commissions payable to an insurance 
intermediary in respect of assistance policies. 
 The Long-Term Act (1998) requires that policyholders should be given 
the option of a monetary benefit, even in situations where the terms 
of the policy contract specifies that payment would be in kind (i.e., 
provision of funeral). 
In addition, friendly societies and co-operatives, which are governed by the 
Friendly Societies Act 25 (1956) and Co-operatives Act 14 (2005) 
respectively, are permitted to offer the long-term (life) products, and are 
also exempted from compliance with the requirements of the Long Term Act 
as long as the benefits/payout do not exceed ZAR5,000 (USD$699) per 
member. Financial intermediaries such as insurance brokers and agents are 
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regulated primarily through the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
(FAIS) Act 37 (2002). Insurance intermediaries providing advice and 
intermediary services to clients are subject to authorisation/registration 
which requires the fulfilment of certain conditions with regards to education, 
experience, fit and proper, and reporting. Under the Long-Term Act (1998), 
the commission levels payable to intermediaries is capped at 3.25 percent 
for individual life, health and disability products (Bester et al., 2009). 
Other Regulation 
Following the end of apartheid in 1994, the financial services sector faced 
pressure from the government to extend the provision of financial services to 
the low-income sector. Hence, the introduction of the FSC in 2004 which 
specified access targets for the commercial (formal) insurance industry- see 
footnote 12. The growth and expansion of micro-insurance in recent years 
has been largely attributed to the increased drive by commercial (formal) 
insurers in achieving the access targets as described in the FSC (Chamberlin, 
Ncube, Chelwa, & Smit, 2011). Furthermore, the need for consumer 
protection in the emergent credit life insurance market resulted in the 
implementation of the National Credit Act (2005) which stipulates the need 
for  transparent products and pricing, as well as the giving clients the option 
to select a preferred insurance provider when taking out credit agreements 
(Bester et al., 2009). In 2011, the National Treasury (the policy-making 
body for the financial sector) in conjunction with stakeholders, such as the 
FSB and insurance companies, set out a framework for the regulation of 
micro-insurance in South Africa. The proposed regulation which is set to be 
implemented in 2014, aims to reduce the regulatory costs to facilitate 
outreach into the low income market by formal insurers, and provide 
formalisation and graduation options for the informal market (South African 
National Treasury, 2011) (see Table 2.2 for details of the proposed 
regulation). 
  







Population (millions) 160 50 
 
Urbanisation (%) 49 61 
 
Percent of population on < US$ 2 per day (%) 
 
84.49 31.33 
Percent of population on < US$ 1.25 per day (%) 67.98 13.77 
 
Gini  coefficient  
 
0.48 0.63 
   
Literacy (% of Adults) 82 61 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)- (US$ billions)  228 363 
 
GDP/Capita(US$) 1,121 5,695 
 
GDP growth rate (%) 3 8 
 
Average Annual Inflation rate (%)  11 4 
 
Average Annual Interest rate (%) 
 
7.5 5.5 
Insurance penetration (insurance premiums/GDP) (%) <1 16 
 
Sources: World Bank (2012a); International Monetary Fund (2012) .This table presents some key economic indicators for Nigeria and South Africa for 2011/2012. The 
Gini coefficient (index) is a measure of income disparity. The closer the gini coefficient is to 1, the greater the variation between the rich and poor. On average female 
life expectancy in the two sub-Sahara African countries listed in this table is about 4 years more than for their male counterparts. Inflation is measured as the average 





Table 2.2B: Characteristics and Definition of Micro-insurance: Proposed Regulation. 
 Nigeria South Africa 
Definition “…insurance that is accessed by the low income 
population; provided by licensed institutions, and 
run in accordance with general principles.” 
“…insurance products which are accessible and/or 
used by low-income households”. 
Benefit Limits Life and Non-life = N1 million (USD$ 6,380) Life= ZAR50,000 (USD$ 6,380), Asset 
=ZAR100,000(USD$ 13,000) 
Capital requirements Life=N150 million (USD$0.96 million) 
Non-Life=N200 million (USD$1.28 million). 
Life and Non-life = ZAR3 million (USD$0.39 
million). 
Term Limits n/a Maximum = 1 year 
Product Features Simplicity in product design. Terms must be simple 
and easily understood. 
Simplicity in product design and disclosure 
requirements. 
Reinsurance Adequate reinsurance arrangements required. Reinsurance not compulsory. 
Demarcation Composite life and non-life micro-insurance 
products are allowed, but separate insurers must 
underwrite the risk. 
Composite products underwritten by the same 
provider permitted. 
Intermediary/ Distribution Channels Alternative distribution channels permitted in 
addition to the traditional broker/agent; however 
commission is capped ≤20% for life insurance, and 
≤ 15% for non-life. 
Alternative distribution channels allowed; however 
commission paid to intermediaries is uncapped. 
 
Institutional Aspects Only firms incorporated as a limited liability 
company are permitted to register as a micro-
insurer. 
Public companies, co-operatives, and friendly 
societies may become micro-insurers. 
Existing formal insurers May underwrite micro-insurance as a separate 
business/ department under existing licence. 
Must obtain a separate license in order to be able 
to underwrite micro-insurance business. 
Source: National Insurance Commssion (2013), South African National Treasury (2011). This table presents the main characteristics of the proposed regulation for 







2.3 Justification of Institutional Context 
Nigeria and South Africa are considered to be good environments within 
which to focus the present study for the following reasons: 
 Low-income population:  Although Nigeria, and South Africa are the 
two largest economies of sub-Saharan Africa, a large proportion of the 
population live on less than USD$2 per day, and the proportion of the 
population which is extremely poor (i.e., individuals who live on less 
than USD$1.25 per day) is significant especially for Nigeria – see Table 
2.1. The large proportion of low income households in both countries 
suggest that micro-insurance is the most appropriate insurance 
category for a considerable proportion of the population and its 
effective supply should be a priority for the insurance sector. Indeed, 
the increasing incidence, extent and complexity of poverty in Sub-
Saharan Africa represents major economic, social, and political 
challenges for domestic governments and the international 
community. The effective supply of micro-insurance could help 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere to alleviate socio-
economic poverty, promote financial stability and foster economic 
development and sustainability (e.g., see Hamid, Roberts, & Mosley, 
2011). Therefore, Nigeria and South Africa provide potentially 
interesting institutional environments within which to examine and 
compare the profitability of primary micro-life insurance suppliers.  
 
 Low insurance and micro-insurance take-up: The level of insurance 
take up and penetration in Nigeria is consistently below 1 percent of 
GDP. De Vos et al. (2011) report that the insurance sector in Nigeria 
serves less than 1 percent of the adult population. In addition, the 
report highlights poor product offerings and lack of trust in the 
insurance sector as the main factors limiting the take-up of insurance 
in Nigeria. On the other hand, insurance penetration in South Africa, 
at 16 percent is one of the highest in the world. The high take-up and 
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penetration of micro-insurance in South Africa is largely driven by the 
voluntary demand for funeral insurance which accounts for about 72 
percent of the total micro-insurance market. However, there is limited 
take-up of other non-funeral life insurance products (e.g., weather-
index insurance) in spite of the recent innovations and introduction of 
products tailored to the needs of the low-income market (Bester et al., 
2009). Thus, the limited domestic insurance markets suggest that 
there is considerable scope for the future growth in demand and 
expansion for micro-insurance products in both Nigeria and South 
Africa. 
 
 Nigeria and South Africa represent areas of the world where the 
demand and supply of micro-insurance is growing in line with broader 
micro-finance development initiatives and domestic economic growth 
and development (e.g., see Cohen, McCord, & Sebstad, 2005; Cohen 
& Sebstad, 2005). Indeed, Cohen and Sebstad (2005) report that in 
Sub-Saharan Africa consumer demand for key asset (prime-earner) 
protection (life and health) insurance is moving away from self-
insurance (risk retention) to external risk pooling (risk transfer). This 
arises as individuals seek to move out of poverty and small (e.g., 
family-owned) businesses focus on diverting resources from 
unproductive self-insurance arrangements to more productive income-
generating activities. 
 
 A cross-country comparative study such as the current research 
project can reveal how differences in insurance regulation between 
jurisdictions might influence the financial performance of micro-
insurance providers. For example, the profitability of micro-insurers 
could be affected by external rules governing premium tariffs, public 
subsidies, actuarial standards, coverage limits, and so on. These 
considerations should help highlight the impact of different regulatory 
structures on underwriting results (Crawford-Ash & Purcal, 2010a). 
This infrastructural aspect could be of direct interest not only to micro-
life insurers, and their international insurance and reinsurance 
partners but also to international aid agencies such as the African 
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Development Bank, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Indeed, Mosley (2003, pp. 151) adds that “. . . because the 
protective motive of insurance appeals particularly strongly to the 
poorest people, the customers of micro-insurance schemes are at risk 
of exploitation within an unregulated market.” 
2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the institutional background for the two countries 
- Nigeria and South Africa - that are the focus of the present study.  In 
particular, the chapter has examined the institutional context for both Nigeria 
and South Africa in terms of the economic and physical landscape, the 
nature of the micro-life insurance market, and the regulatory landscape 
within which micro-insurance providers currently operate. The characteristics 
of the proposed regulation and/or guidelines for micro-insurance in both 
countries are also briefly depicted. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the 
salient features of the micro-life insurance markets in both countries which 
qualify them as suitable environments for the conduct of the present study. 
Therefore, based on the institutional context, Nigeria and South Africa 
represent potentially interesting domains in which to examine the 
determinants of the profitability of micro-life insurance firms. The theoretical 
and empirical literature relating to micro-insurance and financial performance 







This chapter examines the theoretical and empirical literature relating to 
micro-insurance. In particular, the chapter describes the origin, definition 
and perspectives of micro-insurance; the differences between micro-
insurance and conventional insurance; and micro-life insurance product-
types. Furthermore, the chapter reviews the literature on determinants of 
the financial profitability of micro-insurance firms. Specifically, the literature 
on transaction costs, information asymmetry, reinsurance and leverage are 
examined. Intuitions drawn from the review of literature are employed in the 
development of the research hypotheses outlined in chapter 4 of the thesis. 
3.2 The Origin of Micro-Insurance 
Despite the growing recognition that micro-insurance can play a significant 
role in the future development of emerging economies such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa, the concept of micro-insurance is not a new phenomenon. In 
fact, the principle of risk protection through risk pooling underpinned the 
early mutual pools, friendly (including affiliated) societies, and co-operative 
insurance schemes for low-income groups in industrialized countries such as 
the UK and US during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (e.g., see 
Crawford-Ash & Purcal, 2010b; Plater, 1997). The friendly society movement 
that emerged in the UK in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries embraced 
a variety of organizational forms some of which provided risk (e.g., life 
insurance) protection for the industrial working class as well as middle class 
interest groups such as the medical profession and clergy. ‘Affiliated order 
societies’ (e.g. trade unions) tended to have exclusive working class 
members who made regular contributions to a risk pool that provided 
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financial relief in the event of some future hardship (e.g., an industrial 
accident). The governance of affiliated orders were often local but under the 
control and supervision of a central office. Moreover, mutuality was 
promoted by regular social events and local community involvement in the 
society and its management of the risk pool. Local knowledge and scale 
economies in the processing of risk information further helped friendly 
societies control information problems such as adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Plater, 1997). In the twentieth century, many friendly societies 
became amalgamated with larger insurers – a process of consolidation which 
is currently occurring in emerging economies such as South Africa (South 
African National Treasury, 2008). Micro-insurance-type arrangements are not 
necessarily confined to contemporary developing economies, but they can 
also have a place among socially excluded groups in cities and rural areas in 
more developed parts of the world such as the UK and Ireland (Dror & 
Armstrong, 2006). Indeed, the origin of micro-insurance in Africa is also 
linked to informal risk poling groups such as friendly societies and funeral 
associations (Berg, 2011). Therefore, micro-insurance could serve as a 
potentially efficient and effective market solution to risk management issues 
in emerging economies. As such, it can be an important mechanism for 
reducing poverty and underdevelopment in less developed parts of the world 
like Africa. 
3.3 Definition of Micro-Insurance 
Churchill (2007) defines micro-insurance as the protection of low-income 
groups against specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments 
proportionate to the likelihood and cost of risk involved. The International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors, IAIS (2007) also define micro-
insurance as a type of insurance which is accessed by the low-income 
population, provided by a variety of different entities, but run in accordance 
with general insurance practices. Regardless of the varying definitions of 
micro-insurance, there is a common element of insurance protection for low 
income people. On the other hand, the identification of what qualifies as ‘low 
income’ is debatable. Consequently, what constitutes micro-insurance varies 
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between different jurisdictions, and is dependent on the national or corporate 
objectives of industry regulators and/or insurers. Although there is no clear 
encompassing definition for micro-insurance, Churchill and Matul (2012) 
identified four main ways to make the definition of micro-insurance 
operational. These are: 
 Target group: This definition describes micro-insurance as insurance 
products targeted at low-income people. However, for insurers and/or 
industry regulators, the classification of what qualifies as ‘low income’ 
varies by individual and by country. Therefore, using this definition, 
insurers face a difficulty in ascertaining whether a prospective 
policyholder is sufficiently poor to qualify for micro-insurance. 
  
 Product Definition: The definition of micro-insurance could be based on 
product features which ensure that the product is relevant for the 
target (low-income) households. In this approach, micro-insurance 
products are characterised by low premiums and/or low sums assured. 
This definition is particularly used by micro-insurance regulators 
whose aim is to entice existing insurers to provide risk protection for 
the poor. However, the restriction in product features could impede 
the innovative capacity of the insurer. 
 
 Provider Definition: Micro-insurance can be defined in terms of the 
nature of the organisation that can provide it. For example, local 
insurers such as small mutual, co-operatives, friendly-societies and 
community-based organisations could provide micro-insurance 
alongside formal insurers. Smith et al. (2010) report that the use of a 
vast number of unconventional institutional arrangements (e.g., co-
operatives and friendly-societies) is required to reach the underserved 
market. Thus, a definition that places emphasis on specific provider-
types could hinder penetration and expansion. 
 
 Distribution Channel: The definition of micro-insurance could be 
further described in terms of the intermediary involved in the 
distribution process. Micro-insurance products could be distributed 
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using conventional channels (e.g., micro-finance institutions (MFIs)) 
as well as unconventional channels such as low cost retailers, utility 
and telecommunication firms, or any organisation that has a footprint 
in the low-income market (Bester et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, Churchill (2006a) proposes the two main perspectives of 
micro-insurance. The first perspective describes micro-insurance as a means 
of extending social protection facility for the poor in the absence of 
alternative government welfare schemes. The second view is that, micro-
insurance could offer a vital financial service to low income households by 
developing an appropriate business model that enables the poor to be a 
viable market segment for commercial insurers. 
3.3.1 Micro-insurance - Social Protection Perspective 
Risk is a common phenomenon which affects the lives of individuals and 
households15. In the presence of risks and shocks, individuals (especially the 
wealthy and non-poor) draw on their ex-ante risk management instruments 
to manage the resultant expenses. However, for low-income individuals 
especially in developing countries who have no access to precautionary risk 
management tools or social protection systems, the presence of risks and 
shocks severely impacts their welfare as they have to rely on their financial, 
physical and human assets (Churchill & Matul, 2012). Some of the strategies 
employed by the poor to cope with loss events include selling productive 
assets, informal credit arrangements, and family and mutual support 
networks. Churchill (2006b) contends that informal risk coping strategies are 
inefficient, insufficient and unreliable especially in the face of covariant 
shocks which systematically affect members of the same community. In 
addition to the loss of welfare due to unforeseen risks, low income 
individuals and households suffer from the on-going uncertainty about the 
occurrence and timing of loss events. As a result they are unable to take 
                                                          
15 Risk can be defined as the chance of loss or loss itself. It arises when the possibility of an 
event with negative effects leads to a decline in income for a person or household (as in the 
case of unemployment) or a rise in expenditure (as in the case of a price shock), or both (as 
would be the case when an illness leads to disability that prevents employment and results in 
health care costs) (e.g., see Churchill & Matul, 2012; Cohen & Sebstad, 2005). 
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advantage of income generating opportunities that could reduce poverty. 
Several studies (e.g., see Dercon, Kirchberger, Gunning, & Platteau, 2008; 
Murdoch, 1999) have shown that the ability of low-income groups to rise out 
of poverty in the long–term is impeded by the substantial welfare costs 
incurred in dealing with unexpected losses due to death or disability. 
Murdoch (1999) in his study of the risk strategies used by the poor in 
developing countries also noted that informal risk-coping mechanisms only 
serve as a partial protection for low income groups. Furthermore, Dercon et 
al. (2008) highlight the use of financial instruments such as flexible savings 
and credit products, and social protection systems as risk-coping strategies 
which could help low income households to manage risks. 
 Social Protection systems generally involve a variety of government policies 
and programs (e.g., universal healthcare, unemployment and disability 
benefits, maternity old age pensions etc.) which help to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability by diminishing people’s exposure to risks and enhancing their 
capacity to protect themselves (Churchill & Matul, 2012).  Since the 1970s, 
the social protection policies of several countries in sub-Saharan Africa (with 
the exception of some countries like South Africa) have focused on 
emergency food aid, famine relief and humanitarian assistance. For example, 
in countries such as Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Malawi 
there has been a continuous shift from emergency aid focus into more 
permanent social protection programs such as the spread of aid-financed 
pilot cash transfer schemes targeted at the poor and most vulnerable. On the 
other hand, Southern African countries such as South Africa, Namibia, and 
Botswana have a relatively more robust social assistance system which 
provides grants for vulnerable groups especially women and children 
(Barrientos & Hulme, 2008).  Despite the efforts of various governments, 
there is still a global shortfall in social protection as more than half of the 
world’s population have no access to social security systems. Indeed, the 
situation is reported to be more severe in developing countries particularly 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia where the coverage of statutory social 
protection is estimated at 5-10 percent of the working population (Garcia & 
Gruat, 2003). Micro-insurance schemes could therefore serve as crucial 
components in the development of comprehensive social protection schemes 
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and assist in filling the gaps created by inadequate social protection systems. 
Furthermore, compared to informal savings and credit products, micro-
insurance could provide an efficient means by which low-income households 
could access protection, and enable a more complete coverage for large 
losses. In particular, micro-insurance could give the poor access to formal 
insurance services (e.g., risk protection advice), and provide a means of 
coping with the consequences of severe economic shocks (Dercon et al., 
2008). In a similar vein, Leftley and Mapfumo (2006) also acknowledge that 
when used with other financial instruments such as credit and savings, 
micro-insurance could provide an invaluable safety net for low income 
groups.  
3.3.2 Micro-insurance - New market Perspective 
 Micro-insurance could serve as an opportunity to expand into new markets 
for participants such as multinational insurers and reinsurers (e.g., through 
joint-ventures) and can be a potential source of profitable new business for 
insurance providers (Churchill, 2007). The new market perspective of micro-
insurance derives from the ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ (BoP) strategy 
established by Prahalad (2006) who proposed that the low income market 
represents a significant untapped opportunity for value-creation. Prahalad’s 
(2006) BoP concept which identifies the common principles for operating in 
the BoP market draws on case studies from micro-finance and other 
industries such as construction, consumer goods and healthcare. Prahalad 
(2006) emphasises that the viability of firms in the BoP market segment is 
dependent on innovation in systems and processes that would facilitate the 
production of goods and services tailored to the needs of the low income 
people. The provision of insurance for the low income market has received 
widespread attention and growing interest from a variety of stakeholders and 
regulators in recent years mainly due its estimated market potential. For 
example, Lloyd's of London (2009) estimates the market potential for micro-
insurance to be between 1.5 and 3 billion policies with annual growth rates of 
approximately 10 percent or higher. Furthermore, Swiss Re (2010) using the 
Prahalad (2006) BoP concept categorised the low-income market into two 
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broad segments based on consumption level and ability to afford premiums 
(see Figure 3.1). Swiss Re (2010) classified the segment at the bottom of 
the pyramid as the extremely poor people who live on less than US$1.25 per 
day and account for 1.4 billion people globally. The second segment which 
consists of people who survive on between US$1.25 and US$4 per day 
accounts for about 2.6 billion of the global population. The second segment 
is classified as the ‘target market’ for commercially viable micro insurance as 
the population in this segment is able to afford premiums. Swiss Re (2010) 
further reports that micro-insurance markets in these two segments of the 
pyramid, as shown in Figure 3.1, could generate incomes of up to USD$40 
billion. The revelation of the huge market potential has led to an increased 
entry of commercial insurers into the low-income market. Coydon and 
Molitor (2011) in a survey of commercial micro-insurers, reveal that the 
involvement of commercial insurers in micro-insurance is mainly driven by 
the objective to invest in a new market and realise expectations of profitable 
growth. In addition, corporate social responsibility (CSR), brand recognition 
and mandatory regulation were also identified as important factors for 
entering into low income markets such as those that characterise developing 
countries like those of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Figure 3.17: Potential Market Estimates for the Global Micro-
Insurance Market. 
 
Source: Adapted from Swiss Re (2010). This figure presents the potential market estimates for the global 
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3.4. Characteristics of Micro-Insurance 
The low income sector represents a vast untapped and attractive opportunity 
for commercial insurers as it could help to diversify their business into new 
markets, capture emerging market growth, and contribute to financial profits 
as well as secure broader social welfare goals (Churchill & Matul, 2012). The 
low income market is distinct from the traditional insurance market - see 
Table 3.1. Hence, a better understanding of the nature and characteristics of 
the market is essential for sustainable micro-insurance provision and take-
up. Swiss Re (2010) outline the core elements for the effective provision of 
micro-insurance as follows: 
 Insurance Principles: In a similar manner to traditional insurance, 
micro-insurance is based on insurance principles which involve the 
payment of premiums by policyholders in exchange for the promise of 
indemnification by the insurer in the event of a covered loss. Biener 
and Eling (2012) contend that for risks to be insurable, loss exposures 
must be independent and loss probabilities should be estimated 
reliably; the maximum possible loss per event must be manageable in 
terms of insurer solvency; the average loss per event must be 
moderate; loss exposure must be sufficiently large; and the potential 
problems resulting from information asymmetry cannot be excessive. 
  
 Accessibility: The target market for micro-insurance is low income 
groups including individuals who do not have access to conventional 
insurance. Therefore, micro-insurance products and services should be 
designed to reach the ‘remote’ segments of the society. In particular, 
partnership with institutions (e.g., retailers, co-operative societies 
etc.) which are traditionally not involved in insurance but have a large 
footprint and reputation in low income markets is essential in 
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 Affordability: Micro-insurance products are generally characterised by 
low premiums and sums assured in order to ensure affordability by the 
target market. Indeed, the viability of micro-insurance products is 
dependent on the ability of the insurer to strike a balance between the 
needs of the low income market and adequate (and affordable) pricing 
(Swiss Re, 2010).  
 
 Flexibility: Micro-insurance products and processes must be tailored to 
meet the needs to the of the target population. Indeed, a ‘one-size fits 
all’ approach in terms of product design, premium collection and 
distribution is ineffective (Olaosebikan, 2013). 
 
 Simplicity: The low income market consists of individuals with limited 
or no knowledge of insurance. Therefore, simplicity in terms of 
underwriting conditions, premium collection and policy language is 
essential (Swiss Re, 2010). 
3.5 Micro-Life Insurance Product Types 
The most popular micro-life insurance product types in sub-Saharan African 
countries such as Nigeria and South Africa include, savings-linked insurance, 
credit life insurance and funeral insurance (Churchill & Matul, 2012). The key 
features of these micro-life insurance products are outlined below: 
 Savings-linked insurance: Rusconi (2012) highlights the use of 
contractual savings products as one of the means by which low income 
individuals and households can manage risk. However, in the face of 
major losses, the use of savings products might be an insufficient risk 
management tool. Savings-linked insurance is similar to endowment 
policies in that it covers the risk of death and accumulates value over 
time. Endowment policies are products which usually combine life 
insurance and long-term contractual savings. Traditional endowment 
policies involve regular premium payments over the long-term, of at 
least five years or more at the end of which the client receives a lump 
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sum plus a bonus. However, if the client dies before the end of the 
term the beneficiary receives the sum assured. For low income clients, 
the surrender value in the event of premature cancellation of 
traditional endowment products is usually low because of the irregular 
premium payments as well as the high commissions paid to agents 
(Roth, Garand, & Rutherford, 2006). In order to provide more value to 
low income clients, the new wave of savings-linked micro-insurance 
products seek to address issues of high delivery costs and irregular 
premium patterns which plague traditional endowment products 
(Churchill & Matul, 2012). 
 
 Credit life insurance: This is the most prevalent type of micro-life 
insurance product and usually the starting point for organisations 
looking to enter the micro-insurance market (Churchill & Matul, 2012). 
A typical credit life policy covers the principal and interest of a loan in 
the event of the death of the borrower. Credit life policies, which are 
usually provided through MFIs and credit cooperatives, help eliminate 
the risk of borrowers’ mortality risk (and hence non-repayment of the 
loan) by transferring some of the cost to the borrower, thus protecting 
the loan portfolio as well as shareholders or member-owners. For 
micro-insurance providers, credit life policies tend to be more 
profitable, straightforward to administer, and provide a relatively easy 
access to a large customer base with a potential for the demand of 
other insurance services products (Matul et al., 2010; Roth et al., 
2007). In addition, credit life policies are usually offered as a 
mandatory requirement to obtaining micro-loans, and are relatively 
easy to understand by the low income market (Churchill, 2006a). On 
the other hand, credit life products have been criticised as being more 
valuable to the providers than the borrowers in spite of its potential in 
reducing the financial strain of family/group members following the 
death of the borrower. For example, Manje (2005) in a study of a 
Zambian MFI found low client satisfaction (value) for credit life 
products. He contends that the mandatory nature of credit life policies 
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meant that most borrowers were unaware of the coverage provided as 
the premiums paid were perceived as a fee for obtaining micro-loans. 
  
 Funeral insurance: This type of policy covers the funeral expenses in 
the event of the death of the policyholder. The benefits/payout of a 
funeral policy could be in form of a funeral service, cash benefit or a 
combination of both (Churchill & Matul, 2012). The prevalence of 
funeral insurance (e.g., in South Africa) as noted earlier in Chapter 2, 
section 2.2, can be attributed to the social and cultural requirements 
for the deceased to have a dignified burial. Funeral insurance is 
usually provided by a variety of formal (e.g., commercial and co-
operative insurers) and informal (e.g., community groups, funeral 
parlours and burial societies) providers. The history of funeral policies 
and indeed insurance can be traced back to funeral associations which 
are informal mutual risk pooling groups that ensure decent funeral for 
members or any other nominated persons in the event of death (Berg, 
2011). In large parts of Africa, funeral insurance is the most popular 
type of insurance. Prior research (e.g., see Dercon, De Weerdt, Bold, 
& Pankhurst, 2006; Dercon et al., 2008) examine the prevalence of 
informal group based funeral insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania and 
report that nearly 90 percent of rural households in a representative 
sample of the rural Ethiopian population belonged to at least one 
funeral scheme. In South Africa, approximately 45 percent of the adult 




3.6 Links between Micro-Finance and Micro-Insurance 
Micro-finance can be generally described as the provision of financial services 
(usually credit and savings) to low-income individuals who do not have 
access to formal banking services (Murdoch, 2000). Prior research (e.g., see 
Sebastad & Cohen, 2001) have shown that the ‘micro-finance trinity’ of 
savings, credit and insurance could assist in capital accumulation, income 
smoothing, and help improve the risk–bearing capacity of low income 
individuals and vulnerable households. In particular, MFIs could help 
strengthen the risk bearing capacity of low income households by providing 
credit to finance new economic activities whilst adopting new technologies to 
improve access and cost using group dynamics. Although credit unions and 
co-operatives have served the needs of the poor for several centuries, the 
development of modern micro-finance is often credited to Dr. Mohammed 
Yunus who launched an action research to examine the possibility of 
designing a credit delivery system to provide banking services targeted at 
the rural poor in Bangladesh. Dr. Mohammed Yunus later went on to 
establish the Grameen Bank in 1983. Since then, innovation in micro-finance 
as well as the providers of financial services to the poor has continued to 
evolve (Siegel, Alwag and Canagarajah, 2001). The World Bank (2012) 
estimates that about 160 million people in developing countries are served 
by micro-finance. Brown and Churchill (2000a) describe micro-insurance an 
extension of micro-finance into the realm of insurance to deal explicitly with 
risk management. The pioneering attempts in the provision of micro-
insurance have been closely linked to micro-finance programs because the 
existing networks of MFIs makes the delivery of micro-insurance products 
less costly. Furthermore, MFIs have increasingly perceived a demand for a 
risk management product (i.e. credit life) which protects both their clients’ 
and their own interests- see section 3.5. Therefore, micro-finance and micro-
insurance instruments and services have developed concurrently to provide 
access to low income households who do not have access to formal financial 
services due to high transaction costs, information asymmetry problems (i.e. 
moral hazard and adverse selection), and lack of collateral (Murdoch,2000). 
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3.7 Related Literature 
This section now reviews the key literature relevant to analysing the demand 
and supply of micro-insurance in developing economies such as those of sub-
Saharan Africa. 
3.7.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE)  which is closely related to the information 
asymmetry and agency theory literature opines that economic activity takes 
place in firms as they are efficient in controlling the twin problems of 
bounded rationality (i.e., incomplete and costly contracting) and managerial 
opportunism (i.e., self-seeking behaviour). TCE further argues that cost-
effective contractual commitment in complex business transactions (such as 
insurance) can be facilitated through the purchase of transaction-specific 
assets (Williamson, 1979) 16 . These specific-assets help reduce the 
information and frictional costs of conducting insurance in established 
markets (Adams 1997).  
Micro-insurance arrangements may not necessarily have the transaction-
specific assets necessary to cost-effectively control contracting problems 
such as bounded rationality and other market frictions. Indeed, the high 
transaction costs involved in the management of large volumes of small 
policies is a major hindrance to the penetration of micro-insurance in sub- 
Saharan Africa and other parts of the world (Churchill & Matul, 2012). 
Significant expenses are incurred by micro-insurers in designing appropriate 
insurance products, distributing insurance in new markets, collecting 
premiums from persons who may not have bank accounts, and assessing 
and paying out small claims (Churchill, 2007). For example, Collier, Skees, 
and Barnett (2009) highlight the increased administrative costs in promoting 
weather-index insurance to farmers in rural areas of developing countries 
                                                          
16  Adams (1997) contends that in insurance markets, transaction-specific assets can be 
physical in nature (e.g., specialist production technology such as computer systems) and/or 
human-specific (e.g., the specialist insurance knowledge of actuaries). 
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who usually have no prior experience with any form of insurance or risk 
management arrangements. Jutting (2004) in a study of  community health 
insurance schemes in Senegal, West Africa find that larger, and more formal 
health insurance schemes faced higher transaction costs due to enhanced 
information asymmetry problems compared with the smaller insurance 
schemes operated by local co-operative/mutual-type structures. The high 
transaction costs of participating in micro-insurance could raise prices 
beyond the means of local communities and could thus help explain, at least 
partially, the relatively high income and price elasticity of demand profile of 
some micro-insurance schemes in segments of the market such as the health 
care micro-insurance sector in rural India (Ito & Kono, 2010). Furthermore, 
Swiss Re (2010) reports that the long-term profitability and sustainability of 
micro-insurance is dependent on the ability of the micro-insurance provider 
to build a cost-effective infrastructure given the high operating and 
administrative cost involved in reaching remote areas.  
Cost efficiency in financial institutions (especially in the insurance industry) 
has received a lot of attention in the academic literature (e.g., see Abdul 
Kader et al., 2010; Biener & Eling, 2011; Eling & Luhnen, 2010a; Fenn, 
Vencappa, Diacon, Klumpes, & O'Brien, 2008). Cummins and Zi (1998) 
define cost efficiency as the ratio of the costs of a fully efficient firm with the 
same output quantities and input prices to the given firm’s actual costs. 
Abdul Kader et al. (2010) in their efficiency study of the takaful insurance 
industry find an overall average cost efficiency of 70 percent which is 
comparable to the efficiency scores of insurance firms in developed 
countries. They contend that the use of non-executive directors and the 
separation of the CEO and chairman functions have no significant impact on 
cost efficiency. Eling and Luhnen (2010b) in their international insurance 
efficiency study find a steady technical and cost efficiency growth with large 
differences in efficiency estimates across countries. Furthermore, Fenn et al. 
(2008) in a study of efficiency in European insurance firms find that during 
the sample period investigated, insurance firms were operating under 
conditions of decreasing costs. They also contend that larger firms and those 
with high market shares tend to be the most cost inefficient. However, only a 
few prior studies have directly examined the impact of cost efficiency on 
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profitability. For example, Greene and Segal (2004) in the study of 
profitability and efficiency in the US life insurance industry, find a negative 
association between cost inefficiency and profitability. They contend that cost 
inefficiency is substantial relative to earnings and that inefficiency arises in 
firms due to the suboptimal usage of resources either by overpaying for 
inputs and/or by employing a technologically inferior process. They further 
demonstrate that the adverse effect of cost inefficiency translates into lower 
firm profitability. Choi and Weiss (2005) examine the relation between 
market structure and performance in US property-liability insurers find that 
cost efficient firms are able to charge lower prices and thus earn higher 
profits than cost inefficient firms. The finding of Choi and Weiss (2005) is 
consistent with the ‘efficient structure hypothesis’ which proposes that cost 
efficient firms are able to grow in size and market share because they are 
able to charge lower prices than their competitors while maintaining 
profitability. 
3.7.2 Information Asymmetry 
The notion of asymmetric information and its impact on influencing market 
micro-structure is closely related to the agency theory. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) highlight the agency incentive conflicts that can arise between 
different contracting constituents (e.g., shareholders and managers) due to 
the increased separation of ownership and control as an organization grows 
in size. Two basic features of the agency problem particularly relevant in the 
context of insurance are: (i) the problem of goal divergence between the 
economic interests of principals (owners) and agents (managers), and the 
associated agency costs borne by principals in verifying that delegated 
agents are acting in ways that maximize their utility; and (ii) inefficient risk-
sharing which arises when principals and agents have different attitudes 
towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
demonstrate that adverse selection (and its ‘sister’ concept, moral hazard) is 
all-pervasive in insurance transactions due to information asymmetries 
between the insurance company and the insured. As a result, the 
owners/managers of insurance companies have to control such problems 
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through ex-post monitoring, and the use of contractual mechanisms such as 
the use of restrictive covenants. The key objective of managers and 
shareholders of insurance companies is, in the face of agency problems and 
information asymmetries, to determine an optimal incentive contract that 
maximizes shareholders’ wealth at the lowest cost. The concepts of adverse 
selection and moral hazard in the context of micro-insurance are examined 
further below. 
3.7.2.1 Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection which is sometimes referred to as the ‘lemons problem’ 
after Akerlof’s (1970) analysis of information asymmetry and pricing in the 
US second-hand motor vehicle market, relates to the risk that prospective 
policyholders (insured agents) have utility maximizing incentives to actively 
withhold private information from the insurer ex-ante in order to secure 
economic advantages (from higher than anticipated claims) later on. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) showed that adverse selection is all-pervasive 
in insurance transactions due to information asymmetries between the 
insurance company and the insured. Bryant and Prohmmo (2002) in their 
study of village funeral insurance societies in North-East Thailand (in which 
equal contributions are made by all participating households with unequal 
risks) find evidence of minor adverse selection. In their study, the 
sustainability of the funeral insurance scheme was attributed to its ability to 
reduce information asymmetry ex-ante by restricting membership only to 
households in the village within a specified threshold of acceptable risk. 
Dercon et al. (2006) also find evidence of adverse selection for funeral 
insurance in Tanzania and Ethiopia. Furthermore, Giesbert et al. (2011) in a 
study of micro-life insurance in Ghana report evidence of adverse selection 
and life-cycle effects. They found that risk averse households and individuals 
who considered themselves more exposed to risk than others were less likely 
to purchase insurance. Smith et al. (2010) in their study of alternative 
distribution channels for micro-insurance in South Africa argue that adverse 
selection is exacerbated in small risk pools. In addition, several studies have 
also focused on economically efficient remedial strategies to curb and/or 
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reduce adverse selection in insurance markets. For example, Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) show that a Pareto optimal insurance market (‘separating 
equilibrium’) can be achieved when insurance companies offer prospective 
policyholders (of an observationally uncertain risk-type) a menu of different 
contract types that enable high and low risk-types to choose a form of 
contract that reflects their individual risk preference and risk exposure. Prior 
studies (e.g., Dionne & Lasserre, 1985; Gal & Landsberger, 1988) propose 
that in addition to contracting and monitoring mechanisms, adverse selection 
can be effectively controlled using experience rating (i.e., where premiums 
are based on actual loss experience). Furthermore, Shapira and Venezia 
(1999) suggest the use of screening methods such as offering a set of 
contracts varying in prices and deductibles to induce self-selection of a 
contract appropriate for the potential insured risk-type. Therefore, the use of 
strategies such as screening could help micro-insurers limit adverse selection 
by providing access to information on the individual risks of the insured. The 
screening and monitoring of the insured could be quite costly for micro-
insurers, therefore, the costs and benefits of these strategies have to be 
carefully considered by micro-insurance providers. The findings of Bryant  
and Prohmmo (2002) suggest that the ‘gate-keeping function’ of local group-
type insurance arrangements can be effective in controlling adverse selection 
issues as well as reducing the costs of screening and monitoring. In a similar 
vein, Biener and Eling (2011) find that offering group policies could help 
reduce the problems of adverse selection in micro-insurance markets, and 
propose the use of co-operative (mutual) architecture.  
3.7.2.2 Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard arises from “hidden actions’’ of the insured. That is, when the 
purchaser of an insurance contract takes actions that impact on the 
probability of incurring an insurable loss and/or the size of that loss. This 
situation arises due to the inability of the insurer to perfectly observe the 
actions of the insured after insurance has been purchased (Arrow, 1963; 
Pauly, 1968). Cummins and Tennyson (1996) report that moral hazard exists 
in two distinctive forms. First, ex-ante moral hazard which relates to the risk 
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that indemnification through insurance discourages insured agents from 
spending on loss prevention measures, and ex-post moral hazard which 
relates to the risk of excessive (fraudulent) claims reporting by the insured. 
In a study of medical insurance in the US, Pauly (1968) observed that ex-
post moral hazard is particularly evident in medical insurance as claims are 
highly dependent on decisions made by the patient and physician once the 
illness has occurred. He also found that individuals who purchase health care 
insurance tend to seek more (and more expensive) medical care due to the 
low marginal cost of insurance compared with funding medical bills privately. 
Furthermore, Cohen and Sebstad (2005) in their study of health care 
insurance in Africa report that individuals often perceive insurance as a 
prepayment scheme. As such, they do not use medical treatments to meet 
actual needs but use healthcare services in an attempt to expend the 
premium payments already made under the insurance policy.  
Biener and Eling (2012) contend that ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard 
exists only to a minimal degree in life insurance because the event that 
triggers coverage is death, which is fairly transparent (e.g., verified by a 
death certificate) and thus gives the beneficiary of the insurance contract no 
clear informational advantage over the insurer. Furthermore, Pauly (1968) 
advocated the use of risk-sharing contractual devices such as deductibles 
and/or co-insurance to mitigate moral hazard problems. Prior studies (Brown 
& Churchill, 2000a, 2000b) also propose the use of third party proof 
requirements, mandatory policies as well as exclusions. In addition, Roth and 
Athreye (2005) identified agent-fraud and moral hazard issues in the study 
of a micro-life insurance scheme in India, and propose the use of exclusions 
for suicide in the first year as well as strict screening and monitoring of 
agents as effective control mechanisms. 
3.7.2.3 Agency Costs 
Agency costs are the direct and indirect costs of attempting to ensure that 
agents (i.e., managers), and other contracting constituents, such as insured 
policyholders, act in the best economic interests of principals (i.e., owners of 
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the insurance firm). In micro-insurance, information costs are the additional 
expenses incurred in reducing business costs such as adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe agency costs as the sum 
of monitoring costs incurred by the principal, bonding expenditures of agents 
plus the residual loss in the traded value of the corporation17. The two main 
types of agency problems which arise in the context of insurance 
transactions as a result of the separation of ownership and control are: 
manager-owner and policyholder-owner incentive conflicts (Mayers & Smith, 
1981, 1982, 1988). Furthermore, prior studies (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983a, 1983b) demonstrate that owners may observe incentive 
issues with the agents (managers) they employ to manage and run their 
organisations, especially as those agents possess increasing levels of 
informational advantages over owners. Agency theory contends that 
managers are likely to pursue strategies and goals to meet their own utility. 
For example, managers might make less risky decisions given concerns 
about preserving their job security. Smith (1976) proposes that manager-
controlled firms are more likely to maximize sales rather than profits, and 
engage in activities that smooth income. The excessive use of perks and sub-
optimal decision–making of managers could adversely affect the overall 
profitability of the firm. Consequently, the shareholder-owners undertake 
costly mechanisms to monitor the behaviour of managers. Eisenhardt (1989) 
contends that the degree to which managers use their ability to maximise 
the wealth of the shareholder-owners is dependent on the percentage of 
equity ownership that they possess. Eisenhardt (1989) therefore argues that 
increasing insider-ownership could help align owner-manager incentives.  
With regard to policyholder-owner incentive conflicts, agency theory holds 
that shareholders of insurance firms have incentives to expropriate wealth 
from the policyholders in order to increase the value of their residual claims 
in financial markets. This could be achieved by shareholders and their 
                                                          
17Jensen and Meckling (1976) define monitoring costs as the costs incurred by the principal in 
controlling the behaviour of agents – for example, through budget restrictions, compensation 
policies, operating rules and so on. Bonding costs refer to the incentives which the principal 
pays the agent to guarantee that he/she will not take actions which would harm the principal’s 
interests – e.g., by using external auditors to scrutinize financial systems, or in the insurance 
context, by purchasing reinsurance  (e.g., see Mayers & Smith, 1990). The residual loss is the 
dollar equivalent of the loss in the expected traded value of the firm experienced by the 
principal as a result of agency problems in incomplete markets. 
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managers increasing the risk on collaterised assets underpinning the 
liabilities of the insurance pool after insurance policies are sold. In such a 
situation, shareholders bear the upside risk (i.e., increased security returns) 
while policyholders bear the downside risk (i.e., the costs of bankruptcy) 
(MacMinn & Garven, 2000). Furthermore, shareholders-owners could decide 
to exercise their ‘default put option’ under limited liability rules and 
voluntarily liquidate the insurance firm in the event of asset depletion (e.g., 
arising from some unanticipated catastrophe or severe economic shock 
(MacMinn, 1987). Policyholders are primary fixed claimholders in stock 
insurers in that their claims have a specified value over a finite period and 
unlike mutual forms of organization they do not share in the profits of the 
company. Therefore, agency costs arise to optimize incentive contracts 
between the residual claims of owners of insurance firms and the fixed 
claims of policyholders. The policyholder-owner agency problems can be 
mitigated through contractual means (e.g., reinsurance), internal rules and 
procedures (e.g., governing investment policies), and/or by external 
regulation (e.g., prohibiting voluntary liquidation of insurance firms) (e.g., 
see Garven & MacMinn, 1993; Mayers & Smith, 1981, 1982, 1988). 
Prior studies (e.g., see Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Mayers & Smith, 
1981) suggest that organizational form can be an effective control of agency 
problems and information asymmetries in insurance markets. These scholars 
hypothesize that due to inherent advantages in minimising agency problems 
(costs), certain ownership structures could effectively control the incentive 
conflicts inherent in the relationship between owners, managers and 
policyholders. For example, Mayers and Smith (1988) argue that by merging 
the owner-policyholder functions, mutual insurers (including friendly societies 
and co-operatives) are more effective in controlling the policyholder-owner 
agency conflicts than stock forms of organisation. Their managerial discretion 
hypothesis holds that in mutual-type organizations managerial decision-
making is controlled by internal policies and procedures (e.g., actuarial rules) 
thereby inducing financially prudent decisions. Additionally, the lack of 
access to capital markets means that relative to their counterparts in stock 
insurance firms, the risk-averse behaviour of managers of mutual insurers is 
economically rational as an adverse shock has to be absorbed by internal 
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reserves and retained earnings rather than equity. This increases the risk of 
financial distress and/or bankruptcy. Prior studies (e.g., Mayers & Smith, 
1981, 1982, 1988) further argue that because managerial activities in 
mutual companies will be controlled by internal procedures and rules, they 
will tend to predominate in less complex and risky lines of business (e.g., life 
insurance) that do not require high degrees of managerial discretion. On the 
other hand, Hansmann (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1988) predict that 
stock insurers  are effective in controlling the owner-manager conflicts and 
are more likely to exist in segments of the insurance market (e.g., 
catastrophe lines) that require more managerial discretion in underwriting, 
investment and operating decisions. Furthermore, in advancing her expense 
preference hypothesis, Mester (1989) offers an alternative view by arguing 
that agency problems can be relatively more acute in mutual forms of 
organization because without the ‘disciplining effect’ of the market for 
corporate control the managers of mutual insurers are likely to increase the 
agency costs of operation (e.g., through excessive perquisite consumption 
and on-the-job shirking).  
Stock and mutual forms of organization are the two most common forms of 
ownership structures. However, in many jurisdictions (including Nigeria and 
South Africa) variations in the type of ownership structure can also exist 
within the stock form of organization. For example, equity can be held by a 
few large (majority) investors, disparate individual investors, and/or by 
managerial-owners. Mayers and Smith (1994) examine the variation in 
operating characteristics across ownership structures of common stock 
insurance companies, and classify them into four main groups, namely: 
‘association-owned stock firms’, mutual-owned stock firms’, ‘closely-held 
stock firms’, and ‘widely-held stock firms’. They argue that ‘mutual-owned’ 
stock firms are similar to conventional mutual insurance companies because 
the shareholders are also the policyholders of the association or the parent 
mutual. In large (particularly publicly listed) closely-held stock firms, there is 
often a merger of the manager and shareholder functions which helps to 
substantially reduce owner-manager conflicts but which might come at a cost 
for policyholders (e.g., as a result of excessive risk-taking). Closely-held 
stock firms can be further classified into ‘closely-held stock firms owned by 
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managers’ or closely-held stock firms owned by other investors’ depending 
on the amount of equity held by insiders (managers). However, for widely-
held stock insurance firms there is usually a clear separation of shareholder-
manager-policyholder functions. He and Sommer (2010) examine a spectrum 
of ownership structures in the US property–liability insurance industry and 
find that the agency costs associated with owner-manager conflicts increase 
with the degree of separation and control. They come to similar conclusions 
as Mayers and Smith (1994) and contend that agency conflicts are most 
likely to be acute when widely-held ownership rights predominate. If left 
unchecked by contractual control and incentive alignment mechanisms, such 
a structure could increase agency problems (costs) in the firm. Leech and 
Leahy (1991) contend that due to the complete separation of ownership and 
control in widely-held firms, there is no individual or group incentive to 
exercise control and enforce profit maximization. Furthermore, Cummins and 
Sommer (1996) argue that owner-manager conflicts are expected to be 
smallest in closely-held firms by managers and largest in widely-held firms 
with closely-held firms owned by others providing an intermediate case. Ke, 
Petroni, and Safieddine (1999) in a study of the executive compensation 
structure in US insurance firms find a positive association between firm 
performance and the level of compensation for widely-held (public) insurers 
but not for closely-held-private insurers. They further argue that 
shareholder-owners of closely-held firms have more incentives to proactively 
monitor the activities of managers than their counterparts in firms with more 
disparate shareholdings. 
The empirical results of prior research on the influence of ownership 
structure on firm performance has been has been theoretically complex, 
empirically ambiguous, and subject to continuous debate since the 
pioneering work of Berle and Means (1932) who first proposed an inverse 
correlation between the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm performance. 
Using accounting profit as a measure of performance, Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) provided a conflicting view from the argument of Berle and Means 
(1932) and posit that ownership structure should be regarded as an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders 
and the market for traded shares. On the other hand, Morck, Shleifer, and 
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Vishny (1988) proposed a curvilinear association between managerial 
ownership and firm performance using both the accounting profit and Tobin’s 
Q. Furthermore, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examine two aspects of 
ownership which are likely to represent conflicting interests - the managerial 
ownership and the percentage of the five largest shareholding interests. They 
find no evidence to support the notion that variation across firms in observed 
ownership structures result in systematic variations in firm performance. 
Oswald and Jahera (1991) obtained a positive relation between the levels of 
insider ownership and excess stock returns. They contend that a higher level 
of insider ownership implies improved decision making, thus supporting the 
notion that the strategy of increasing the vested interests of managers is 
beneficial to the long-term performance of the firm. In a similar vein, 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) examine the influence of institutional 
ownership on firm performance, and find that the strength of the relation 
between the institutional ownership and performance depends on the degree 
of managerial ownership. Mehran (1995) in a study of the executive 
compensation structure in US manufacturing firms, propose that the use of 
compensation contracts can be one of the major ways to mitigate owner-
manager agency conflicts in firms. He found that firm performance is 
positively related to both the percentage of equity held by managers and the 
percentage of their total compensation that is equity-based.  
3.7.3 Financial Leverage 
The incentive conflicts between the managers and owners of firms’ as 
discussed in the preceding section, provides the basis for the agency cost 
theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed that due to the separation of 
ownership and control in firms, managers tend to pursue their own utility-
maximising strategies rather than promoting shareholder wealth. The use of 
debt in the capital structure of firms has been identified as one of the ways 
to mitigate the loss from the owner-manager agency conflicts as the residual 
claim of managers in a firm rises with increasing level of debt (Harris & 
Raviv, 1990, 1991). The ‘free-cash flow hypothesis’ of Jensen (1986) 
stipulates that the pressure to generate cash-flows to meet debt obligations, 
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reduces the amount of free-cash available to managers to pursue self-utility 
maximising objectives. Jensen (1986) argues that the threat of a failure in 
meeting debt repayments serves as an effective motivating force for 
managers to be efficient. In a similar vein, Stulz (1990) argues that owner-
manager conflicts arise in operating and investment decisions, as managers 
prefer to invest all available funds (i.e., over-investment) even if 
shareholder-owners prefer cash payouts in the form of dividends. The 
empirical findings of Stulz’s (1990) study indicate that the repayment of debt 
schedules reduces the amount of free-cashflow available to managers to 
invest in self-utility maximizing projects.  
Harris and Raviv (1990) and Williamson (1988) also provide support for the 
use of debt in mitigating the owner-manager agency conflicts. They contend 
that managers prefer to continue operations in the face of bankruptcy even if 
the shareholder-owners prefer liquidation. However, debtholders have the 
option to force liquidation if cashflows are poor and subsequent debt 
repayments fail to be made. Grossman and Hart (1982) also propose that in 
widely-held corporations, high levels of debt in the capital structure could 
serve as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial free-cashflow waste 
through the threat of liquidation. Furthermore, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) 
in a study of a sample of low and high growth French firms find that a 
positive relation between leverage and improved efficiency in line with the 
‘free-cashflow’ hypothesis of Jensen (1986). Similarly, Adams and Buckle 
(2003) in their investigation of the Bermuda insurance market find that 
highly leveraged firms have better operational performance than lowly-
leveraged firms.   
The agency costs of debt also arise from incentive conflicts between 
shareholder-owners and debt-holders at high levels of indebtedness 
especially when there is a risk of default. Myers (1977) in explaining the 
‘underinvestment’ or ‘debt-overhang’ problem contends that the issue of 
risky debt reduces the present market value of the firm. The 
underinvestment problem particularly arises in highly levered states when an 
unexpectedly severe loss to collaterised assets motivates owners of the firm 
to exercise their ‘default put option’ under limited liability rules and so avoid 
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reinstating lost or impaired productive assets. Owners of firms are motivated 
to undertake this action because the future economic benefits of post-loss 
asset reinstatement are perceived to accrue largely to fixed-claimants (e.g., 
debt-holders) rather than themselves as residual risk-bearers. Stulz (1990) 
further argues that at high leverage levels, the debt repayment may 
outweigh the free-cash flow available to managers, thus reducing the funds 
available for profitable investments. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) contend that high leverage could also lead to the problems of ‘asset 
substitution’ which arise out of the agency conflicts between shareholder-
owners and debt-holders. They argue that shareholders have incentives to 
choose prospectively risky projects as they benefit from the upside risk of 
increased returns while the debt-holders bear the downside risk of 
bankruptcy costs. Williamson (1988) contends that at high debt levels, the 
inflexibility of the rules which gives debt-holders the option to force 
liquidation could result in the ‘forced-sale’ of firms’ assets when they are 
more valuable. Harris and Raviv (1990) describe the agency costs of debt as 
the investigation costs employed in determining the value of the firm during 
the liquidation decision. There is a trade-off between the liquidation value 
and investigation costs. Hence, firms with higher liquidation value and lower 
investigation costs are likely to be highly levered. In most firms, the optimal 
structure is determined by trading-off the benefits versus the costs of debt. 
Therefore, high leverage could have both a positive and negative effect on 
firm performance. The extant literature on capital structure confirms that 
increases in leverage will lead to an increase in firm value up to an optimum 
point beyond which further increases in leverage reduces the firms’ value 
(Purnanandam, 2008). 
3.7.4 Reinsurance 
The agency costs of debt which arise from incentive conflicts between 
contracting constituents (i.e., shareholders, managers, debtholders) is one of 
the objectives for the corporate purchase of reinsurance (Mayers & Smith, 
1990). Smith and Stulz (1985) show that value maximizing firms’ hedge 
because of taxes, costs of financial distress and managerial risk aversion to 
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job loss in event of solvency.  Indeed, risk hedging via the purchase of 
reinsurance could also help reduce expected taxes, expected costs of 
bankruptcy, and allow the ceding insurer access to the services and technical 
expertise of the reinsurer (Berger , Cummins, & Tennyson, 1992; Garven & 
Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Mayers & Smith, 1982, 1990) The underinvestment 
problem first analysed by Myers (1977) in which managers reject positive 
net present value (NPV) projects due to the conflicts of interest between 
shareholder-owners and debtholders could also be alleviated through the use 
of reinsurance (Mayers & Smith, 1987).  
 The results of prior research (e.g., see Adams, 1996; Adams, Hardwick, & 
Zou, 2008; Cole & McCullough, 2006; Garven & Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Shiu, 
2011) indicate that the purchase of reinsurance is positively associated with 
leverage which is consistent with the expected bankruptcy cost argument 
and agency costs theory. Adams (1996) in the examination of the relation 
between reinsurance and firm-specific factors in the New Zealand life 
insurance industry finds that reinsurance is associated with smaller and more 
highly leveraged firms. His analysis supports the ‘risk-bearing’ hypothesis 
which suggests that insurers tend to reinsure more to alleviate the risk of 
severe loss as their leverage levels gets close to solvency constraints. 
Furthermore, Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003) demonstrate that the 
demand for reinsurance is positively related to insurers’ leverage. They 
contend that the use of reinsurance reduces the effects of large unexpected 
losses and increases the probability the insurer would benefit from 
investment in tax-favoured assets (e.g., rental real estate). Shiu (2011) 
investigates the effects of capital structure on the purchase of reinsurance in 
the UK non-life insurance industry, and finds that insurers with a higher level 
of leverage tend to reinsure to reduce the probability of insolvency and 
mitigate the agency costs arising from the conflicts between policyholders 
and shareholder-owners. Powell and Sommer (2007) examine the internal 
and external sources of capital through the investigation of the reinsurance 
activity between affiliated and unaffiliated insurers. They find that leverage 
has a positive impact on both internal and external reinsurance. Adams et al. 
(2008) in the investigation of the factors affecting the incremental use of 
reinsurance in UK life insurance firms find that insurers with higher leverage 
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tend to purchase more reinsurance than less leveraged insurers. On the 
other hand, Cole and McCullough (2006) in the examination of the overall 
demand for reinsurance as well as the utilisation of foreign reinsurance by 
US insurers, find that insurers with lower leverage are associated with the 
use of foreign insurance but document no significant relation between the 
overall demand for reinsurance and leverage. In addition, Hoerger, Sloan, 
and Hassan (1990) find that the decision of an insurance firm to purchase 
reinsurance is influenced by the probability of bankruptcy. They contend that 
the purchase of reinsurance shifts some of the portion of the insurer’s risk to 
the reinsurer thus reducing the expected costs of bankruptcy. Consistent 
with the findings of previous studies, Carson and Hoyt (1995) also find that 
in the US life insurance industry higher levels of leverage are associated with 
an increase in the probability of bankruptcy. Using the ratio of direct 
business written to surplus as a measure of leverage, they posit a positive 
association between leverage and the demand for reinsurance. Adiel (1996) 
further contends that reinsurance is crucial for primary insurers as it helps to 
increase insurer capital and earnings and reduce regulatory costs.  
Despite the beneficial effects of reinsurance in reducing the agency costs of 
debt, expected taxes and expected costs of bankruptcy, the purchase of 
reinsurance could be costly for the ceding insurer. Jean-Baptiste and 
Santomero (2000) contend that reinsurance reflects both the riskiness of the 
primary insurer’s policies that are being reinsured as well as the reinsurer’s 
perception regarding the true quality of the insurer’s business. They 
demonstrate that the insurer has more information than the reinsurer 
regarding the risk being transferred as well as control over the ultimate 
outcome of the risk. This leads to higher reinsurance premiums which could 
lower the expected profit of the ceding insurer and so lower the quantity of 
reinsurance purchased. Doherty and Garven (1995) contend that the 
purchase of reinsurance can be costly for primary insurance writers (e.g., in 
terms of brokerage fees and ceded premiums).  
In micro-insurance, reinsurance serves as an important risk management 
tool to stabilize irregular claims patterns and also as a source of technical 
expertise for the insurer. In particular, most micro-insurers in Sub-Saharan 
68 
 
Africa are operating at a small to medium scale due to the lack of risk capital 
and limited access to cost effective reinsurance insurance (Olaosebikan, 
2013). Reinsurance provides micro-insurers with the capacity to expand and 
build sustainable operations as well as the technical expertise to deal with 
issues such as lack of data, control of adverse selection, moral hazard and 
fraud which are prevalent in the low income market (Swiss Re, 2010). In 
addition, Lloyd's of London (2009) emphasise the importance of reinsurance 
in capacity building, and product development especially for small micro-
insurance schemes. However, the role of reinsurance has been found to be 
relatively limited as most commercial micro-insurers argue that due to the 
low sums assured, significant losses might not surpass the deductibles under 
reinsurance agreements (Churchill & Matul, 2012). Prior studies (e.g., Brown 
& Churchill, 2000a; Brown & Churchill, 2000b) examine the current state of 
the micro-insurance market using evidence from MFIs, cooperatives, private 
companies and other organisations with micro-insurance products. They 
highlight the importance of reinsurance in improving the growth prospects of 
micro-insurers, stabilizing financial results, providing protection against 
catastrophic losses, improvement of underwriting expertise, and 
management of sub-standard risks. They further highlight the importance of 
reinsurance in opening up the low income market for mass covariant risks 
such as natural disasters that could otherwise be uninsurable. Olaosebikan 
(2013) in her study of micro-life insurers in Nigeria obtained a negative 
association between the purchase of reinsurance and profitability. This 
suggests that the cost of reinsurance might be highly priced to reflect the 
increased risk associated with insuring the lives of low income groups. 
McCord et al. (2005) in a study of a group personal accident micro-insurance 
product developed by a local MFI and the American International Group 
(AIG) in Uganda, found minimal use of reinsurance. They contend that the 
low level of reinsurance usage is due to the small sums assured and the 
relatively widespread exposures which limit the potential for huge losses. 
Despite the minimal use of reinsurance, the micro-insurance product assisted 
the participating MFI to generate revenue and improve loan portfolio quality. 
The product was also reported as the main generator of revenue and profits 
for the AIG Uganda partner. The substantial technical expertise received by 
the MFI from AIG subsidiary in Uganda was crucial to the success of the 
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scheme. Therefore, the study demonstrates that micro-insurers may not 
necessarily require significant amount of reinsurance for risk mitigation. 
Indeed, the regulatory requirements for micro-insurance providers to hold 
such ‘costly’ reinsurance may result in a loss of profitability.  
3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on micro-
insurance. It examines the origin, definition and characteristics of micro-
insurance products as well as the common micro-life insurance product 
types. The chapter further reviews the extant literature on transaction costs, 
information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard), agency costs, 
leverage and reinsurance. As highlighted in chapter 1, section 1.1, the 
existing literature on micro-insurance highlight the key features of the micro-
insurance market as well as the supply and demand side factors affecting the 
business success and /or the increased take up of micro-insurance in 
developing countries. However, broader empirical and quantitative studies on 
the business success of micro-insurers remain limited (Koven and 
Zimmerman, 2011). The present study seeks to address the gap in literature 
by examining the quantitative factors that drive the business 
success/profitability of commercial micro-life insurers. In particular, the 
present study differs from prior micro-insurance literature (e.g., Biener and 
Eling, 2011) because the focus is on the assessment of the profitability of 
commercial micro-‘life’ insurance providers operating in Nigeria and South 
Africa.  In addition, the study employs a larger dataset and draws intuitions 
from the agency theory/information asymmetry literature to build a 
theoretical framework on the determinants of profitability. Furthermore, the 
present study differs from prior research because it utilises the two main 
frontier efficiency techniques (i.e., DEA and SFA) in the estimation of cost 
efficiency and hypotheses that that the ability of the managers of micro-life 
insurance firms in controlling transaction costs is crucial to profitability. The 
insights drawn from the review of literature in this chapter is employed in 
developing the research hypotheses put forward next in chapter 4 of this 






This chapter draws insights from the review of literature carried out in 
chapter 3 of the thesis, and derives four main hypotheses to guide the 
empirical testing carried out in chapter 6. The lack of sufficient high quality 
data on the risks underwritten, severe information asymmetries associated 
with adverse selection and moral hazard (including fraudulent claims),  high 
transaction costs in delivery and claims administration, regulatory 
constraints and inadequate risk pooling capacity and technical expertise are 
factors impeding the growth of micro-insurance in developing countries (e.g., 
see Koven & Zimmerman, 2011). Based on the review of theoretical and 
empirical literature, the determinants of the business success of micro-life 
insurance firms is hypothesised to be primarily dependent on the managerial 
success in reducing market imperfections (e.g., information asymmetries and 
transaction costs) and building capacity to realize economies of scale. The 
test hypotheses and their motivation are outlined below. 
4.2 Cost Efficiency 
The high transaction costs in the management of large amount of small 
policies have been identified as one of the key factors that affect the 
sustainability of micro-insurance schemes in sub-Saharan Africa (Swiss Re, 
2010). Given that the micro-insurance industry in developing countries is 
characterised by low premiums, it is hypothesised that cost efficiency may be 
one of the main drivers of profitability. Recent micro-insurance studies (e.g., 
Biener & Eling, 2011, 2012; Olaosebikan, 2013; Olaosebikan & Adams, 
2013) stress the importance for micro-insurers to realize scale economies 
from high volume product sales and other resource input efficiencies (e.g., 
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from the use of new technology) in order to realize sustainable profitability. 
Greene and Segal (2004) obtained a negative association between cost 
inefficiency and profitability. They contend that cost inefficiency which is 
substantial relative to earnings, may be the main driver of profitability. In a 
similar vein, Choi and Weiss (2005) find that cost efficiency is positively 
associated with profitability. They contend that cost efficient firms are more 
profitable because they are able to charge lower prices than their 
competitors. Therefore, the first hypothesis is that: 
H1a: Other things being equal, a positive relation between cost 
efficiency and the profitability of micro-life insurers is likely to exist. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) highlight that the cost efficiency incorporates 
both the technical and allocative efficiency estimate. Technical efficiency 
reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximum outputs from a given set of 
inputs while allocative efficiency reflects the ability of a micro-life insurer to 
use inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices. Thus, the 
efficiency of a micro-life insurer in terms of production/service technology 
and resource allocation will have a significant impact on profitability. 
Accordingly: 
H1b: Other things being equal, a positive relation between technical 
efficiency and the profitability of micro-life insurers is likely to exist. 
H1c: Other things being equal, a positive relation between allocative 
efficiency and the profitability of micro-life insurers is likely to exist. 
4.3 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure can be an effective control of agency problems and 
information asymmetries in insurance markets as it can moderate the 
incentive conflicts inherent in the relationship between owners, managers 
and policyholders (Mayers & Smith, 1982, 1994). Thus, the ownership 
72 
 
structure of a firm can play a significant role in the determination of a firm’s 
profitability. However, the empirical results of prior research (e.g., see 
Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001) on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance have been 
ambiguous and inconsistent. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
contend that ownership structure should be regarded as an endogenous 
outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and the 
market for traded shares. On the other hand, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
examine two aspects of ownership which are likely to represent conflicting 
interests - the managerial ownership and the percentage of the five largest 
shareholding interests. They find no evidence to support the notion that 
variation across firms in observed ownership structures result in systematic 
variations in firm performance. Other studies (e.g., Ligon, Thomas, & 
Worrall, 2002; Paal & Wiseman, 2011) suggest that local 
mutual/cooperative-type organizations are particularly apt in the context of 
micro-insurance in developing countries. This is because mutual forms of 
organization provide close ex-ante control over the entry of new 
policyholders to the insurance pool (e.g., through the application of strict 
underwriting criteria) and introduce ex-post controls to minimize aberrant 
behaviour by existing policyholders and managers (e.g., in the form of 
contractual mechanisms). Therefore, mutual forms of insurance organisation 
can be especially effective in mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, and reducing the agency cost of ex-post monitoring and 
contractual enforcement. Given the ownership forms observed in the 
Nigerian  and South African micro-insurance sector, the effect of a continuum 
of shareholding (stock)-types in reducing information asymmetry and agency 
problems is the focus of analysis. The ownership structures examined include 
public (widely-held)18 and private (closely-held) stock firms. In addition, the 
variation in private (closely-held) stock firms (i.e. closely-held by ‘managers’, 
closely-held by banks and closely-held by others such as insurance 
companies, financial companies, and mutual funds) is also examined.  
                                                          
18 Following Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011), public (widely-held) stock micro-life insurers 
are defined as those entities whose shares are listed on the main domestic stock exchange, 




Mayers & Smith (1994) argue that for closely-held stock insurance firms, 
tighter monitoring and control of managerial activities by owners reduces 
information asymmetry and agency costs thus increasing the market value of 
the firm. For, public (widely-held) stock insurers less stringent monitoring 
and control of managers by shareholders leads to higher agency costs 
compared with closely-owned entities. Cummins and Sommer (1996) further 
contend that owner-manager conflicts and associated agency costs are 
expected to be smallest in closely-held firms and largest in widely-held firms. 
Leech and Leahy (1991) contend that there is no individual or group 
incentive to exercise control and enforce profit maximisation in widely held 
firms due to the complete separation of ownership and control. Additionally, 
He and Sommer (2010) posit that the agency costs associated with owner-
manager conflicts increases with the degree of separation of ownership and 
control. They contend that the owner-manager conflicts and agency costs are 
likely to be acute when widely-held ownership rights predominate. As a 
result the second hypothesis is that: 
H2a: Other things being equal, private (closely-held) stock micro-life 
insurers are likely to be more profitable than public (widely-held) stock 
micro-life insurers. 
For public (widely-held) stock firms there tends to be greater separation of 
ownership and control, as ownership is dispersed among a large number of 
shareholders (Barry et al., 2011). Mester’s (1989) expense preference 
hypothesis implies a different perspective on the profitability-effect of 
ownership structure by arguing that agency costs can be relatively more 
acute in closely-held stock (privately-owned) firms rather than widely-held 
(publicly traded) firms. This is because without the ‘disciplining effect’ of an 
active market for corporate control, the managers of closely-held stock 
insurers are likely to increase agency costs (e.g., through excessive 
perquisite consumption and on-the-job shirking) especially in situations 
where the level of inside (managerial) ownership is low. Consistent with the 
optimal contracting theory, (Ke et al., 1999) find a positive association for 
the level of compensation and firm performance in public (widely-held) firms. 
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They contend that there is less need of the use of costly mechanisms in 
monitoring the activities of managers in widely held firms compared to 
closely-held firms. As a result: 
H2b: Other things being equal, public (widely-held stock) micro-life 
insurers are likely to be more profitable than private (closely-held) 
stock micro-life insurers. 
Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that the closer the merger of the owner-
manager functions, the lower the agency costs of monitoring and control. 
Owner-managers are also motivated to take decisions that increase period 
profitability and increase the value of their ownership stake in the firm. 
Cummins and Sommer (1996) further contend that the owner-manager 
conflicts and subsequent agency costs are expected to be smallest in closely-
held firms owned by managers and largest in widely-held firms with closely-
held owned by others providing an intermediate case. He and Sommer 
(2010) suggest that the degree of separation and control and subsequent 
agency costs is smallest in firms closely-held by managers. Therefore, for the 
two classes of closely–held stock insurers, the agency costs of monitoring 
and control are expected to be relatively higher in micro-insurers with 
closely-held stock held by large investors (banks) than in micro-insurers that 
are closely-held by management. As a consequence: 
H2c: Other things being equal, micro-life insurers with closely–held 
stock owned by management are likely to be more profitable than 
micro-life insurers that have closely-held stock owned by large 
banks. 
On the other hand, micro-insurers with closely-held stock owned by banks 
could be more profitable than micro-insurers with closely-held insider 
shareholdings because bancassurers could have inherent economic 
advantages compared with management-owned entities. For example, banks 
tend to have extensive distribution networks that enable their micro-
insurance subsidiaries to develop a large and diversified customer-base 
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(Angove & Tande, 2011). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) contend that large 
(non-management) shareholder-owner of firms could serve as effective 
monitors of managers because they have lower marginal cost of acquiring 
and disseminating information. Furthermore, the information asymmetry 
problems (i.e., moral hazard and adverse selection) could also be 
substantively reduced for micro-insurers that are closely-held by banks due 
to their ability to accurately access the creditworthiness of micro-customers 
from records held by the parent banking corporation (Olaosebikan & Adams, 
2013). Accordingly: 
H2d: Other things being equal, micro-life insurers with closely–held 
stock owned by banks are likely to be more profitable than micro-life 
insurers with closely-held stock owned by management. 
4.4 Leverage 
The impact of the capital structure on firm performance has been well 
documented in literature (e.g., see Adams & Buckle, 2003; Myers, 1977; 
Stulz, 1990). The use of debt financing has been identified as one of the 
ways to reduce the owner-manager agency conflicts as the residual claim of 
managers rises with the increasing use of debt (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
Insurance company managers also realize ‘tax shield benefits’ from 
increasing leverage thus enhancing annual reported profits (Adams et al., 
2008). The free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) suggests that high 
leverage levels can actually be value-enhancing for firms as the obligation to 
meet the repayment schedules under debt agreements disciplines managers 
to act in ways consistent with the strategic goal of maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth. In a similar vein, Grossman and Hart (1982) contend that high debt 
ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow 
waste through the threat of liquidation. Furthermore, Stulz (1990) argue that 
the use of debt helps mitigate the overinvestment problem which arises 
when managers expend the firm’s free-cashflow on self-utility maximizing 
projects. Harris and Raviv (1990) and Williamson (1988) also demonstrate 
that leverage could alleviate the owner-manager conflicts by giving 
76 
 
debtholders the option to force the liquidation of the firm when in extreme 
financial distress. Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) argue that high leverage is 
associated with improved firm efficiency in line with the agency cost 
hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Adams and Buckle (2003) also 
contend that highly leveraged firms have better operational performance 
than lowly-leveraged firms. Additionally, Purnanandam (2008) finds that in 
the absence of legislative restrictions and tight regulatory monitoring and 
control (which apply to the Nigerian and South African micro-insurance 
markets) high leverage can actually induce excessively risky behaviour by 
shareholders and their managers (particularly if executive earnings-based 
incentive compensation plans are in place) thus increasing ‘upside abnormal’ 
profits. Therefore, the third main hypothesis is that: 
H3a: Other things being equal, a positive relation between leverage 
and the profitability of micro-life insurers is likely to exist. 
On the other hand, Stulz (1990) predicts that the use of debt could have 
both a positive or negative effect on firms’ performance. He argues that at 
high leverage levels, the increased need to meet the repayments under debt 
schedule could outweigh the free cash flow available to managers for 
profitable investments. Myers (1977) contends that high leverage could have 
a negative impact on performance of firms with abundant growth 
opportunities due to the underinvestment problem which arises when there 
is risk of default. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that at high 
leverage levels, the agency incentive conflicts between shareholders-owners 
and debtholders which leads to the problems of asset substitution could also 
lead to a reduction in firm value. Williamson (1988) further adds that the 
flexibility of the rules which give debtholders the option to force the 
liquidation of the firm at high debt levels could also have a negative impact 
on the traded value of firms. Consequently, an alternative to the third 
hypothesis is that: 
H3b: Other things being equal, a negative relation between leverage 




Prior empirical research (e.g., Berger  et al., 1992; Garven & Lamm-
Tennant, 2003; Mayers & Smith, 1982, 1990) demonstrate that the purchase 
of reinsurance could help to mitigate the risk and costs of bankruptcy, reduce 
expected taxes, and provide technical expertise for the primary insurer. In 
particular, the importance of reinsurance in the success of micro-insurance 
initiatives has also been emphasised by previous studies (Brown & Churchill, 
2000a, 2000b; Dror & Armstrong, 2006; Lloyd's of London, 2009). However, 
access to reinsurance in developing countries can often be limited and/or 
costly for primary insurance writers thus limiting their profitability 
(Olaosebikan, 2013). Insurers can manage their capital position and improve 
balance sheet strength (thus mitigating insolvency risk and the political costs 
of regulatory intervention) not only by increasing equity but also by 
transferring part of their liabilities for assumed risks to third party 
reinsurance companies (Adiel, 1996; Hoerger et al., 1990). The purchase of 
reinsurance by primary insurance carriers could also help to mitigate the 
underinvestment problem which arises due to the agency cost of debt, as 
well as the expected bankruptcy costs, thus contributing to sustainable 
profitability (Adams, 1996). Furthermore, reinsurance can lower expected 
taxes by reducing the variability of future earnings and so contribute to the 
traded value of insurance firms (Adams et al., 2008; Garven & Lamm-
Tennant, 2003). The purchase of reinsurance has also been identified as one 
of the vital links in the sustainability of micro-insurance schemes in times of 
environmental disasters and economic shocks (Dror & Armstrong, 2006). In 
addition, the findings of McCord et al. (2005) demonstrate that the technical 
expertise of reinsurers in dealing with issues of lack of data, control of 
information asymmetry problems and fraud is invaluable to the sustained 
growth and profitability of micro-insurance schemes. Therefore, the fourth 
main hypothesis is that:  
H4a: Other things being equal, the level of reinsurance of micro-life 
insurers is likely have a positive impact on profitability.  
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On the other hand, Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000) contend that 
information asymmetry regarding the quality of the insurer’s business as well 
as riskiness of the policies ceded is reflected in the high cost reinsurance 
premiums which could lower the expected profit for the insurer. (Doherty & 
Garven, 1995) report that the purchase of reinsurance is costly for primary 
insurance writers (e.g., in terms of brokerage fees and ceded premiums) and 
thereby reduces profitability and the market value of insurance firms. 
Furthermore, Olaosebikan (2013) found a negative relation between 
profitability and the level of reinsurance in the Nigerian micro-life insurance 
market and suggests that reinsurance may be highly priced to reflect the 
increased risk associated with providing micro-life insurance coverage to low 
income groups. This reasoning implies that: 
H4b: Other things being equal, the level of reinsurance of micro-life 
insurers is likely have a negative impact on profitability.  
4.6 Interaction Term (Reinsurance x Leverage) 
Prior research (e.g., see Adams, 1996; Adams, Hardwick, & Zou, 2008;; 
Garven & Lamm-Tennant, 2003) highlight the importance of reinsurance in 
reducing the expected costs of bankruptcy induced at high leverage. Adams 
(1996) finds that the increasing use of reinsurance is associated with highly 
leveraged firms in line with the ‘risk-bearing’ hypothesis which suggests that 
insurers tend to reinsure more to alleviate the risk of severe loss as their 
leverage levels gets close to solvency constraints. In addition, Garven and 
Lamm-Tennant (2003) contend that the use of reinsurance reduces the 
effects of large unexpected losses and increases the probability the insurer 
would benefit from investment in tax-favoured assets. Shiu (2011) finds that 
insurers with a higher level of leverage tend to reinsure to reduce the 
probability of insolvency and mitigate the agency costs arising from the 
conflicts between policyholders and shareholder-owners. Adams et al. (2008) 
in the investigation of the factors affecting the incremental use of 
reinsurance in UK life insurance firms find that insurers with higher leverage 
79 
 
tend to purchase more reinsurance than less leveraged insurers. Therefore, 
the fifth main hypothesis is that: 
H5: Other things being equal, a positive relation between the 
interaction term (reinsurance x leverage) and the profitability of 
micro-life insurers is likely to exist. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the main test hypotheses derived from the 
review of literature in chapter 3. The determinants of the profitability of 
micro-life insurers has been described as the managerial success in reducing 
market imperfections (e.g., information asymmetries and transaction costs) 
and building capacity to realize economies of scale. The hypotheses outlined 
in this chapter thus provide the foundation for the empirical analysis 
conducted in chapter 6 of the thesis. The procedure for conducting the 







This chapter introduces the sample data, defines the main variables, and 
specifies the models employed in the empirical analysis. Specifically, the 
chapter describes frontier estimation techniques – SFA and DEA employed in 
a first-stage computation of the cost efficiency estimates. It also describes 
the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) model employed in the second-
stage regression analyses to test the research hypotheses put forward in 
chapter 4. 
5.2 Data Sources and Description 
The data employed to test the hypotheses put forward in the preceding 
chapter are obtained from the annual financial statements of (micro) life 
insurance firms in Nigeria and South Africa. For Nigeria, annual data are 
compiled by the NIA and submitted to the insurance industry regulator – the 
NIACOM. For South Africa, annual data are filed with the local insurance 
industry regulator – the FSB. In cases where information on micro-life 
insurance business could not be identified from published sources, data were 
then obtained directly from internal company sources through authorized 
direct access and/or by interview with technical managers. There is currently 
no specific regulation for micro-insurance in Nigeria and South Africa 19 , 
therefore life insurers are not mandated to hold separate data for micro-
                                                          
19Although micro-insurance regulation has not been implemented for both countries, there is 
an ‘unofficial’ definition for micro-insurance provision. For example, In South Africa, based on 
the requirements of the FSC charter, micro-insurance is usually defined as products targeted 
to the LSM 1-5 (low income population) which commercial (formal) insurance  providers  have 
to report (though not compulsory) in their annual statements. For Nigeria, micro-insurance 
products are usually characterized by low premiums (usually around US $6 per month) and 
low sums assured.  
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insurance activities. Hence, commercial insurers have not formally monitored 
the costs associated with developing and writing their micro-insurance 
operations. Therefore, in cases where the required data, especially on 
expenses, are unobtainable through published sources and /or interviews, 
the present study makes assumptions around the allocation of expenses due 
to the difficulty in directly assessing the actual expenses of the micro-life 
insurance business. As in Angove and Tande (2011) the proportional method 
of expense allocation which assumes that the cost of writing the micro-life 
business is proportional to the premium income generated is employed. 
Appendix A presents the comparison of the observed/actual expenses versus 
estimated expenses for the eleven Nigerian micro-life insurers who reported 
the expenses on their micro-insurance business. As expected, the actual 
expenses are on average 11 percent higher than the estimated expenses. 
This difference reflects the high transaction costs associated with micro-
insurance, and suggests that the expenses incurred on the micro-life 
insurance business are on average higher than the premium income 
generated. However, given the lack of data, the proportional method of 
expense allocation is applied for the micro-life insurers for which the data on 
expenses is not available. With the penetration/growth of micro-insurance 
and the introduction of micro-insurance regulation, it is hoped that future 
research will be able to more accurately monitor expenses in order to better 
understand the profitability and commercial viability of micro-life insurance. 
 The sample data were obtained for Nigerian and South African micro-life 
insurers over six years - 2005 to 2010. There were a number of mergers and 
acquisitions in the Nigerian insurance industry in 2007, which was triggered 
by a consolidation exercise conducted by NAICOM. The exercise resulted in 
the reduction of life insurers from 52 firms in 2005 to 26 firms by 2010. For 
South Africa, the number of life insurers over the sample period increased 
from 67 firms in 2005 to 76 firms by 2010. It should be noted that not all the 
Nigerian and South African life insurers offered micro-life insurance products 
and so the data set had to be ‘trimmed’ to include only those life insurers 
offering micro-insurance products. The micro-life insurance firms for which 
financial data were obtained for both countries were all stock forms of 
organization. Furthermore, the combined data set consisting of both Nigerian 
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and South African micro-life insurers were further ‘cleaned’ by eliminating 
firms with less than three years of continuous data in order to conduct an  
effective panel data estimation from which to derive reliable and robust 
results. As in Weber (2010), the Bacon technique for detecting outliers in a 
multivariate dataset was employed to identify any outliers in the data 
sample. The sample ‘filtering process’ identified 31 micro-life insurance 
providers for Nigeria and 30 micro-life insurance providers for South Africa 
resulting in an unbalanced panel of 303 firm-year observations consisting of 
141 firm-year cases for Nigeria and 162 firm-year observations for South 
Africa. To ensure the comparability of all monetary values the annual 
financial data for each country were converted to US dollars at the prevailing 
end-of-year exchange rates and deflated by the consumer price index to the 
base year 2005 (e.g see, Biener & Eling, 2011; Cummins & Zi, 1998). The 
annual country-specific consumer price indices for Nigeria and South Africa 
were obtained from the latest published financial statistics of the IMF. 
5.3 Frontier Efficiency Estimation 
Frontier efficiency methodology is a class of benchmarking techniques which 
estimate the operating performance of a firm relative to “best practice” 
efficiency frontiers derived from leading firms in the industry. Frontier 
efficiency methodology has long been applied in the academic literature and 
also by financial institutions (e.g., banks and insurance firms) because it 
summarises firm performance in a single statistic that controls for differences 
among firms using a multidimensional framework (Cummins & Weiss, 2000). 
The use of the frontier analysis enables researchers and/or individuals to 
determine the ‘best practice’ firms within the industry, assign numerical 
efficiency values and identify areas of input overuse and/or output 
underproduction. The concept of economic efficiency arises from the micro-
economic theory of the firm (Coelli, 1996). The production frontier is the 
most basic concept of economic efficiency which indicates the minimum 
amount of input required to produce any level of output for a firm operating 
with a single unit of input and output (Cummins & Weiss, 2000). The 
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pioneering work of Farrell (1957) which considers multiple inputs in the 
measurement of firm efficiency is recognised by most scholars to be the 
precursor of modern efficiency measurements. He proposed that the 
efficiency of a firm consists of two parts: First, technical efficiency which 
reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximum output from a given set of 
inputs; and second, allocative efficiency which reflects the ability of the firm 
to use the inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices. The 
combination of the two components gives rise to economic efficiency or cost 
efficiency. Farrell (1957) demonstrated his concepts of modern efficiency 
using two approaches: the input-oriented measures and the output-oriented 
measures. 
The input-oriented measure for technical efficiency indicates the amount by 
which input quantities can be reduced without changing the level of output 
quantities produced while the output orientated measures of efficiency 
indicates the amount by which output quantities could be proportionally 
expanded without altering the input quantities employed (Coelli, 1996). Färe 
and Lovell (1978) demonstrate that the measures for technical efficiency 
computed using the constant returns to scale (CRS) specification model 
provides the same value for both input and output-orientations. However, 
the values obtained using the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) 
results in unequal values for the input and output orientated measures of 
technical efficiency (see section 5.3.1). Coelli and Perelman (1999) contend 
that the choice of orientation has only a minor influence of the efficiency 
scores obtained and that the choice of the appropriate orientation depend on 
the quantities (i.e., input or output) in which managers have the most direct 
control. The present study employs the input orientated measure in the 
estimation of technical efficiency because the input quantities, and in 
particular, the price of input quantities is the primary decision faced by the 
managers of micro-life insurance firms.  
The two primary methodologies for estimating efficiency are the linear 
programming (DEA) approach and the econometric (SFA) approach. The 
costs and benefits of both techniques are emphasised by the adherents of 
each approach and there is no consensus on the preferred choice of 
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estimation methodology (see Eling & Luhnen, 2010a for a detailed review of 
relevant literature). The two methods differ primarily on  the degree of 
restriction imposed on the ‘best practice’ frontier and the distributional 
assumptions imposed on the random error and inefficiency. 
5.3.1 Linear Programming (DEA) Approach 
DEA is a linear programming technique developed by Charnes, Cooper, and 
Rhodes (1978) and subsequently revised by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper 
(1984) amongst others. DEA is the most widespread mathematical 
programming approach employed in the estimation of production, cost and 
revenue frontiers and provides an efficient way of decomposing efficiency 
into its components (Coelli, 1996).  With DEA, the frontier is formed as the 
piecewise linear combinations that connect the set of best practice 
observations thus yielding convex production possibilities set (Berger & 
Humphrey, 1997). The DEA approach imposes less structure on the 
specification of the ‘best practice’ and does not decompose the inefficiency 
and error terms. The deviations of the observed firms from the frontier are 
all attributed to inefficiency (Coelli, 1996).The DEA model proposed by 
Charnes et al. (1978) which assumes input-orientation and constant returns 
to scale has been employed in several studies (e.g. see, Cummins & Nini, 
2002; Worthington & Hurley, 2002). However, Eling and Luhnen (2010b) in 
the survey of about 55 studies which employ the DEA, contend that the DEA 
specification under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) which 
was proposed by Banker et al. (1984) is the most widely used specification.  
The VRS model is the most preferred model for the DEA estimation of 
efficiency because compared to the CRS model, which assumes that all the 
sample firms considered (also referred to as decision making units (DMUs)) 
are operating at an optimal scale, the VRS accounts for market imperfections 
such as constraints on finance, imperfect competition, and so on, which 
might hinder firms from operating optimally (Coelli, 1996). The VRS 
specification model thus allows a more accurate estimation of the technical 
efficiency (TE) of firms which are not operating at optimal scale due to 
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market imperfections. In the VRS model, the frontier is formed as a convex 
hull of intersecting planes which provides a tighter envelope of the data 
points (compared with the conical hull of the CRS model), and results in 
efficiency scores which are greater than or equal to those obtained using the 
CRS model specification (Coelli & Perelman, 1999). 
Following the example given in Coelli (1996), the present study employs 
three inputs and two outputs (see section 5.4) in the estimation of technical 
and cost efficiency scores for the combined sample of Nigerian and South 
African micro-life insurers. Furthermore, the study uses the input-orientated 
measure of efficiency under the VRS assumption because the sample of 
micro-life insurers used in the present study are subject to various market 
imperfections (e.g., regulatory constraints, imperfect competition etc.) which 
have an impact on their operations. DEA measures the technical efficiency as 
the ratio of outputs to assigned inputs. The efficiency,  of an insurer    is 
thus measured by the ratio: 
 
 
   
    
    
 
[5.1] 
where   represents the M x 1 vector of output weights;     is a K x 1 vector 
of input weights of outputs;    is the vector of outputs for the  
   insurer; xi is 
the vector of inputs for the     insurer – where,   = 1,2, …, 62.  The linear 
programming problem is then specified as shown below for each insurer,   to 
obtain optimal input and output weights for the maximisation of efficiency:  
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 ≤  1    where j=1,2,… ,62. 






The optimisation equation involves obtaining the values for   and   such that 
the efficiency measure is less than or equal to one, and the value for the     
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firm is maximised. A downside to the optimisation equation is that it has an 
infinite number of solutions thus a constraint is imposed where the vector of 
input and output weights is transformed: 
         ( 
   ) 
                        st       = 1, 
                                        -  
      0 where j=1, 2,…, 62. 





The envelopment form of equation [5.3] is therefore derived as: 
         , 
               st         + Y𝞴 ≥ 0, 
                          – X𝞴 ≥ 0, 
                N1’𝞴 =1 




where   is a scalar, 𝞴 is a M x 1 vector of constants, and N1 is an N x 1 
vector of ones. The envelopment form of equation [5.4] involves fewer 
constraints. The linear programming is solved N times, and once for each ith 
insurer. The value of     is the technical efficiency, which satisfies the 
condition,   ≤ 1, is obtained for each insurer with the value of 1 indicating a 
technically efficient firm with a point on the frontier.  The behavioural 
objectives of insurers such as cost minimisation or revenue maximisation can 
be considered when information on price is available (Coelli, 1996). Following 
from equation [5.4], the information on input prices is employed in the 
estimation of the cost minimisation. Thus: 
                 *, 
               st         + Y𝞴 ≥ 0, 
                         – X𝞴 ≥ 0, 
                N1’𝞴 =1 






 where    is a vector of inputs for the  
  -insurer and   * represents the cost-
minimising vector for the input quantities for the    -insurer (DMU), given the 
input prices    and the output levels    where i=1,2, …, 62. The total 
economic (cost) efficiency (CE)20 of the     insurer is therefore computed as 
the ratio of the minimum cost to the observed cost as in [5.6] below:  
 
    
        





5.3.2 Econometric (SFA) Approach 
SFA which was initially developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and 
Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977), is the most commonly used 
econometric approach in frontier efficiency estimation. SFA specifies a 
functional form for the production, cost and profit relationship among inputs 
and outputs. SFA differs from DEA because it utilizes information on the total 
expenditure on the inputs used in addition to the information on input prices, 
output quantities, and also accounts for random error in the estimation of 
cost efficiency (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000). The two main decisions faced in 
the application of the econometric frontier approach – SFA, is the 
determination of the most appropriate functional form for the cost function 
and the distributional assumption for the error term. SFA methodology is 
usually applied in two steps. First, the cost function is estimated to 
determine the efficient frontier, while the deviation of individual firms from 
the efficient frontier due to inefficiency, and random error are estimated in 
the second stage. The cost frontier is defined as the function that gives the 
minimum attainable cost for each level of output (Eling & Luhnen, 2010a). 
The stochastic cost frontier can be written as: 
                                                          
20Following Biener and Eling (2011), the efficiency values are estimated separately for all 
years and based on a ‘one-world’ frontier. 
      (       )         [5.7] 
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where    is the expenditure incurred by the  
   insurer;    is the M X 1 vector 
of outputs of the     insurer;    is the N x 1 vector of input prices faced by 
the     insurer;   is the vector of technology parameters;     is an insurer-
specific error; and   (       )          represents the stochastic cost frontier. 
The insurer-specific error     is further decomposed into: 
     =      [5.8] 
where    is the two-sided random error component, and    is the non-
negative cost inefficiency component (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000). 
Functional Form 
Cummins and Weiss (2000) contend that a lack of knowledge on the exact 
functional form of the production (cost) function of financial services firms 
has led to the use of various approximations. Therefore, the selection of the 
most appropriate functional form for the cost function frontier is one the 
major decisions in the econometric frontier estimation of efficiency. Some 
examples of the functional forms employed in various studies include the 
Cobb-Douglas, translog, generalised translog, composite-cost, and the 
Fourier flexible functional form. 
 The Cobb-Douglas functional form is the most simple and earliest 
method used in the determination of the production function of firms 
(e.g. see, Schmidt & Lovell, 1979). Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
contend that the simplicity of the Cobb-Douglas function enables 
direct focus on the error term which contains the information on cost 
efficiency. However, it has the disadvantage of not being able to 
accommodate multiple outputs without violating the requisite 
curvature properties in output space. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
further contend that if the true structure of (single-output) production 
technology is more complex than its Cobb Douglas representation, 
the un-modelled complexity could influence the error term, thus 




 The translog production function developed by Christensen, 
Jorgenson, and Lau (1973) is the most widely used parametric 
function in literature (e.g. see, Cummins & Weiss, 2000; Cummins & 
Zi, 1998; Rai, 1996). The translog frontier has the advantage over 
earlier functional forms because it accommodates multiple outputs 
without violating the conditions of output curvature. Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000) contend that the translog frontier, which is more flexible 
than the Cobb-Douglas function, forms the basis of the empirical 
estimation and decomposition of cost efficiency based on the system 
of equations. Despite its prevalence in econometric efficiency 
estimation, the quadratic feature of the translog requires the 
independent variables to be greater than zero. In situations where 
multiple outputs are considered, and not all firms produce all outputs, 
the estimation of the translog function could become problematic 
(Cummins & Weiss, 2000). Several approaches, such as the setting of 
firms with zero outputs to a small positive number, have been 
employed to curb the limitations of the translog function.  
 
 The generalised translog, composite-cost, and Fourier flexible 
functional forms are techniques which have been developed to 
address the limitations of the translog functional form.  In the 
generalised translog function, the output variables are transformed 
using a Box-Cox transformation (e.g. see, Caves, Christensen, & 
Tretheway, 1980). The composite-cost function employed by Berger, 
Cummins, and Weiss (1997) in the analysis of economies of scope in 
the US non-life insurance industry, consists of a quadratic 
components for outputs which are linked through interaction terms to 
a log-quadratic component for input prices. The resulting functional 
form can then be estimated linear or log-linear. The generalised 
translog, composite-cost as well as the translog cost functions have 
been criticised in literature because they impose a U-shaped structure 
on the cost function (Cummins & Weiss, 2000). The Fourier flexible 
functional form developed by Gallant (1982) has been shown to 
address the limitation of the translog functions through the addition of 
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trigonometric (Fourier) transformations to the translog functional 
forms. This results in an extremely flexible function that does not 
impose a U-shape structure for the cost function (e.g. see, Berger et 
al., 1997; Fenn et al., 2008). 
Distributional Assumptions for the Error term 
 SFA postulates a composed error model which is made up of two 
components: the random departures from efficiency, and the departures due 
to inefficiency. The random error component ( ) is modelled using a two-
sided random error term; because it differs across firms, it is assumed to be 
independent, identically distributed, and beyond the control of individual 
firms. On the other hand, the inefficiency component ( ) is a one-sided error 
term which follows an asymmetric distribution because it can only act to 
increase (and not reduce) costs (see equation [5.8]). The distributional 
assumption for the random error component ( ) is usually a symmetric 
distribution such as the standard normal (Eling & Luhnen, 2010a). For the 
inefficiency component ( ), distributions such as the half-normal, truncated-
normal, exponential, and gamma could be employed. Greene (1990) in the 
estimation of the stochastic cost frontier of a cross section of US electricity 
utilities, obtained relatively similar values for the inefficiency component 
using all four (i.e., half-normal, truncated-normal, exponential, and gamma) 
distributional assumptions. However, he contends that the half-normal 
distributional assumption for the inefficiency component is relatively 
inflexible as it presumes that most firms are clustered near full efficiency, 
and thus proposes the use of other distributions such as the exponential 
distribution. On the other hand, Ritter and Simar (1997) argue that the 
choice of the distribution for the inefficiency component is largely immaterial, 
and suggests the use of relatively simple distributions such as the half-
normal or exponential rather than more flexible distributions such as 
truncated-normal or gamma as suggested by Greene (1990). 
Therefore, following prior literature (e.g., Eling & Luhnen, 2010a), the 
present study employs the translog functional form in the specification of the 
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cost function. In addition, the translog function is the preferred functional 
form because the study employs two outputs, the dollar value of premiums 
and investment income, which is produced by all the micro-life insurers 
considered (see section 5.4). Thus, the specified cost function is not 
particularly affected by the quadratic feature limitations of the translog. The 
study also assumes the normal distribution for the random error component 
( ), and the exponential distribution for the inefficiency component ( ). The 
translog cost function is specified as follows: 
                                        
 
 
                    
 
 
                                                . 
 
[5.9] 
where   denotes the     insurer (i= 1, 2, …, 62), subscript     indexes the      -
time period (t= 2005, …, 2010),      is the observed total cost
21 for the      
insurer in year t,      is the amount of output m produced by the  
    insurer 
in year t,     is the price of input n for the  
   insurer in year t,     is the 
random error term, and     is the inefficiency error term. In the estimation of 
the cost function, the symmetry restriction is imposed, and the total costs 
and input prices are divided by one of the input prices to ensure the linear 
homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices (e.g., see Kumbhakar & Lovell, 
2000). 
5.3.3 Input, Input Prices and Outputs 
The definition of the most appropriate measure of inputs, outputs, and their 
respective prices is crucial in frontier efficiency estimation. The nature of the 
services (micro-insurance) sector which is characterised by intangible 
outputs, implicit prices, and lack of publicly available data on some inputs, 
makes the appropriate measurements of inputs and outputs 
problematic(Cummins & Weiss, 2000). However, prior insurance industry 
research (e.g. see, Eling & Luhnen, 2010b) identified acceptable measures of 
                                                          
21As in prior studies (e.g., Choi & Weiss, 2005; Eling & Luhnen, 2010a) observed total cost is 
measured as the operating expenses plus the cost of capital (see Appendix A). 
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inputs, outputs, and prices that produce economically meaningful efficiency 
scores. 
Input and Input Prices 
The three main insurance inputs as defined in literature are: labour, business 
services and materials, and capital 22 . Following prior literature on 
international insurance industry efficiency studies (e.g. see, Eling & Luhnen, 
2010B; Fenn et al., 2008), the present study merges the labour, business 
services and materials into a single variable. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
publicly available data on the number of employees or hours worked in the 
(micro) insurance industry, the input quantities on labour and business 
services are proxied by dividing the expenditures for these inputs with 
publicly available price indices on wage rates. For example, the present 
study utilises operating expenses (including commissions) divided by the 
price of labour as the proxy for the labour and business services input 
quantities. The price of labour is defined as the regional International Labour 
Organization (ILO) average annual market wage rate. Debt and equity 
capital are considered as the most important inputs for which cost measures 
have to be found. Thus, debt capital is proxied as the total liabilities while 
the price of debt capital is measured as the country-specific annual long-
term government bond rates. Equity capital which is proxied as the capital 
plus surplus is measured as the 5-year average of yearly total return rates of 
the relevant MSCI emerging markets indices (e.g., see Biener & Eling, 2011). 
The regional wage per year for the insurance sector per country is available 
from the ILO statistics while the proxies for the price of capital were obtained 
from the Thomson DataStream database.  
  
                                                          
22Labour can be sometimes split further into agent labour and home office labour, because the 
two types of labour have different prices and are used in different proportions by firms in the 
industry. Business services and materials include travel, advertising etc., but are not usually 
subdivided. The three categories of capital that could be considered are: physical, debt and 
equity capital. Due to their small proportion, physical capital is usually merged into the 





The three principal approaches employed in the measurement of insurance 
outputs are: the value-added approach, the intermediation approach, and 
the user-cost approach23. The value added approach has been described as 
the most appropriate method for efficiency studies, because it considers all 
the asset and liability categories, and counts them as important outputs if 
they contribute a significant added value based on operating and cost 
allocations (Berger, Cummins, Weiss, & Zi, 2000; Grace & Timme, 1992). 
The value added approach assumes that risk-pooling/risk-bearing, provision 
of real financial relating to insured losses and financial intermediation are the 
three main services provided by insurers, and thus output proxies are 
defined for each of these services. Eling and Luhnen (2010b) contend that 
insurers create value-added by operating a risk pool, collecting premiums 
from policyholders, and redistributing them to customers who have incurred 
losses. They further contend that the provision of real services (e.g. financial 
planning) could create added value for policyholders. Cummins and Nini 
(2002) also contend that insurers create value added through financial 
intermediation by investing the premiums provided by policyholders, and 
paying out claims and other administrative expenses. For the risk-
pooling/risk-bearing service in life insurance, either the premiums or incurred 
benefits have been used as proxies. However, what constitutes the most 
appropriate proxy for the risk pooling/risk bearing output has been the 
subject of debate in the literature (see Eling & Luhnen, 2010b; Yuengert, 
1993). Following prior research (e.g. see, Gardner & Grace, 1993; Greene & 
Segal, 2004), the present study employs the US dollar value of premiums as 
the proxy for the risk-pooling/risk-bearing functions because the output of a 
life insurer can be viewed the outcome of the selling effort and additional risk 
that the insurer bears. The intermediation function is proxied using the US 
dollar value of the investment income because insurers issue debt contracts 
(i.e., insurance policies or annuities), and invest the funds received until they 
                                                          
23In the intermediation approach insurers are viewed as pure financial intermediaries who 
borrow funds from policy holders, invest the borrowed funds, and pay-out claims, taxes and 
costs (e.g. see, Brockett, Cooper, Golden, Rousseau, & Wang, 1998). The user-cost approach 
uses the net contribution of the financial product to total revenues in the determination of 
inputs or outputs (Hancock, 1985). 
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are used to pay claims and/or withdrawn by policyholders (Eling & Luhnen, 
2010a). 
 The use of frontier efficiency estimation techniques in the insurance sector, 
particularly in the academic literature, has seen rapid growth in recent years 
(Eling & Luhnen, 2010a). However, the selection of the most appropriate 
frontier efficiency estimation approach has been subject to intense debate in 
literature with some researchers arguing for the econometric approach, and 
others for the linear programming approach. Indeed, both the econometric 
and linear programming approaches have their advantages and 
disadvantages, and there is no consensus as to which method is more 
superior (Cummins & Zi, 1998). In the present study, the cost efficiency 
estimates are derived using both the linear programming (DEA) and 
econometric (SFA) approaches in a first-stage analysis. The definition and 
measurement, and summary statistics of the input, input prices, and outputs 
are further depicted in Appendix B. 
5.4 Panel Data Design 
In the second-stage regression, a panel dataset is constructed from annual 
data covering the period 2005 to 2010 in order to test the research 
hypotheses developed in chapter 4. A panel data design has been shown to 
provide an effective estimation approach as it permits flexibility in modelling 
differences in behaviour across firms. Prior studies (e.g., see Baltagi, 2005; 
Hsiao, 1985, 2003) have emphasised the benefits of panel datasets for 
econometric research. Some of these advantages include: 
 Controls for individual heterogeneity: Panel data has the advantage of 
controlling for the omission of country, firm and/or time invariant 
variables. For example, in  the present study, the profitability of 
micro-life insurers from two countries-Nigeria and South Africa are 
modelled as a function of some independent variables (i.e., cost 
efficiency, ownership structure, leverage, and reinsurance) and control 
variables (i.e., regulation, firm size, age, product-mix, and interest 
rates). However, there could be other omitted country, firm and/or 
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time-invariant variables which could affect the profitability of micro-life 
insurers. Differences in financial literacy between Nigeria and South 
Africa could be an example of a country-specific variable that could 
affect the demand and supply, and subsequent profitability, of micro-
life insurers. Furthermore, time-invariant variables such as 
geographical location could also affect the profitability of micro-life 
insurers. The omission of country, firm and time-specific variables 
could lead to biased parameter estimates. 
 
 Reduces collinearity among variables: Some explanatory variables 
could be highly related with each other. For example, in the present 
study, the Leverage variable could be related to the Reinsurance 
variable (see section 3.6.5). This relation could be a potential source 
of multicollinearity, and result in the production of biased parameter 
estimates if time-series data are employed. However, the problem of 
multicollinearity is less likely in panel data because the cross-sectional 
dimension of the panel data design adds variability (i.e., between and 
within-firm variability) which leads to narrower confidence intervals 
despite the possible existence of multicollinearity (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
 Facilitates the analysis of dynamic adjustments:  Compared to cross-
sectional data which examine the behaviour of firms at a certain point 
in time, panel data has the advantage of allowing the study of the 
variation in the behaviour of firms across different time periods. For 
example, the panel data design allows the examination of the variation 
in the profitability of micro-life insurers in different time periods. 
Despite its advantages, there are certain limitations that could arise in the 
use of panel data design. The main limitation of the panel data design in the 
current study is the issue of potential sample bias arising from an 
unbalanced panel. For example, the consolidation exercise conducted in the 
Nigerian insurance industry in 2007 triggered a spate of mergers and 
acquisitions in which some firms were closed to new business and became 
run-offs, while new firms were also being established. These changes result 
in incomplete or unbalanced panels, as the sample-data may not reflect all of 
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the population of micro-life insurance firms, thus resulting in the production 
of biased outcomes. However, on balance the advantages of the panel data 
design are considered to outweigh this potential limitation. 
5.5 Model Specification 
The modelling procedure employed in the second-stage regression analysis 
follows prior literature on the determinants of financial performance. The 
definitions of all variables included in the analysis are presented in Appendix 
B. To conduct the panel data analysis, the general base-line regression 
equation is estimated as follows: 
             +                              




where,   indexes the     insurer (i= 1, 2,…, 62), subscript   indexes the    -
year (i.e., time periods, t =2005,…, 2010).           is the dependent 
variable - annual profitability;               is the cost efficiency estimate; 
            is the ownership structure dummy variables;             
represents the level of leverage;                is the level of reinsurance 
purchased;             represents the country and firm-specific variables;   -
   are K x 1 vectors of the independent variables; and    is L x 1 vectors 
with L representing the number of control variables. The disturbance term is 
specified as a two-way error component model in the form: 
                                                    [5.11] 
where    indicates insurer-specific effects,     indicates year-specific effects 
and     indicates the remainder (random) disturbance. The explanations of 
each of the variables in equation [5.10] are given below.     
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5.5.1 Dependent Variable 
Following prior studies (e.g., see Greene & Segal, 2004; Wipf & Garand, 
2010), the dependent variable,         , is the annual profitability- the return 
on assets (ROA) - which is measured as the ratio of net income before 
interest and taxes for insurer   in year   to the average of total assets in 
years   and      24  More specifically, this variable is defined as: 
   
  
 =
                 





where   denotes the     year,    represents net income;     represents 
premiums earned (net of reinsurance);    is investment income (net of fees);  
    is incurred claims (net of reinsurance recoverable),     is management 
expenses ,     is commissions paid, and     is total assets.  
5.5.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in the study are explained below. 
Cost Efficiency (Efficiency): As in Greene and Segal (2004), cost 
efficiency estimates derived from the DEA (see equation [5.5]) and SFA (see 
equation [5.7]) analyses. Because micro-insurance is by design a low-
premium product, the proportion of the premium that must go to pay for 
expenses (as opposed to payment for covered losses) i.e., the transaction 
costs are high. Therefore, as in Choi and Weiss (2005) cost efficient firms are 
expected to be more profitable than cost inefficient firms. 
Ownership structure (Ownership): Consistent with He and Sommer 
(2010), the ownership structure is represented by dummy variables for each 
share ownership class considered, namely:   = 1 for public (widely-held) 
stock micro-life insurer, and 0 for private (closely- held) stock micro-life 
                                                          
24 Prior studies (e.g. see, Carroll, 1993; Pope & Ma, 2008) have also used the ratio of net 
income to net premiums earned in the estimation of annual profitability. 
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insurer. For the variation of private (closely-held) stock micro-life insurers;  
    = 1 for shareholdings closely-held by management, 0 otherwise;     = 
1 for shareholdings closely-held by banks, and 0 otherwise; while    =1 for 
shareholdings closely-held by others (e.g., insurance companies, financial 
companies, and mutual funds), and =0 otherwise.  
 
Leverage (Leverage): The degree of financial leverage reflects the ability 
of the micro-life insurer to manage their economic exposure to unexpected 
losses.   Following, Rajan and Zingales (1995), leverage is estimated as the 
ratio of life insurance liabilities plus other liabilities (net of reinsurance) to 
surplus (net admissible assets). An insurance company’s surplus is the 
amount by which total assets exceed total liabilities. The greater an insurer’s 
leverage, the higher the ratio. As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4, high 
Leverage could have a positive (tax-shield benefits) or negative (agency 
costs) impact of the profitability of a firm. 
  
 
Reinsurance (Reinsurance): Following prior research (e.g., Adiel, 1996) 
on the corporate demand for reinsurance. The level of reinsurance of 
reinsurance is measured as: 
 
 
              
                     
                     
 
 
                         [5.13] 
The measure reflects the total amount of reinsurance purchased by a micro-
life insurance firm. As discussed in chapter 4, the level of reinsurance 
(Reinsurance) could have a positive (Garven & Lamm-Tennant, 2003) or 
negative (Jean-Baptiste & Santomero, 2000) impact on the profitability of 
micro-life insurers. 
5.5.3 Control Variables 
In addition to the explanatory variables stated above, five control variables 
which could also affect the profitability of micro-life insurers are included in 
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the regression model. The motivation for including the control variables is as 
follows:  
Regulation: The development of any market could be either enhanced or 
stifled by regulation. Prior research (e.g., see Biener & Eling, 2012; Kwon, 
2010) contend that the regulatory and legal frameworks in developing 
economies could play a significant role in the penetration and profitability of 
micro-insurance programs. Indeed, Outreville (1990) contends that a well-
established and clear regulatory framework could ease the barriers to market 
entry, encourage product-market innovations, and foster increased 
competition between micro-insurance suppliers, thereby empowering low 
income groups with risk management solutions and improved access to 
financial services. For example, the Insurance Regulation and Development 
Authority (IRDA) Act (2000) in India which made it compulsory for insurance 
companies to allocate 5% of their gross premium income for provision of 
insurance in the rural and social sectors has been partly responsible for the 
rapid increase in micro-insurance schemes and opened up realistic 
opportunities for the poor to purchase insurance (Ito & Kono, 2010). On the 
other hand, stringent and/or inadequate regulation could also hinder the 
development of micro-insurance. For example, Ayorinde (2001) argues that 
in Nigeria, inadequate regulatory controls such as the Insurance Act (1976) 
which makes it mandatory for all insurance companies to invest their funds 
in domestic assets has been largely responsible for the generally low levels 
of insurance penetration and lacklustre profitability of local insurance 
companies. Furthermore, tight regulatory schemes (e.g., Asfaw & Jütting, 
2007) and regulation-induced transaction costs (e.g., Pauly, Zweifel, 
Scheffler, Preker, & Bassett, 2006) have also been reported for micro-health 
schemes. Therefore, the adequacy or otherwise of insurance regulation is 
likely to be an important consideration in the management of information 
asymmetries, agency problems, and other market imperfections with micro-
insurance schemes in Africa. Biener, Eling, and Schmit (2013) in their study 
of the impact of regulation on micro-insurance markets propose that 
regulations which yield arbitrage between micro-insurance and standard (or 
“conventional”) insurance regulatory systems should be avoided. Koven and 
Zimmerman (2011) describe the ideal regulatory environment for micro-
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insurance as one which neither over-promotes the market nor creates 
barriers by insisting on rigid enforcement of traditional insurance guidelines. 
As noted previously (see chapter 2, section 2.2), there is currently no 
specific micro-insurance regulation in Nigeria and South Africa. Thus, the 
regulatory quality index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators which 
captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector 
development is used as a proxy to measure regulation. More specifically, the 
annual percentile rank for each country on regulatory quality is used in the 
present study. The percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries that 
rank lower than the indicated country such that higher values indicate better 
regulatory quality (World Bank, 2012b). 
Size: Hardwick (1997) contends that large insurers are more able to 
efficiently diversify assumed risks and so reduce the unit cost of risk in the 
management of their underwriting portfolios. Adams and Buckle (2003) also 
suggest that large insurers are likely to have better financial performance 
than small insurers because they can realize scale economies through 
increasing output and economizing on the unit costs of technology and 
product development. Large insurers can also more efficiently diversify 
assumed risks and so reduce the unit cost of risk in the management of their 
underwriting portfolios. However, and Eling (2011) find that large micro-
insurers were inefficient, and had the highest potential for upgrading the use 
of technology in their operations. Furthermore, Adams and Buckle (2003) 
point out that the profitability of large insurers could be adversely affected 
by the enhanced information asymmetries and agency costs that often arise 
when organizations get bigger. Therefore, the predicted effect of firm size on 
the profitability of micro-life insurers is not clear from the literature. Firm 
size (Size) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Product Mix: Abdul Kader et al. (2010) report that the operational 
efficiency, and hence profitability, of insurance firms could be affected by 
their product-mix as multi-product insurers are likely to benefit not only from 
economies of scale but also from economies of scope in the use of shared 
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inputs (e.g., labour, technology, and so on). Mathewson (1983) also 
acknowledges that in multi-product insurance firms managers can spread 
assumed risks across different lines of insurance by imposing different 
underwriting criteria in order to realize economic gains in particular market 
segments while concomitantly keeping overall underwriting risk within 
acceptable bounds. Therefore, we expect that, all else equal, multi-line 
micro-life insurers will be more profitable than micro-life insurers with a 
narrow product-range. As in Mayers and Smith (1990), Product Mix is 
measured by a Herfindahl concentration index that is computed using the 3 
major lines of products sold by micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South 
Africa
25
. The Herfindahl index for each firm is computed as: 
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where      is the amount of direct premium written in the  
   line of 
insurance, and     is the amount of total premiums written across the 
micro-life insurance lines. The closer the Herfindahl index to one, the more 
concentrated is the production function of the micro-life insurer. 
Age: The length of time an insurance provider has been operating in the 
micro-life segment of the market could influence period profits. For example, 
established operatives are expected to have better local knowledge and a 
more dedicated sales force than new entrants to the market. Therefore, the 
length of time in the local micro-life insurance market is expected to be 
positively related to profitability. However, Biener and Eling (2011) found 
that firms which have been active in the micro-insurance market for long 
periods tended to be less efficient than new entrants to the micro-insurance 
market. Age is measured as the number of years an insurer has been 
operating in the micro-life insurance market. In addition, following Hsu and 
Petchsakulwong (2010) the natural logarithm of Age (i.e., lnAge) is 
                                                          




employed in the regression analysis to control for extreme values in the 
length of time of operations of the sample of micro-life insurers investigated. 
Interest rates : Doherty and Garven (1995) suggest that profit margins 
reflect the average price of traded insurance policies and that in competitive 
markets insurance prices follow, and are inversely related to, the movement 
of average annual interest rates in the economy (which in Nigeria and South 
Africa are roughly 8% and 6% per annum respectively). This reasoning 
implies an inverse relation between profitability and interest rates. On the 
other hand, high interest rates can improve yields on investments’ such as 
cash deposits and bonds. This suggests that there will be a positive linkage 
between the profitability of micro-insurance schemes and the level of interest 
rates in the economy (Olaosebikan, 2013). Therefore, the predicted effect of 
interest rates on the level of profitability of micro-life insurers is ambiguous. 
The variable Interest rate is measured as the annual commercial bank 
interest rate which is obtained from the international financial statistics 
database (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
Time Effects: Dummy variables for each year are also employed in the 
model to proxy for other macroeconomic factors such as changes in 
underwriting prices and inflation, which are cross-sectionally constant. 
Country Effects: To control for country-specific effects (e.g. cultural 
factors), a dummy variable for Country is included in the model; where 1 
represents Nigerian micro-life insurers, and 0 represents South African 
micro-life insurers. 
Interaction term (Reinsurance x Leverage): As noted earlier (see 
chapter 3, section 3.6.5), prior research (e.g., Adams et al., 2008; Garven & 
MacMinn, 1993) contend that insurers with high leverage tend purchase 
more reinsure to alleviate the costs of bankruptcy. Therefore, an interaction 
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term, Reinsurance x Leverage 26, is included in the model to capture the 
interaction between these two variables. 
The definition and measurement of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables are also given in Appendix C. 
5.6 Econometric Diagnostics 
In order to determine the most appropriate panel data estimator for the 
model in equation [5.10], a series of diagnostic tests are conducted. First, 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangean Multiplier Test (1980) is applied to examine 
the relative efficiency of the heterogeneous panel (fixed/random effects) 
estimation against the homogenous pooled OLS model. The Wald F-statistic 
and the LM chi-square are both statistically significant and the null 
hypothesis of no firm or period specific effects in the sample data is rejected 
(p–value <0.01). Thus, suggesting that the panel data which has the 
advantage of controlling for omitted firm- and/or period-specific effects is 
more appropriate for the analysis of the sample data. Second, the Hausman 
Specification Test (1978), which examines the differences between the 
coefficients obtained from fixed and random-effects panel data models, is 
conducted to determine the most appropriate panel model specification. The 
computed chi-square is found to be statistically insignificant (p-value > 
0.10), indicating that the coefficient estimates obtained from the random-
effects panel data model are more efficient.  
Further diagnostic tests are conducted to test for the presence of serial and 
cross-sectional correlation (heteroskedasticity) which could lead to 
inconsistent estimates in panel data. The Wooldridge (2002) test is 
conducted to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of the linear 
panel data model. The null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation in 
the panels is rejected (p–value <0.01). The Modified Wald proposed by 
                                                          
26 The introduction of interaction terms could lead to high levels of multicollinearity in the 
regression model, thus the ‘centering’ procedure is applied in which each variable is 
subtracted from their corresponding mean values before constructing the multiplicative 
interaction terms. The centering procedure reduces the correlation between the product terms 
and the component parts of the interactive effects (Coulton & Chow, 1993).  
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Greene (2003) is further applied to test for the presence of group-wise 
heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis of no group-wise heteroskedasticity is 
rejected (p–value <0.01). Therefore, following Grace and Leverty (2012) the 
FGLS estimation method which accounts for the presence of both the panel-
specific heteroskedastic and serial correlated error terms is employed in the 
multivariate regression analysis. The FGLS estimator, proposed by Parks 
(1967) has been identified as the most appropriate methodology to improve 
upon the estimation efficiency when the panel data sample is faced with the 
problems of both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. However, despite 
the efficiency gain of the FGLS in allowing for the heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation, it is not without its drawbacks. For instance, Wooldridge 
(2002) contends that it is difficult to assess the performance of FGLS in finite 
samples due to the difficulty in deriving finite sample properties. In the 
present study, the FGLS estimator is specified to control for panel-specific 
heteroskedasticity because the data sample employed consist of micro-life 
insurance firms from two different countries. In addition, the panel–specific 
AR (1) serial correlation structure also is specified for the model due to the 
unbalanced nature of the panel data set. 
 5.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter describes the sources of data and the period of empirical 
analysis. The study uses data obtained from the annual financial statements 
of micro-life insurance firms in Nigeria and South Africa. The final sample 
consists of 310 firm-year observations over the period of 2005-2010. The 
chapter also describes the frontier efficiency methods (i.e., DEA and SFA) 
and variables employed in the first-stage analysis to derive the cost 
efficiency estimates. In addition, the definition and measurement of the 
dependent, independent and control variables which are used in the second-
stage regression analysis to test the research hypothesis put forward in 
chapter 4 are also described. Finally, the chapter specifies and justifies the 
use of the FGLS model employed in the multivariate regression. The 
empirical results obtained from the statistical analysis are now reported and 





6.1   Introduction 
The implications of managerial success in reducing market imperfections 
(e.g., information asymmetries and transaction costs) and building capacity 
to realize economies of scale as described in chapter 3 of this thesis, is 
crucial to the profitability of micro-life insurers. Consequently, the four main 
research hypotheses which were put forward in chapter 4 are now tested 
using the research design and other statistical procedures as described in 
chapter 5. Specifically, the univariate analyses in which summary statistics 
are used to describe the key aggregate features of the variables are 
employed. This is followed by a bivariate analysis in which the 
Pearson/Spearman correlation analyses are used to test the association 
between pairs of each variable. Finally, the FGLS analysis is employed to 
examine the determinants of profitability while controlling for country, firm-
related, and time-specific effects. 
6.2 Univariate Analysis-Descriptive Statistics 
The cross-sectional and time-series data are first pooled and described using 
descriptive statistics including the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum range, and number of observations. The descriptive 
statistics summarises the overall characteristics of the dataset and ascertains 
the distribution for each variable. 
Table 6.1 Panel A, reports the means, medians, standard deviations, and 
minimum and maximum values for the dependent, independent and control 
variables for the combined data-set of Nigerian and South African micro-life 
insurers used in the regression analysis. The descriptive statistics are 
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computed from the panel data sample of 310 firm-year observations. The 
results show that the annual profitability (Profit) of the total sample of South 
African and Nigerian micro-life insurers over the period (2005-2010) on 
average is 9 percent. The maximum profitability is reported at over 33 
percent while the minimum profit is reported as a loss of around 8 percent.  
Turning to the independent variables, Table 6.1 Panel A, reveals that the 
average cost efficiency of the total sample of firms derived using the DEA 
(Efficiency-DEA, mean=0.31), is lower than the estimates obtained using the 
SFA (Efficiency-SFA, mean=0.799). In addition, there is also a large 
variation in the values of the cost efficiency estimates derived using the DEA 
(Efficiency-DEA, Std. dev=0.295). These findings are as expected, and 
consistent with the results of prior literature (e.g., Cummins & Zi, 1998) 
which use multiple frontier efficiency methods. The cost efficiency estimates 
derived using the DEA are expected to be lower than the estimates derived 
using the SFA, because the DEA measures all the random departures from 
the frontier as inefficiency, while the SFA separates the departures from the 
frontier into the inefficiency and random error components. Appendix A, 
Panel B reports the results of the principal components of cost efficiency- 
technical and allocative efficiency. The results reveal that inefficient resource 
allocation makes a lower contribution to overall cost efficiency. The values 
for technical efficiency range from 0.08 to 1.00 with a mean of 0.65 for the 
combined data sample indicating that micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South 
Africa could improve their production efficiency on average by 35 percent 
possibly through upgrading their operations to state-of-the-art technology. 
Allocative efficiency with a mean of 0.48 is lower than technical efficiency 
suggesting that overall cost efficiency could be improved by focusing on cost-
minimizing input combinations. For the Ownership dummy variables, Dp, Dpm, 
Dpb, Dpo, the results reveal that  widely-held (public) stock micro-life insurers 
(Dp) account for about 32 percent of the total sample firms while closely-held 
(private) stock firms (i.e., Dpm, Dpb, Dpo) account for 68 percent of sample 
firms. Table 6.1, Panel A further reveals that the degree of financial leverage 
is on average (Leverage, mean=2.48) considerably high suggesting that the 
total liabilities of the sample firms exceed the surplus. The standard 
deviation (Leverage, Std. dev=3.38) exceeds the mean value suggesting the 
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presence of extreme values in the tails of the sample distribution. The mean 
(median) of Reinsurance is 10 percent (6 percent), implying that on average, 
micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa only cede a relatively small 
percentage of their annual gross premiums to third party reinsurer. The 
standard deviation of reinsurance (Reinsurance, Std. dev=0.13) exceeds the 
mean value suggesting a variation in the level of reinsurance of the sample 
firms, with some firms having no reinsurance arrangements at all during the 
period (2005-2010) of analysis. 
For the control variables, Table 6.1 Panel A reveals the mean value of 
Regulation is roughly 47 percent, suggesting that about 47 percent of 
countries/firms worldwide rank lower than Nigeria and South Africa in terms 
of the regulatory quality (i.e., the perception of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote 
private sector development). Furthermore, the standard deviation for 
regulation (Regulation, Std. dev=0.22) is high, indicating significant variation 
in the regulatory environment of the total sample of firms considered. The 
average insurer size is 9.42, which represents an approximate value of USD$ 
13 million of total admitted assets. The smallest micro-life insurer in the 
sample has total assets valued at USD$ 0.085 million (Size, Min. = 4.45) and 
the largest retains total assets of about USD$40 billion (Size, Max. = 
17.50)27. Furthermore, the standard deviation of firm size variable (Size, 
Std. dev. = 3.03) indicates a considerable variation in the size of the sample 
firms. Just under 14 percent of sample observations have policies written in 
a single line of business (i.e., Product Mix=1) with an average of 0.69 for all 
firm-year observations in the sample. However the average (Product Mix, 
mean = 0.69) is larger than the median (Product Mix, median= 0.65), 
implying that the sample is slightly skewed towards less diversified micro-life 
insurers. The average length of time of operation in the micro-insurance 
market, Age for the sample firms is approximately 24 years. However, a 
large variation exits in the age of the sample firms (Age, Std. dev. = 20.78), 
with the oldest firm operating in the market for about 98 years.   
                                                          
27Eling and Luhnen (2010a) found an average size of USD$2.8 billion in a study of the cost 
efficiency of insurers from 36 countries. Hence, compared to regular insurance markets, the 
micro-life insurers examined in the present study are relatively small in terms of total assets. 
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Table 6.1D: Descriptive Statistics: Nigeria and South African Micro-Life 
Insurers, 2005-2010.cs: Nigerian and South African Micro-Le 
Insurers, 2005-2010. 
Panel A: Total Sample- Nigerian and South African Micro-life Insurers 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. Observation 
Profit 0.092 0.068 0.122 -0.076 0.331 303 
Efficiency-DEA 0.314 0.207 0.295 0.002 1.000 303 
Efficiency-SFA 0.799 0.821 0.087 0.168 0.943 303 
Ownership: Dp 0.317 1.000 0.466 0.000 1.000 303 
Dpm 0.313 0.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 303 
Dpb 0.208 0.000 0.406 0.000 1.000 303 
Dpo 0.155 0.000 0.363 0.000 1.000 303 
Leverage 2.480 1.039 3.377 -5.424 18.152 303 
Reinsurance 0.100 0.059 0.134 0.000 0.799 303 
Regulation 0.465 0.640 0.223 0.190 0.710 303 
Size 9.422 8.599 3.039 4.452 17.504 303 
Product Mix 0.686 0.648 0.216 0.214 1.000 284 
Age 24.990 18.000 20.777 1.000 98.000 303 
lnAge 2.887 2.890 0.861 0.693 4.585 303 
Interest 0.077 0.076 0.021 0.038 0.108 303 
Country 0.465 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 303 
Reinsurance x 
Leverage 
0.026 0.037 0.659 -1.711 5.031 303 
Panel B:   Sample of Nigerian Micro-life Insurers 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. Observation 
Profit 0.080 0.065 0.107 -0.076 0.331 141 
Efficiency-DEA 0.378 0.258 0.348 0.045 1.000 141 
Efficiency-SFA 0.815 0.826 0.054 0.541 0.908 141 
Ownership: Dp 0.497 1.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 141 
Dpm 0.156 0.000 0.364 0.000 1.000 141 
Dpb 0.277 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 141 
Dpo 0.071 0.000 0.258 0.000 1.000 141 
Leverage 0.582 0.332 0.954 -2.370 7.431 141 
Reinsurance 0.103 0.046 0.142 0.000 0.799 141 
Regulation 0.228 0.240 0.027 0.190 0.260 141 
Size 7.590 7.808 1.540 4.452 10.849 141 
Product Mix 0.632 0.621 0.189 0.214 1.000 124 
Age 24.347 19.000 14.113 2.000 53.000 141 
lnAge 3.001 2.944 0.663 0.693 3.970 141 
Interest 0.069 0.076 0.024 0.038 0.099 141 
Reinsurance x 
Leverage 




Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics: Nigeria and South African Micro-Life 
Insurers, 2005-2010 (Continued). 
Panel C:   Sample of South African Micro-life Insurers 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. Observation 
Profit 0.102 0.078 0.134 -0.076 0.330 162 
Efficiency-DEA 0.258 0.179 0.246 0.145 1.000 162 
Efficiency-SFA 0.798 0.813 0.075 0.449 1.00 162 
Ownership: Dp 0.161 1.000 0.368 0.000 1.000 162 
Dpm 0.457 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 162 
Dpb 0.148 0.000 0.356 0.000 1.000 162 
Dpo 0.228 0.000 0.421 0.000 1.000 162 
Leverage 4.132 2.875 3.834 -5.424 18.152 162 
Reinsurance 0.097 0.052 0.127 0.000 0.630 162 
Regulation 0.672 0.670 0.025 0.640 0.710 162 
Size 11.040 11.148 3.085 5.102 17.505 162 
Product Mix 0.725 0.703 0.225 0.287 1.000 160 
Age 25.549 16.000 24.216 1.000 98.000 162 
lnAge 2.789 2.770 0.974 0.693 4.585 162 
Interest 0.084 0.091 0.016 0.064 0.108 162 
Reinsurance x 
Leverage 
0.033 0.015 0.850 -1.711 5.031 162 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the descriptive statistics for Nigerian and South African micro-
life Insurers for the years 2005 to 2010. Panel A, shows the descriptive statistics for the combined dataset 
of Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers. Panel B, presents the descriptive statistics for the 
Nigerian micro-life insurer data-set while Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the South African 
data-set. Profit is the annual profitability-the return on assets (ROA) which measured as the ratio of net 
income to the average of total assets in years   and    . Efficiency-DEA is the cost efficiency estimates 
derived using DEA in the first-stage analysis (see section 5.3.1). Efficiency-SFA is the cost efficiency 
estimates derived using SFA in the first-stage analysis (see section 5.3.2). Ownership represents the 
ownership structure variables; Dp, Dpm, Dpb, Dpo where Dp =1 for widely-held (public) stock micro-life 
insurers, and 0 for private (closely-held) stock micro-life insurer, Dpm = 1 for micro-life insurers with 
shareholding closely-held by managers , and 0 otherwise,  Dpb = 1 for micro-life insurers with 
shareholdings closely-held by Banks, and 0 otherwise, Dpo =1 for micro-life insurers with shareholding 
closely-held by ‘others’ (such as insurance companies, financial companies, and mutual funds), and 0 
otherwise. Leverage is the total liabilities-to- surplus ratio. Reinsurance is the ratio of gross premium 
written ceded to the reinsurer. Regulation denotes the regulatory environment which is proxied using the 
country-specific annual percentile rank of the regulatory quality index of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI).The regulatory quality index captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector development. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total admitted assets. Product Mix is the line of business Herfindahl index, which 
measures the product diversification of the micro-life insurer. Age is the length of time of operations in 
the micro-insurance market. lnAge is the natural logarithm of the length of time of operations of a firm in 
the micro-insurance market.  Interest is the country-specific annual commercial bank lending rate. 




The average annual commercial bank lending rate, Interest for the sample 
period is approximately 8 percent. The standard deviation (Interest, Std. 
dev=0.02), however, is small, indicating that the interest rates does not 
change significantly from year-to-year. Finally, the Country dummy variable 
indicates that Nigerian micro-life insurers’ account for approximately 46 
percent of the total sample of firms considered in the study. 
Table 6.1 Panels B and C, report the means, medians, standard deviations, 
and minimum and maximum values for the dependent, independent and 
control variables for the dataset Nigerian and South African micro-life 
insurers respectively. The descriptive statistics are computed from the panel 
data sample of 141 firm-year observations for Nigerian micro-life insurers, 
and 162 firm-year observations for South African micro-life insurers. The 
values obtained for Profit indicate that on average, both Nigerian and South 
African micro-life insurers have comparable levels of annual profitability. The 
average annual profitability, Profit for Nigerian micro-life insurers is 8 
percent while the average annual profitability (Profit) for South African 
micro-life insurers is approximately 10 percent.  
Turning to the independent variables, Table 6.1, Panels B and C indicate that 
Nigerian micro-life insurers (Efficiency-SFA, mean=0.82; Efficiency-DEA, 
mean=0.38) are on average more cost efficient than South African micro-life 
insurers (Efficiency-SFA, mean=0.79; Efficiency-DEA, mean=0.26) when 
either the DEA or SFA is employed in the derivation of the cost efficiency 
estimates. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the cost efficiency 
estimates derived using the DEA (Efficiency-DEA, Nigeria, Std. dev =0.35; 
South Africa, Std. dev = 0.25) for both countries is high, indicating a large 
variation in the estimates obtained. For the ownership structure, Ownership, 
the results indicate that the data sample for Nigerian micro-life insurers’ is 
approximately evenly split between widely-held (public) firms (i.e., 
Ownership Dp, mean=0.49) and closely-held (private) firms. Table 6.1, Panel 
C further reveals that the data sample for the South African micro-life 
insurers’ consists of 16 percent widely-held (public) stock firms, Dp while the 
remaining 84 percent accounts for closely-held (private) stock firms. 
Interestingly, closely- held stock firms owned by managers, Dpm at 46 
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percent account for the highest percentage of the closely-held (private) 
micro-life insurers highlighting the entrepreneurial nature of owner-
managers of South African firms. The average ratio of the total liabilities to 
surplus for South African micro-life insurers (Leverage, mean=4.13) is 
significantly higher than that for Nigerian micro-life insurers (Leverage, 
mean=0.58). However, there is significant variation in Leverage for South 
African firms (Leverage, Std. dev. =3.83), indicating the presence of some 
extreme values in the tails of distribution. The mean (median) of 
Reinsurance at, 10 percent (5 percent) and 8 percent (5 percent) for 
Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers respectively, is comparable for 
firms in both countries. This indicates that on average, both Nigerian and 
South African micro-life insurers only cede a small (> 10 percent) per 
proportion of their annual gross premiums to reinsurers. The results further 
suggest a limited micro-life reinsurance market for Nigeria and South Africa, 
especially for Nigeria which has legal restrictions on reinsurance with foreign 
reinsurance firms.   
For the control variables, Table 6.1 Panel B and C indicate a significant 
difference in the average values of Regulation for Nigeria and South Africa 
(Regulation, Nigeria, mean. =0.23; South Africa, mean =0.67). On average, 
approximately 67 percent of countries worldwide rank lower than South 
Africa in terms of regulatory quality, while approximately 23 percent of 
countries worldwide rank lower than Nigeria in terms of regulatory quality. 
The higher values of the regulatory quality index obtained for South Africa 
suggests that South Africa has a better regulatory environment than Nigeria. 
The average Size for Nigerian micro-life insurers is 7.6, which represents an 
approximate value of USD$ 2 million of total admitted assets, while the 
average Size for South African micro-life insurers is significantly higher at 
11.04, which represents an estimated value of USD$ 63 million of total 
assets. The total assets of the smallest micro-life insurer in Nigeria (Size, 
Min. = 4.45), is approximately USD$ 0.085 million, while the smallest South 
African micro-life insurer (Size, Min. = 5.10) retains total assets valued at 
USD$ 0.16 million. Furthermore, the mean values of Size for both countries 
are similar to the median values, implying that the distribution of the sample 
is not excessively skewed towards either large or small firms. On average, 
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the degree of product line concentration for Nigerian micro-life insurers is 
lower than that of South African micro-life insurers (Product Mix; Nigeria, 
mean=0.63, South Africa, mean=0.73). The mean value for Product Mix in 
both countries is higher than the median values (Product Mix; Nigeria, 
median=0.62, South Africa, mean=0.70), suggesting that the sample firms 
are slightly skewed towards less diversified micro-life insurers. Table 6.1, 
Panel B and C further show that the average length of time of operations 
(Age) of the Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers’ in the data-set 
are similar (Age: Nigeria, mean=24.35; Age: South Africa, mean=25.55). 
There is also a significant variation in the age of the micro-life insurers in 
both countries (Age: Nigeria, Std. dev. =14.11, Age: South Africa, Std. dev. 
=24.22). However, South Africa has the oldest micro-life insurer which has 
been operating for 98 years. Furthermore, the average value for annual 
commercial bank lending rate, Interest for the sample period for Nigeria is 
approximately 7 percent while that of South Africa is estimated at 8.4 
percent. The standard deviation (Interest, Nigeria, Std. dev. =0.02, South 
Africa, Std. dev. =0.02), however is small, indicating no significant year-to-
year changes in annual interest rates for both Nigeria and South Africa. 
6.3 Bivariate-Correlation Analysis 
The bivariate analysis involves testing for the associations between the 
variables. The present study used both the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients 28 . Chow (1982) contends that correlation analysis 
should be conducted prior to multivariate tests in order to minimise the risk 
of variable measurement errors, and identify inter-correlated variables which 
could distort the statistical significance of multivariate results. In addition, 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) contend that correlation analysis could 
reveal high and statistically significant collinearity between independent 
variables, following which other diagnostic tests such as the variance 
                                                          
28 The Pearson correlation describes the linear association between two variables; however, 
the Pearson correlation coefficient could produce inaccurate results when associations between 
variables are non-linear. On the other hand, the Spearman correlation coefficient measures 




inflation factors (VIF) could be conducted to ascertain that the presence of 
multicollinearity would not affect the parameter estimates obtained in the 
multivariate analysis. 
Table 6.2 gives the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between 
all the dependent, independent and control variables for the pooled firm-year 
observations of Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers for the period 
2005-2010. In line with previous studies (e.g., Choi & Weiss, 2005; Greene 
& Segal, 2004), and consistent with the first hypothesis (H1), a positive and 
statistically significant association is obtained between annual profitability 
(Profit) and the cost efficiency estimates derived using the DEA (Efficiency-
DEA),as well as the estimates derived using the SFA (Efficiency-SFA) for both 
the Pearson and Spearman correlation. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
for Efficiency-DEA is positive and statistically significant (p≤0.10, two-tailed 
test), while Efficiency-SFA is also positive and statistically significant 
(p≤0.01, two-tailed test). The results suggest that the ability to control 
operational costs (cost efficiency) has a positive impact on the annual 
profitability of micro-life insurers, and that cost efficient firms are likely to 
have higher profitability than cost inefficient firms. 
Turning now to the independent variables, consistent with Mayers and Smith 
(1994) and hypothesis H2a, a negative and statistically significant 
association (p≤0.05, two-tailed test) is obtained between the ownership 
structure dummy variable, Dp and Profit. This suggests that the increased 
agency costs due to the wider separation of ownership and control in widely-
held (public) stock micro-life insurers result in a negative impact on the 
annual profitability. Furthermore, in the analysis of the variation of closely-
held (private) stock micro-life insurers (i.e., Dpm, Dpb, Dpo), a positive and 
statistically significant (p≤0.05, two-tailed test) association is found only 
between closely-held stock firms mainly owned by mangers, Dpm and Profit. 
This implies that the closer merger of the owner-manager functions in firms 
closely-held by managers reduces the agency costs of monitoring and 
control, in line with hypothesis, H2c and consistent with the findings of He  
and Sommer (2010). 
  
Table 6.2E: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix: Nigeria and South African Micro-Life Insurers, 2005-2010. 
Source: Research Data. This table presents the pairwise correlation for the years 2005-2010.The Pearson correlations are in the lower triangle (unitalised) and the Spearman 
correlations are in the upper triangle (italised). Profit is the annual profitability-the return on assets (ROA) which measured as the ratio of net income to the average of total assets in 
years   and    . Efficiency-DEA is the cost efficiency estimates derived using DEA in the first-stage of analysis (see section 5.3.1). Efficiency-SFA is the cost efficiency estimates 
derived using SFA in the first-stage of analysis (see section 5.3.2). Ownership represents the ownership structure variables; Dp, Dpm, Dpb, Dpo where Dp =1 for widely-held (public) 
stock micro-life insurers, and 0 for private (closely- held) stock micro-life insurer, Dpm = 1 for micro-life insurers with shareholding closely-held by managers , and 0 otherwise,  Dpb = 
1 for micro-life insurers with shareholding closely-held by banks, and 0 otherwise, Dpo =1 for micro-life insurers with shareholding closely-held by ‘others’ (such as insurance 
companies, financial companies, and mutual funds), and 0 otherwise. Leverage is the total liabilities-to-surplus ratio. Reinsurance is the ratio of gross premium written ceded to the 
reinsurer. Regulation denotes the regulatory environment which is proxied using the country-specific annual percentile rank of the regulatory quality index of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI).The regulatory quality index captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
promote private sector development. Size is the natural logarithm of total admitted assets. Product Mix is the line of business Herfindahl index, which measures the product 
diversification of the micro-life insurer. lnAge is the natural logarithm of the length of time of operations of a firm in the micro-insurance market. Interest is the country-specific 
annual commercial bank lending rate. Country is a country dummy variable where 1= Nigeria, and 0= South Africa. ***,**,and * indicate the significance at the 0.01,0.05, and 0.10 







Table 6.2 further reveals a positive and statistically significant association 
(p≤0.01, two-tailed test) between Leverage and Profit. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis H3a, and indicates that the use of debt could be 
profit-enhancing for micro-life insurers. This result also lends support to the 
‘free cashflow hypothesis’ of Jensen (1986), and the mitigation of 
overinvestment argument of Stulz (1990). On the other hand, a negative but 
statistically insignificant association is obtained between Reinsurance and 
Profit. 
For the control variables, a negative and statistically significant (p≤0.10, 
two-tailed test) association is found between Age and Profit, suggesting that 
younger micro-life insurers are more profitable than more established 
operatives. This result is not surprising as Biener and Eling (2011) in the 
study of the performance of micro-life insurers’ also found that firms which 
have been operating in the market for longer periods were least efficient, 
and had the highest potential of upgrading their operations to the state-of-
the-art technology. Table 6.3 also gives the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients between all the independent and control variables. 
The statistically significant correlation between some of the explanatory 
variables also raises the possibility of multicollinearity. There is a strong 
association between the Ownership variables Dp, Dpm, Dpb, Dpo; Efficiency-
DEA and Efficiency-SFA; Leverage, Size, Country and Regulation; and also 
between Size and Age. Therefore, for the ownership structure dummy 
variables, widely-held (public) stock micro-life insurers Dp, are analysed 
separately from the subsets of closely-held (private) stock firms, Dpm, Dpb, 
Dpo. The cost efficiency estimates, Efficiency-DEA and Efficiency-SFA are also 
analysed separately. Country and Regulation are highly negatively correlated 
(Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficients are, -0.99/0.87, p≤0.01, two-
tailed test), thus Country is excluded from the regressions to avoid possible 
multicollinearity29. 
Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are computed for all the explanatory 
variables (see table 6.3) in the regression model to ensure that the presence 
                                                          
29 Country is excluded from the regression to avoid multicollinearity. However, the Regulation 
variable is retained to also serve as a surrogate for the country-specific effects, especially as 
the values for Regulation do not overlap for the two countries (see Table 6.1). 
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of multicollinearity will not bias the significance of the parameter estimates. 
The VIF 30  measures the amount by which the variance of an estimated 
coefficient is increased due to its linear association with explanatory 
variables. Multicollinearity is not a problem in the regression if the estimated 
VIF of the explanatory variable is less than 10 (Kennedy, 2003). The VIFs for 
all the independent and control variables are shown in Table 6.3. The 
calculated VIFs are all less than 4. Therefore, multicollinearity does not pose 
a severe econometric problem in the present study. 
Table 6F.3: Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
 
Source: Research Data. This table presents the VIFs for all of the independent and control variables for 
the years 2005-2010. Profit is the annual profitability-the return on assets (ROA) which measured as the 
ratio of net income to the average of total assets in years   and    . Efficiency-DEA is the cost efficiency 
estimates derived using DEA in a first-stage analysis (see section 5.3.1). Efficiency-SFA is the cost 
efficiency estimates derived using SFA in a first-stage analysis (see section 5.3.2). Ownership represents 
the ownership structure variables; Dp, Dpm, Dpb, Dpo where Dp =1 for widely-held (public) stock micro-life 
insurers, and 0 for private (closely- held) stock micro-life insurer, Dpm = 1 for micro-life insurers with 
shareholding closely-held by managers, and 0 otherwise,  Dpb = 1 for micro-life insurers with shareholding 
closely-held by Banks, and 0 otherwise, Dpo =1 for micro-life insurers with shareholding closely-held by 
‘others’ (such as insurance companies, financial companies, and mutual funds), and 0 otherwise. Leverage 
is the total liabilities-to- surplus ratio. Reinsurance is the ratio of gross premium written ceded to the 
reinsurer. Regulation denotes the regulatory environment which is proxied using the country-specific 
annual percentile rank of the regulatory quality index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) .The 
regulatory quality index captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector development. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total admitted assets. Product Mix is the line of business Herfindahl index, which measures 
the product diversification of the micro-life insurer. lnAge is the natural logarithm of the length of time of 
operations of a firm in the micro-insurance market. Interest is the country-specific annual commercial 
bank lending rate.   
                                                          
30 VIF is calculated by regressing each independent variable in turn on other independent 
variables, and then calculating 1/(1-R2) (Kennedy, 2003). 
 DEA SFA 
Variable VIF VIF 
Efficiency 
 
1.28 1.21 1.72 1.54 
Ownership: Dp - 1.73 - 1.72 
Dpm 2.59 - 2.54 - 
Dpb 1.59 - 1.52 - 
Dpo 1.81 - 1.99 - 
Leverage 2.01 1.98 2.09 2.07 
Reinsurance 1.12 1.11 1.51 1.50 
Regulation 3.57 3.30 3.40 3.09 
Size 2.94 2.70 2.94 2.69 
Product Mix 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.14 
lnAge 1.68 1.62 1.73 1.65 
Interest 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.16 
Reinsurance x Leverage 1.58 1.56 1.56 1.54 
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6.4 Multivariate Results 
This section presents the results for the model specified in equation [5.10]. 
The four main hypotheses, developed in chapter 4, are tested using the FGLS 
methodology as explained in chapter 5, section 5.7. Table 6.4(A) reports the 
parameter estimates and test statistics for the base model in which the direct 
effects are employed in the regression analyses while Table 6.4(B) presents 
the corresponding results when the interaction term is included in the model. 
The Wald chi-square test is statistically significant (p-value <0.01) in all the 
models considered and thus rejects the null hypothesis that all the regression 
coefficients across the models are simultaneously equal to zero. However, a 
comparison of the results presented in Table 6.4(A) & (B) reveals a reduction 
in the Wald chi-square test statistic when the interaction term, (Reinsurance 
x Leverage) is added to the base model. 
Cost Efficiency: Consistent with hypothesis H1a, and the results from the 
bivariate analysis, the coefficient estimate for Efficiency is positive and 
statistically significant (p –value <0.01, one-tailed test) for both the DEA and 
SFA cost efficiency estimates. As noted previously, micro-life insurance is by 
design a low-premium product, and the proportion of the premium that must 
go to pay for expenses (as opposed to payment for covered losses) is higher 
than in conventional insurance. Therefore, given the relatively low average 
annual profitability (9%), the results suggest that efficiency is economically 
significant, and so cost efficient micro-life insurers are likely to be more 
profitable than cost inefficient firms. In addition, the results are consistent 
with prior literature such as Greene and Segal (2004) who find a negative 
association between cost inefficiency and annual profitability in the US life 
insurance industry. Choi and Weiss (2005) also obtain a significant positive 
relation between cost efficiency and annual profitability, and contend that 
higher profits are earned by relatively more cost efficient firms. Furthermore, 
Appendix D and E present the results of the model using technical and 
allocative efficiency respectively. Consistent with hypotheses H1b and H1c, 
the coefficient estimates for technical efficiency is positive and statistically 
significant (p–value <0.01, one-tailed test) in both the DEA and SFA models. 
  
Table 6.4(A)G: Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation. 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
Intercept 0.225 0.042*** 0.223 0.036*** -0.383 0.058*** -0.364 0.052*** 
Efficiency 0.082 0.178*** 0.077 0.016*** 0.729 0.051*** 0.717 0.052*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.015 0.013 - - -0.001 0.009 
Dpm 0.010 0.018 - - 0.008 0.013 - - 
Dpb 0.019 0.015 - - 0.017 0.011 - - 
Dpo 0.014 0.023 - - 0.004 0.021 - - 
Leverage 0.013 0.002*** 0.013 0.002*** 0.011 0.002*** 0.011 0.002*** 
Reinsurance -0.197 0.039*** -0.191 0.038*** -0.152 0.031*** -0.158 0.029*** 
Regulation 0.037 0.051 0.046 0.050 0.032 0.041 0.029 0.037 
Size -0.007 0.003** -0.006 0.003** -0.007 0.003** -0.006 0.002*** 
Product Mix -0.077 0.026*** -0.087 0.025*** -0.045 0.020** -0.045 0.018*** 
lnAge -0.020 0.009** -0.021 0.008*** -0.015 0.08** -0.018 0.008** 












197.74***   484.12*** 
 
366.48*** 
Obs.   282   282   282   282 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) regressions. The DEA column gives the results for the 
regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in 
which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. The dependent variable   is the annual profitability, Profit -the return on assets 
(ROA) which measured as the ratio of net income to the average of total assets in years   and    . All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * 






Table 6.4(B)H: Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation- including the Interaction term. 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
Intercept 0.235 0.043*** 0.234 0.038*** -0.401 0.061*** -0.370 0.053*** 
Efficiency 0.078 0.018*** 0.074 0.017*** 0.749 0.054*** 0.726 0.053*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.017 0.013 - - -0.002 0.010 
Dpm 0.006 0.018 - - 0.006 0.014 - - 
Dpb 0.021 0.015 - - 0.018 0.012 - - 
Dpo 0.015 0.022 - - 0.004 0.019 - - 
Leverage 0.016 0.002*** 0.015 0.002*** 0.012 0.002*** 0.012 0.002*** 
Reinsurance -0.213 0.042*** -0.205 0.041*** -0.162 0.031*** -0.165 0.030*** 
Regulation 0.029 0.050 0.039 0.049 0.019 0.039 0.021 0.036 
Size -0.006 0.003** -0.007 0.003** -0.006 0.003** -0.006 0.002** 
Product Mix -0.091 0.027*** -0.099 0.025*** -0.049 0.022** -0.052 0.019*** 
lnAge -0.019 0.009** -0.021 0.008*** -0.015 0.008* -0.019 0.008*** 
Interest -0.542 0.287* -0.576 0.288* 0.263 0.243 -0.314 0.237 












137.40***   416.21*** 
 
344.83*** 
Obs.   282   282   282   282 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) regressions. The DEA column gives the results for the 
regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in 
which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. The dependent variable   is the annual profitability, Profit -the return on assets 
(ROA) which measured as the ratio of net income to the average of total assets in years   and    . All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * 







The coefficient estimates for allocative efficiency is also positive and 
statistically significant (p–value <0.01, one-tailed test) in the SFA model. 
Therefore, the results suggest that micro-life insurers which are efficient in 
the their production (service) technology and allocation of resources are 
likely to obtain higher profits. 
Ownership structure: Contrary to what was hypothesised in H2a-H2d, and 
the bivariate results, no statistically significant relation is found between the 
Ownership variables, Dp, Dpm, Dpb, Dpo and Profit in both the DEA and SFA 
regression models. A positive but statistically insignificant coefficient 
estimate is obtained for widely-held (public) micro-life insurers Dp, while a 
negative but statistically insignificant coefficient estimate is obtained for all 
the three variations of the closely-held (private) micro-life insurers, Dpm, Dpb, 
Dpo. The results suggest that the ownership structure of micro-life insurers 
has no significant impact on their annual profitability. However, the results 
are not surprising as prior literature on the impact of ownership structure on 
firm performance has also yielded mixed results. For example, Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) find no evidence to support the notion that variation in the 
observed ownership structures across firms in results in systematic 
variations in performance. 
Leverage: Consistent with the bivariate results, and hypothesis H3a, a 
positive and statistically significant relation (p–value <0.01, two- tailed test) 
is obtained for Leverage in both the DEA and SFA regressions 31 . This 
suggests that the increasing use of debt maximises the profitability of micro-
life insurance firms. The result is also consistent with the free cash-flow 
hypothesis of Jensen (1986) which argues that the use of debt could be 
value enhancing for firms as it acts as a disciplinary device to ensure that 
managers pursue the strategic goals of the shareholders. Furthermore, the 
results lends support to the findings of prior research (e.g., see Grossman & 
Hart, 1982; Stulz, 1990) which contend that the increasing use of debt helps 
to mitigate the problems of overinvestment which arises when managers 
expend the firms’ free cash flow on self-utility maximising projects.  
                                                          
31 On the other hand, contrary to the results of prior research (e.g., Purnanandam, 2008), the 
present study finds no support for the non-linear relation between leverage and profitability. 
The coefficient estimates using Leverage2 are negative but statistically insignificant in both the 
DEA and SFA regressions. 
121 
 
Reinsurance: As hypothesised in H4b, a negative and statistically significant 
(p–value < 0.01, two-tailed test) coefficient estimate is obtained between 
Reinsurance and Profit in both the DEA and SFA regressions, suggesting that 
the purchase of reinsurance has a negative impact on the profitability of 
micro-life insurers. The result is also consistent with the findings of prior 
studies which contend that the costly nature of reinsurance, especially for 
micro-life insurers, could result in lower profitability. For example, 
Olaosebikan (2013) in a study of Nigerian micro-life insurers concludes that 
the cost of reinsurance is likely to be highly priced to reflect the increased 
risk of insuring low-income groups. Furthermore, Jean-Baptiste and 
Santomero (2000) also contend that the reinsurers’ lack of information 
regarding the risk being transferred, and control over the ultimate outcome 
of risk results in higher reinsurance premiums, which could therefore lower 
the expected profitability of the ceding insurer. 
Interaction term: Interestingly, a negative and statistically significant (p –
value <0.01, two- tailed test) association is found between the interaction 
term, Reinsurance x Leverage for both the DEA and SFA models, suggesting 
that the relation between Leverage and Profit appears to decline as 
Reinsurance increases. Prior studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2008; Garven & 
Lamm-Tennant, 2003) find a positive relation between high leverage and 
reinsurance, and argue that firms with higher leverage tend to purchase 
more reinsurance in order to mitigate the risk of severe catastrophic loss. 
Therefore, the result obtained in the present study implies that the high cost 
of reinsurance for micro-life insurers possibly outweighs its potential benefit 
of mitigating the probability of bankruptcy induced at high leverage. 
Control Variables: The regression models also controls for other firm-
/country-specific effects namely: regulation, firm size, product mix, age, and 
interest rates. The coefficient estimates for Regulation is positive but 
statistically insignificant in both the DEA and SFA regression models. This 
observation indicates that the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that promote the development of 
the private sector has no significant impact on the annual profitability of 
micro-life insurers. For firm size, a negative and statistically significant 
association is found between Size and Profit for both the DEA (p–value 
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<0.01, two-tailed test) and SFA (p–value <0.10, two-tailed test) 
regressions. This result is consistent with the findings of Biener and Eling 
(2011) and suggests that smaller micro-life insurers have better annual 
profitability than larger micro-life insurance firms. Furthermore, Product Mix 
is negative and statistically significant (p–value <0.01, two-tailed test) in 
both the DEA and SFA regressions. Therefore, consistent with the findings of 
prior literature (e.g., Abdul Kader et al., 2010), the results suggests that 
micro-life insurers with multi-product lines of business are more profitable 
than mono-line micro-life insurers, as they are able to benefit from both the 
economies of scale, as well as the economies of scope in the use of shared 
inputs (e.g., labour, technology, and so on). Consistent with the bivariate 
results, the coefficient estimate of lnAge is negative and statistically 
significant (p–value <0.05, two- tailed test) in both the DEA and SFA 
regressions. The result is also consistent with the findings of Biener and Eling 
(2011), and implies that micro-life insurers which have been operating in the 
micro-insurance market for longer periods have lower annual profitability. 
For Interest, a negative and weak statistically significant (p–value <0.10, 
two- tailed test) coefficient estimate is obtained only in the DEA regression. 
This result is consistent with that cited in Doherty and Garven (1995), and 
implies that the profit margins of micro-life insurers are inversely related to 
the movement of average annual interest rates in the economy. 
The empirical results for the separate country analyses of Nigerian and South 
African micro-life insurers are presented in Table 6.5(A) and 6.5(B) 
respectively. 
Cost Efficiency: Consistent with hypothesis (H1a), and the findings of prior 
literature (e.g., Choi & Weiss, 2005; Greene & Segal, 2004), Table 6.5(A) 
shows that for the Nigerian dataset, the coefficient estimates of Efficiency 
are positive and statistically significant (p–value <0.01, one-tailed test) for 
both the DEA and SFA regressions. The coefficient estimates of efficiency are 
also positive and statistically significant (p–value <0.01, one- tailed test) in 
both the DEA and SFA models for South African micro-life insurers, as shown 
in table 6.5(B).   
  
Table 6.5(A)I: Nigeria: Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers; 2005-2010: Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares (FGLS) Estimation. 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
Intercept -0.308 0.088*** -0.299 0.083*** -0.515 0.096*** -0.468 0.087*** 
Efficiency 0.259 0.033*** 0.277 0.034*** 0.749 0.084*** 0.745 0.078*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.029 0.013 - - -0.014 0.011 
Dpm 0.058 0.016*** - - 0.038 0.017** - - 
Dpb 0.035 0.014 - - 0.024 0.012 - - 
Dpo -0.015 0.019 - - -0.017 0.021 - - 
Leverage 0.056 0.008*** 0.053 0.008*** 0.051 0.009*** 0.051 0.009*** 
Reinsurance 0.035 0.232 0.049 0.229 0.303 0.252 0.238 0.254 
Regulation - - - - - - - - 
Size 0.042 0.008*** 0.045 0.008*** 0.003 0.004* 0.001 0.003* 
Product Mix -0.055 0.032** -0.026 0.027 -0.023 0.026 -0.015 0.013 
lnAge -0.031 0.010*** -0.037 0.009*** -0.039 0.010*** -0.037 0.009*** 
Interest - - - - - - - - 












238.24***   291.35*** 
 
281.50*** 
Obs.   122   122   122   122 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of FGLS regressions for the Nigerian dataset. The DEA column gives the results for the regressions in which the cost 
efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are 
derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. The dependent variable   is the annual profitability, Profit -the return on assets (ROA) which measured as the ratio of net 
income to the average of total assets in years   and    . All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate the significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 







Table 6.5(B)J: South Africa: Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers; 2005-2010: Feasible Generalised 
Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation. 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error  Coeff. Std. Error  Coeff. Std. Error  Coeff. Std. Error 
Intercept 0.426 0.071*** 0.406 0.054*** -0.137 0.113 -0.121 0.230 
Efficiency 0.069 0.033** 0.043 0.030* 0.580 0.102*** 0.561 0.104*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.064 0.026 - - -0.028 0.027 
Dpm 0.069 0.031 - - 0.045 0.023 - - 
Dpb -0.054 0.023 - - -0.008 0.018 - - 
Dpo 0.024 0.033** - - 0.104 0.034*** - - 
Leverage 0.015 0.002*** 0.014 0.002*** 0.013 0.002*** 0.012 0.002*** 
Reinsurance -0.404 0.068*** -0.389 0.072*** -0.281 0.067*** -0.302 0.068*** 
Regulation - - - - - - - - 
Size -0.019 0.005*** -0.018 0.004*** -0.012 0.004*** -0.012 0.004** 
Product Mix -0.103 0.039*** -0.131 0.034*** -0.103 0.038*** -0.100 0.035*** 
lnAge -0.001 0.013 -0.009 0.012 -0.080 0.011 -0.015 0.011 
Interest - - - - - - - - 












145.47***   192.39*** 
 
182.42*** 
Obs.   160   160   160   160 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) regressions for the South African dataset. The DEA column gives the 
results for the regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the 
regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. The dependent variable   is the annual profitability, Profit -the return 
on assets (ROA) which measured as the ratio of net income to the average of total assets in years   and    . All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and 







Albeit, the overall results suggest that cost efficient micro-life insurers in 
both Nigeria and South Africa are likely to be more profitable than firms 
which are not cost efficient.  
Ownership Structure: The impact of Ownership on Profit produce mixed 
results for the two countries. For the Nigerian dataset, table 6.5(A) shows a 
positive and statistically significant (p–value <0.05, two-tailed test) for the 
coefficient estimate of the Ownership variable, Dpm. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Cummins and Sommer (1996), and suggests that micro-
life insurers with stock closely held by managers, Dpm are likely to be more 
profitable compared to firms closely-held by large banks, Dpb as well as firms 
closely-held by other institutional investors, Dpo. The higher profitability could 
be attributed to the closer merger of the owner-manager functions which 
helps to lower the agency costs of monitoring and control. On the other 
hand, Table 6.5(B) shows that for South African micro-life insurers, the 
coefficient estimate of the Ownership variable, Dpo is positive and statistically 
significant (p–value <0.01, two-tailed test), thus suggesting that compared 
to firms closely-held by management, Dpm or large Banks, Dpb, micro-life 
which are closely-held other institutional investors such as insurance 
companies, mutual funds etc. are likely to be more profitable. The result is 
consistent with the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who contend that 
large (non-management) shareholder–owner of firms could serve as effective 
monitors because they have a lower marginal cost of acquiring and 
disseminating information. 
Leverage: In Tables 6.5(A) and 6.5(B), the estimated coefficient for 
Leverage is positive and statistically significant (p –value <0.01, two- tailed 
test) for both countries. This result is consistent with hypothesis H3a, and 
suggests that the increasing use of leverage has a positive impact on the 
profitability both Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers. This result 
further highlights the advantages of leverage in the disciplining managers to 
maximize shareholder wealth by generating free cash flows (Harris & Raviv, 
1990; Jensen, 1986). 
Reinsurance: Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of Reinsurance for 
Nigerian micro-life insurers - see Table 6.5(A) - are positive but statistically 
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insignificant in both the DEA and SFA models. On the other hand, the results 
reveal a negative and statistically significant (p–value <0.01, two-tailed test) 
coefficient estimate in both the DEA and SFA model for South African micro-
life insurers - see Table 6.5(B). Overall, the results are mixed and suggest 
that the increasing use of reinsurance is a statistically significant driver of 
the profitability of South African micro-life insurers. This result further 
suggests that the riskiness of micro-life insurance policies is reflected in the 
high cost of reinsurance for South African firms. However, no empirical 
support is obtained for the impact of reinsurance on the profitability of 
Nigerian micro-life insurers.  
Interaction term: The impact of the interaction term, Reinsurance x 
Leverage produces mixed results for both countries. In Table 6.5(A), positive 
but statistically insignificant coefficient estimates are obtained for Nigerian 
micro-life insurers, thus providing no support for the interactive effects of 
reinsurance and leverage on annual profitability. On the other hand, the 
coefficient estimates of the interaction term are negative and statistically 
significant (p–value <0.05, two-tailed test) in the SFA model for South 
African micro-life insurers. This observation indicates that for South African 
micro-life insurers, the relation between Leverage and Profit appears to 
decline as Reinsurance increases. The results are interesting because they 
imply that for South African micro-life insurers, the high cost of reinsurance 
outweighs the costs of bankruptcy induced at high leverage.  
Control Variables: The regression models also controls for other firm-
/country-specific effects namely: firm size, product mix, and age 32 . The 
estimated coefficients for Size is positive and statistically significant (p–value 
<0.10, two-tailed test) for Nigerian micro-life insurers. In line with the 
findings of Hardwick (1997), this result suggests that larger micro-life 
insurers in Nigeria have higher profitability than smaller micro-life insurance 
firms due to their ability to efficiently diversify assumed risks and realise 
economies of scale. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for Size is 
negative and statistically significant (p–value <0.05, two-tailed test) for 
                                                          
32 The Regulation and Interest variables are omitted from the regression equation for both the 
Nigerian and South African data-set (see Table 6.5(A) and Table 6.5(B)). This is due to the 
presence of multicollinearity which could result in biased parameter estimates. 
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South African micro-life insurers. Consistent with the findings of prior studies 
(e.g., Adams & Buckle, 2003; Biener & Eling, 2011), this result suggest that 
the social cohesion as well as the relatively smaller information asymmetries 
and agency costs results in a higher profitability for smaller micro-life 
insurers in South Africa. The estimated coefficients for Product Mix is 
negative but only statistically significant (p–value <0.05, two-tailed test) in 
the DEA regressions while the estimated coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant (p–value <0.01, two-tailed test) in both the DEA and 
SFA models. Consistent with the findings of prior literature (e.g., Abdul 
Kader et al., 2010; Mathewson, 1983) , the results indicate that for both 
Nigeria and South Africa, multi-product micro-life insurers  are likely to 
benefit not only from economies of scale but also from economies of scope in 
the use of shared inputs. Furthermore, lnAge produces negative and 
statistically significant (p–value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test) coefficient estimates 
for Nigerian micro-life insurers while negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient estimates are obtained for South African micro-life insurers. This 
result implies that micro-life insurance firms which have been operating for a 
longer period in the Nigerian market have lower profitability than younger 
micro-life insurers. 
6.5 Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of the regression results presented in Table 6.4, two 
main diagnostic tests are conducted. The first test is based on omitting the 
Regulation variable from the regressions, as it gives the highest VIF values in 
all the models considered (see Table 6.3). The second test is based on 
employing the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), and the final test is 
conducted using the fixed-effects estimation techniques. 
As discussed in section 6.3 of the present chapter, a statistically significant 
positive correlation is found between the Regulation and Size variables (i.e., 
Pearson/Spearman correlation is 0.57/0.53, p<0.01, two-tailed test) as well 
as the Regulation and Leverage variables (i.e., Pearson/Spearman 
correlation is 0.47/0.62, p<0.01, two-tailed test). Consequently, the 
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computed VIFs - see Table 6.3 –again reveals that multicollinearity does not 
pose a severe econometric problem in the present study as the values 
obtained were all below the acceptable threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2003). 
Multicollinearity can cause the t-tests to be under-estimated and the 
resultant p-values to be over-estimated (Gujarati, 1999). Therefore, to 
further alleviate concerns about multicollinearity, a robustness test is 
conducted by omitting Regulation from the regression model.  
Appendix F presents the results for the regressions omitting the Regulation 
variable. The regression results obtained after omitting the Regulation 
variable in both the DEA and SFA models are consistent with the results of 
the main regressions as reported in Table 6.4. The coefficients estimates are 
consistent in the different regression specifications, and the signs of the 
estimated coefficients do not change. Leverage remains positive and 
statistically significant (p–value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test), Size also remains 
negative and statistically significant (p–value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test), and 
the p-values are improved in all the models considered. In addition, Interest 
remains negative and statistically significant (p–value ≤ 0.10, two-tailed 
test) in the DEA model. The results of the regressions with the omitted 
Regulation variable (Appendix E) indicate that multicollinearity does not 
change the main results, and is therefore not a serious problem in the 
present study. 
For the second robustness test, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation is employed. As discussed in section 5.7, the Wald F-statistic 
rejects the null hypothesis of no firm or period specific effects in the sample 
data. The null hypothesis of the Wooldridge (2002) test of no first-order 
serial correlation is also rejected. Therefore, fixed/year dummies are 
included to capture the period-specific effects, and the standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level to control for firm-specific effects. Greene (2003) 
contends that Efficiency variables can be subject to measurement error, 
because they are predicted from the stochastic frontier/data envelopment 
procedures (see Chapter 5, section 5.3). Thus, following prior research (e.g., 
Choi & Weiss, 2005) Efficiency is assumed to be endogenous, and the ranks 
of the efficiency scores for both the Efficiency-DEA and Efficiency-SFA are 
employed as instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. The Durbin-
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Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of Efficiency-DEA generated a chi-
square ( 2) statistics of 2.33/2.43 (p-value > 0.10) fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that Efficiency-DEA is exogenous. However, Efficiency-SFA 
generated a chi-square ( 2) statistics of 28.90/29.21 (p-value <0.01), and so 
rejects the null hypothesis that Efficiency-SFA is exogenous. Nonetheless, 
the instrumental variables are included in both the DEA and SFA regression. 
Appendix G reports the results for the regressions using the pooled OLS 
estimation.  The results obtained using the pooled OLS estimation in both the 
DEA and SFA models are fairly consistent with the results of the FGLS 
(baseline) regressions as reported in Table 6.4. The coefficient estimates of 
Efficiency in both the DEA and SFA models are positive and statistically 
significant (p–value ≤ 0.05, one- tailed test), lending support for hypothesis 
H1a. This result is consistent with the FGLS (baseline) results, and the 
findings of prior research (e.g., Choi and Weiss, 2005) which suggest that 
cost-efficient micro-life insurers have higher profitability than cost-inefficient 
firms. The Ownership dummy variable is statistically insignificant in all the 
models employed, indicating that ownership structure does not have a 
significant impact on the profitability of micro-life insurers. The estimated 
coefficients for Leverage are positive and statistically significant (p–value ≤ 
0.05, two- tailed test) in all the regression models, and consistent with 
hypothesis H3a. Consistent with the FGLS (baseline) results, the coefficient 
estimates of Reinsurance are negative and statistically significant (p–value ≤ 
0.01, two- tailed test) in both the DEA and SFA models. The interaction 
term, Reinsurance x Leverage, remain negative and statistically significant 
(p–value ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test). For the control variables, Regulation 
becomes positive and weakly statistically significant (p –value ≤ 0.10, two- 
tailed test) further suggesting that the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that promote the development 
of the private sector ‘improves’ the annual profitability of micro-life insurers. 
The coefficient estimates for Size and Product Mix are negative and 
statistically significant (p –value ≤ 0.10, two- tailed test) in all the models 
considered and consistent with the baseline results. Furthermore, contrary to 
the FGLS results, the estimated coefficients for lnAge and Interest are 
negative and statistically insignificant in all the regression models. 
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6.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presents the empirical results obtained from the statistical 
analysis of the Nigerian and South African micro-life insurance industry using 
a panel data covering the period 2005-2010. Using FGLS methodology, four 
main hypotheses were tested using DEA and SFA cost efficiency estimates 
obtained in a first-stage analysis as described in chapter 5, section 5.3. 
Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results of the for the 
pooled data of Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers indicate that 
the ability to control costs is statistically significant, and that cost efficient 
micro-life insurance firms are likely to be more profitable than less cost 
inefficient firms. In addition, the results obtained when the model is analysed 
using the split components of cost efficiency - technical and allocative 
efficiency- reveal that efficiency in the use production/service technology as 
well as efficient resource allocation are significant drivers of the profitability 
of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa. As in prior research, no 
statistically significant result is obtained for the ownership structure 
variables, suggesting that the ownership structure has no significant impact 
on the annual profitability of micro-life insurers. Furthermore, the increasing 
use of leverage was found to be value-enhancing for micro-life insurance 
firms suggesting that leverage helps to mitigate agency conflicts, and reduce 
the amount of free-cash flow available to managers to pursue self-utility 
maximising objectives. On the other hand, reinsurance was found to have a 
negative impact on the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South 
Africa, not surprisingly so given the regulatory restrictions and high cost of 
reinsurance especially in Nigeria. In addition, the interaction of reinsurance 
and leverage was found to have a negative impact on the profitability of 
micro-life insurers. Specifically, at high leverage levels, the annual 
profitability of micro-life insurers appears to decline as the purchase of 
reinsurance increases. The empirical results further confirm that the 
regulatory environment has no significant impact on profitability. Smaller 
and younger micro-life insurers were found to be more profitable, and 
diversification into multi-product lines was also found to be profit 
maximising. Finally, high interest rates in the economy were found to have a 
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weak negative impact on profitability. The main conclusions with regards to 
the key determinants of the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and 
South Africa are summarised, and their implications for commercial and 





Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research results and presents the main 
conclusions and implications arising from the study. In addition, the 
contribution of the research and the limitations of the study are highlighted. 
The consideration of potential areas for future research is also outlined in 
this final chapter of the thesis. 
7.2 Overview of the Project 
The extant literature on micro-insurance (e.g., see Dercon et al., 2008; 
Koven & Zimmerman, 2011) highlights the key demand and supply-side 
factors affecting the business success and take-up of micro-insurance in 
developing countries. Some of the key issues include regulatory constraints, 
cost-effective distribution channels, risk assessment and pricing, market 
demand, consumer education, and role of reinsurers. Using a case studies 
approach, Angove and Tande (2011) examine how profitability can be 
measured, and the level of success of certain micro-insurance programmes. 
However, very few quantitative analyses have been conducted to determine 
the specific factors that drive the profitability of micro-insurance programs. 
Biener and Eling (2011) were the first researchers to quantitatively examine 
the efficiency of micro-insurance programs. They examined the performance 
of micro-insurance programs using frontier efficiency approach, and find 
significant potential for improvement in terms of the productivity and 
operational efficiency. Thus, motivated by prior research, the present study 
analyses the determinants of the profitability of commercial micro-life 
insurance providers in Nigeria and South Africa. Specifically, the study puts 
forward two main research questions: 
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 Research Question 1: Can micro-life insurance be profitable for 
commercial insurance providers? 
 Research Question 2: What are the specific quantitative factors that 
drive business success/profitability of commercial micro-life insurance 
providers? 
 The research focuses on the micro-life insurance industry because in 
contrast to non-life insurance policies (e.g., on crops, property, and health), 
life insurance is the predominant line of micro-insurance business in 
developing countries accounting for approximately 30% of policies sold which 
is largely driven by the lending activities micro-finance institutions (Lloyd's of 
London, 2009). In addition, life insurance products are more compliant with 
the fundamentals of insurability and are generally easy to provide relative to 
other business lines (Biener & Eling, 2012). Hence, the attributes of micro-
life insurance allows potentially ‘cleaner’ tests of the research hypotheses to 
be carried out. Furthermore, Nigeria and South Africa – the two largest 
economies of sub-Sahara Africa - are considered to be good environments to 
conduct the present study based on the physical, economic, and regulatory 
landscape, as well as the salient features of the micro-insurance market. The 
institutional context of both Nigeria and South Africa are discussed in detail 
in chapter 2. 
Furthermore, the present study critically reviewed the theoretical and 
empirical literature relating to micro-insurance and financial performance in 
order to address the research questions put forward. In particular, the study 
examines the origin, definition and perspectives of micro-insurance; the 
differences between micro-insurance and conventional insurance; and micro-
life insurance product-types. The literature on transaction costs, information 
asymmetry, reinsurance and leverage are also critically reviewed in chapter 
3. Drawing a framework from the review of academic literature, four main 
research hypotheses regarding the linkages between profitability, cost 
efficiency, ownership structure, reinsurance, and leverage are then put 
forward to address the research questions in Chapter 4. 
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The data for empirical analyses, covering the six years between 2005 and 
2010 were obtained from the annual reports and accounts provided by the 
insurance regulator in the two countries. For Nigeria, annual data are 
compiled by the NIA and submitted to the insurance industry regulator, 
NIACOM. For South Africa, annual data are filed with the local insurance 
industry regulator, FSB. In situations where data on micro-life insurance 
business are unavailable from published sources, required data are obtained 
directly from internal company sources through authorized direct access 
and/or by interview with technical managers. The period of analysis (i.e., 
2005-2010), represents the earliest and latest years for which complete data 
were available to enable the research to be completed in a timely manner. 
Following prior research (e.g., Cummins & Zi, 1998; Eling & Luhnen, 2010a), 
both the mathematical programming (DEA) and econometric (SFA) frontier 
efficiency estimation techniques are employed in the computation of cost 
efficiency estimates in a first-stage analyses. This procedure enables one to 
examine the potential effects of using different frontier efficiency techniques 
on the derived cost efficiency estimates. Furthermore, the FGLS methodology 
is employed to test the empirical hypotheses put forward in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. The FGLS has been identified as the most appropriate 
estimation procedure for handling the simultaneous presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Grace & Leverty, 2012). In 
addition, the FGLS estimation technique permits the inclusion of firm/year 
dummies to control unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., variation in 
management quality) as well as time-effects (e.g., changes in unobserved 
macroeconomic factors) in the sample firms. The research design and model 
specification are outlined in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
The key aggregate features of the dependent, independent and control 
variables as well as the associations between pairs of each variable are 
presented in Chapter 6. The FGLS regression analysis was employed to 
determine the simultaneous effects of cost efficiency, ownership structure, 
leverage and reinsurance on the financial profitability of micro-life insurance 
firms while concomitantly controlling for time-effects and firm-specific 
effects. In addition, regression analyses were conducted separately for the 
Nigeria and South Africa dataset to highlight differences in the profitability of 
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micro-life insurers in the two countries. The empirical results of the 
regression analyses are also presented in Chapter 6. Section 7.3 below now 
discusses the main conclusions and implications arising from the empirical 
analysis. 
7.3 Research Conclusions and Implications 
The micro-insurance market has received growing interest from local and 
international commercial insurers in recent years. The achievement of 
sustained profitability is a key strategic goal for most commercial players, 
especially for international firms who are seeking new growth opportunities 
away from the saturated traditional markets (Koven and Zimmerman, 2011). 
Despite its huge market potential of up to 2-3 billion policies globally and 
prospective in-force business value estimated at US$40 billion, the viability 
of most schemes/products is still questionable (Swiss Re, 2010). The extant 
literature on micro-insurance highlights the supply and demand factors 
affecting the penetration and viability of micro-life insurance. However, few 
studies have quantitatively examined the factors that drive the profitability of 
micro-life insurance firms. The pioneering study of Biener and Eling (2011) 
identify profit-orientation, size, age, and policy-type as the drivers of the 
efficiency of micro-insurance programs. They found that large non-profit 
firms which have been active in the micro-insurance markets for a longer 
period were inefficient. However, the use of group policies was found to be a 
statistically significant driver of performance in micro-life insurers. Therefore, 
drawing a framework from the financial economics and micro-insurance 
literature, the present study posits that cost efficiency, ownership structure, 
leverage, and risk management decisions (i.e., reinsurance) are likely to be 
important drivers of the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and 
South Africa. The main conclusions from the empirical analysis for the pooled 
data-set of Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers, as well as the 
results of the separate country analysis are discussed below. 
 The first main conclusion of the study is that the sample of Nigerian and 
South African micro-life insurers considered in the present study are on 
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average profitable, with South African firms having a slightly higher average 
profitability than Nigerian firms - see Table 6.1. 
The second main conclusion is that some of the results obtained from the 
data analyses are consistent with what was hypothesised and support the 
findings of previous research. For instance, in the first-stage analysis of the 
efficiency estimates (i.e., cost, technical and allocative efficiency) using the 
two main frontier efficiency techniques (i.e., DEA and SFA), the results 
reveal that efficiency estimates obtained using the mathematical 
programming (DEA) approach are lower than the estimates obtained using 
the econometric (SFA) approach (see Appendix A). These findings are as 
expected, and consistent with the results of prior literature (e.g., Cummins & 
Zi, 1998) which use multiple frontier efficiency methods. The efficiency 
estimates derived using the DEA are expected to be lower than the estimates 
derived using the SFA, because the DEA measures all the random departures 
from the frontier as inefficiency, while the SFA separates the departures from 
the frontier into the inefficiency and random error components - see chapter 
5, section 5.3. Furthermore, in line with prior research (e.g., Cummins & Zi, 
1998; Eling & Luhnen, 2010b), the economic insights derived using either 
the DEA or SFA efficiency estimates in the main regression analyses turn out 
to be relatively similar. These findings suggest that the efficiency estimates 
are not driven by specification errors as the main regression results are 
robust to the choice of frontier efficiency estimation technique. 
In line with the first hypothesis H1a, and consistent with the results of other 
studies (e.g., Choi & Weiss, 2005; Greene & Segal, 2004) the regression 
results reveal that cost-efficiency is a significant driver of the profitability of 
micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa. That is, micro-life insurers 
which are cost efficient are likely to be more profitable than cost inefficient 
firms.  In particular, because micro-insurance products are characterised by 
low-premiums, and the proportion of the premium that must go to pay for 
expenses (as opposed to payment for covered losses) is high, any ability of 
the insurer to reduce per-policy (transaction) costs will yield great returns for 
sustained profitability. Furthermore, consistent with hypotheses H1b and 
H1c, the present study finds that efficiency in production technology and the 
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use of cost-minimizing inputs are also significant drivers of the profitability of 
micro-life insurers. 
Furthermore, in line with the third hypothesis H3a, and the findings of prior 
studies (e.g., Jensen, 1986), the empirical results reveal that increasing 
financial leverage could be profit enhancing for micro-life insurance firms in 
Nigeria and South Africa. Indeed, prior research (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 
1982; Stulz, 1990) contend that the use of debt could mitigate the owner-
manager conflicts (and subsequent agency costs) which arise in operating 
and investment decisions, as the requirement to meet the repayment 
schedule on debt covenants disciplines managers to pursue shareholder 
value maximisation objectives. 
The empirical results for the pooled data-set of Nigerian and South African 
micro-life insurers reveal that the level of reinsurance is negatively 
associated with annual profitability (see Table 6.4). This finding which is 
consistent with prior research and in line with the fourth hypothesis H4b 
suggests that the costly nature of reinsurance purchase reduces the annual 
profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa. Prior research 
(e.g., Jean-Baptiste & Santomero, 2000; Olaosebikan, 2013) contend that 
the reinsurer’s lack of information on the nature of risk being transferred 
(which is particularly high for micro-insurance due to lack of quality data), 
and control over the outcome of risk results in higher reinsurance premiums. 
Indeed, Olaosebikan (2013) contends that reinsurance in the micro-life 
insurance sector of the Nigerian market may be highly priced to reflect the 
increased risk associated with insuring the lives of low-income groups. In 
addition, McCord et al. (2005) observe minimal use of reinsurance in a 
successful micro-insurance scheme in Uganda, and highlight the importance 
of reinsurance in providing technical expertise to primary micro-life insurers. 
However, McCord et al. (2005) contend that due to the low sums assured, 
micro-insurers may not necessarily require significant amounts of 
reinsurance for risk mitigation and the regulatory requirement to hold such 
costly reinsurance may result in a loss of profitability.  
In addition, the empirical results for the pooled data-set indicate that the 
interaction effects between leverage and the amount of reinsurance 
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purchased has a statistically significant impact on the annual profitability of 
micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa. Contrary to the findings of 
prior studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2008; Garven & Lamm-Tennant, 2003) 
which suggest that insurers with high leverage tend to purchase more 
reinsurance to alleviate the costs of bankruptcy, the present study finds that 
the increasing purchase of reinsurance at high leverage levels actually 
reduces the profitability of the firm. These findings suggest that for the 
pooled data-set of Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers, the high 
cost of reinsurance outweighs its potential benefit of mitigating the expected 
costs of bankruptcy induced at high leverage. In other words, reinsurance 
has potential costs as well as risk transfer benefits, which have to be 
carefully considered by the managers of micro-life insurance firms. 
The third main conclusion of the present study is that some of the evidence 
obtained from the empirical research is inconsistent with what was 
hypothesised. For instance, the research findings reveal no statistically 
significant relation between ownership structure and annual profitability of 
micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa for all the ownership forms 
considered. Ownership structure is an effective tool for the control of the 
incentive conflicts inherent in the relationship between owners, managers 
and policyholders (Mayers & Smith, 1981). The empirical results are however 
not surprising, as prior research(e.g., see Berle & Means, 1932; Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985; Demsetz  & Villalonga, 2001) on the influence of ownership 
structure on firm performance has generated mixed results. For example, 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no evidence to support the argument 
that the variation in observed ownership structure across firms results in 
systemic variations in firm performance. Due to the lack of data, the present 
study focuses on only stock micro-life insurers, and it may well be that the 
inclusion of other forms of ownership such as mutual firms could provide 
more interesting results. 
The fourth main conclusion is that institutional differences could also be 
important drivers of the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and 
South Africa. For instance, the research findings indicate that small micro-life 
insurers have higher annual profitability than large micro-life insurers. In line 
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with prior research (e.g., Adams & Buckle, 2003; Biener & Eling, 2011), a 
possible explanation of this observation is that profitability could be 
adversely affected by the enhanced information asymmetries and agency 
costs that arise as an organisation grows in size. Indeed, Biener and Eling 
(2011) contend that social cohesion (i.e., the closer link between ownership 
and control) could explain the efficiency gain of small firms. Furthermore, 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Abdul Kader et al., 2010; Mathewson, 
1983), the observed link between profitability and the degree to which 
micro-life insurers have a diversified range of products suggests that 
compared with their counterparts with a narrow product-range, multi-
product firms are better able to reduce the cost of risk in-house through 
‘natural diversification’ as well as realize benefits from economies of scale 
and scope. In line with Biener and Eling (2011), the empirical results of the 
present study further reveals that micro-life insurers which have been 
operating in the micro-insurance market for longer period have lower annual 
profitability than newer market entrants. This result suggests that the 
innovative nature of new entrants, as well as the adaptation of new 
technology leads to a significant impact on profitability. Furthermore, 
consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Doherty & Garven, 1995) 
the results of the present study suggest that for micro-life insurers in Nigeria 
and South Africa, profit margins reflect the average price of traded insurance 
policies which are inversely related to the movement of the average annual 
interest rates in the economy. On the other hand, no statistically significant 
support is obtained for the impact of the regulatory environment on the 
profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and South Africa. 
The fifth and final conclusion is that interesting results were obtained by 
conducting separate empirical analyses on the Nigeria and South Africa data 
set. Consistent with the results of the pooled data-set of Nigerian and South 
African micro-life insurers (see Table 6.4), and the findings of prior research 
(e.g., Choi & Weiss, 2005), the empirical results for the separate analysis of 
Nigeria and South African micro-life insurers reveal that cost efficient micro-
life insurers are more profitable than less cost efficient firms. The results 
suggest that the success of the managers of micro-life insurance firms in 
controlling transaction costs is crucial for profitability. The empirical results 
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further show that the increasing use of leverage has a positive impact on the 
profitability of micro-life insurers in both Nigeria and South Africa. This result 
is consistent with the findings of prior research (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Harris & 
Raviv, 1990, 1991), and reveals the benefits of leverage in providing tax 
shield and mitigating agency conflicts. Furthermore, consistent with 
hypothesis H2c and the findings of prior research (e.g., Cummins & Sommer, 
1996; He & Sommer, 2010) the empirical results reveal that Nigerian micro-
life insurance firms with shareholding closely-held by management are likely 
to be more profitable suggesting that compared to the other stock ownership 
forms considered,  the closer merger of the owner-manager functions in 
firms with stock closely-held  by management plays a huge role in reducing 
the agency costs of monitoring and control. On the other hand, South African 
micro-life insurers with stock shareholdings closely held by institutional 
investors such as insurance and mutual firms are likely to have greater 
annual profitability. The result which is consistent with the findings of prior 
research (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) suggests that compared to the other 
stock ownership forms considered in the present study, the lower marginal 
cost of acquiring and disseminating information for large non-management 
(institutional) investors results in the effective monitoring of the activities of 
managers. In addition, the underpinnings of the historical development of 
the insurance market in both Nigeria and South Africa could also be a 
possible explanation for the dominance, and subsequent profitability of these 
ownership forms (see chapter 2, section 2.2). 
Finally, contrary to the findings of prior studies (e.g., Garven & Lamm-
Tennant, 2003), the empirical results for the interaction between leverage 
and reinsurance results in a reduction in profitability for South African micro-
life insurers. The results suggest that the high cost of reinsurance outweighs 
its potential benefits of alleviating the expected bankruptcy costs of high 
leverage, thus leading to a reduction of profitability. On the other hand, the 
empirical findings reveal no statistically significant support for the impact of 
the interaction between the leverage and reinsurance on the profitability of 




7.4 Contributions of the Research 
The present study provides new and potentially important insights regarding 
the factors that drive the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria and 
South Africa. It also examines the institutional and macroeconomic 
differences that could impact on the annual profitability of micro-life insurers. 
Therefore, the present study is considered to contribute to the existing 
literature in at least five main regards. 
First, the inverse relation between the profitability of micro-life insurers and 
the amount of reinsurance purchased obtained using the pooled data-set of 
both Nigerian and South African micro-life insurers suggests that reinsurers 
may need to ‘moderate and modify’ their reinsurance prices in micro-
insurance markets either as a CSR exercise or to expand the underwriting 
capacity and solvency position of micro-insurance carriers. In addition, 
reinsurers could, for example, offer micro-insurers ‘conditional fixed-period 
cut price’ reinsurance cover until such time that sufficient volumes of 
business have been generated to enable adequate underwriting data (e.g., 
experience rating) systems to be developed. Therefore, in highlighting that 
reinsurance has potential costs as well as risk transfer benefits; the present 
study could be relevant to local insurance industry regulators and others 
(e.g., credit ratings agencies) in their licensing and financial assessment of 
micro-life insurers. The research project could also help managers of micro-
life insurance firms to better assess annual profitability, and make more 
accurate reinsurance decisions. 
Second, the inverse relation between the firm size of micro-life insurance 
firms and annual profitability could suggest to industry regulators that small 
micro-insurers may be more sustainable (solvent) in developing countries 
than larger operatives. In addition, in showing that smaller operatives are 
more profitable, the research project could be of interest to multinational 
financial institutions and others (e.g., business consultants) to make more 
informed strategic decisions in emerging markets (e.g., with regard to 
prospective joint-ventures and acquisitions). The results could also be of 
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interest to policy-makers to encourage and support the growth of smaller 
micro-life insurance firms. 
Third, Nigeria and South Africa provide interesting environments for the 
examination of the profitability of micro-life insurers, because although being 
the two largest economies in sub-Saharan Africa, both countries are 
characterised by a large proportion of low-income households who do not 
currently have access to formal risk mitigating mechanisms. Therefore, by 
providing insights into the factors that drive the effective supply (and 
profitability) of micro-life insurance, the present study could be of interest to 
policy-makers, and supervisory bodies in supporting the development of 
micro-insurance.  In addition, the insights obtained from the research project 
could be employed in the understanding of micro-insurance operations, not 
only in sub-Saharan Africa but in other parts of the developing world that 
have similar social and economic characteristics such as Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
Fourth, the separate analysis of Nigerian and South African micro-life 
insurers yield interesting results. For the sample of Nigerian micro-life 
insurers examined, the empirical results reveal that younger, larger, cost-
efficient firms which have stock closely held by management and employ 
increasing leverage are more profitable. On the other hand, the empirical 
results reveal that for South African micro-life insurers; smaller, cost efficient 
firms which have stock closely held by large institutional investors (e.g., 
insurance and financial institutions) employed increasing leverage, and 
purchased a lower amount of reinsurance are more profitable. The findings of 
the research project could provide useful insights for multinational investors 
and managers of micro-life insurance firms in Nigeria and South Africa in the 
assessment of the viability/profitability of their micro-insurance programs. In 
addition, the findings reveal that even in jurisdictions with similar economic 
characteristics such as Nigeria and South Africa, a one-size fits all approach 
in terms of investment opportunities is not always effective as the cultural 




Fifth, the results of the two frontier estimation methods (i.e., DEA and SFA) 
employed in the computation of the cost efficiency estimates confirm the 
reliability and robustness of the empirical results. Therefore, in showing that 
the economic insights derived from using either econometric (SFA) or the 
linear programming (DEA) approaches are relatively similar, the present 
study contributes to the literature (and intense debate) on frontier efficiency 
estimation in the insurance industry. The research project could therefore be 
of interest to academics as well as practitioners in the insurance industry. 
7.5 Research Limitations 
The inferences drawn from the research findings should be interpreted by 
acknowledging the inherent limitations within the study. However, as far as 
possible, corrective actions have been taken to minimise the effects of such 
shortcomings. The key limitations of this research project are outlined below. 
First, the present study focuses on the quantitative factors that drive the 
profitability of micro-life insurers. However, there may be other omitted 
country, firm and/or time invariant factors (e.g., customer trust, 
geographical location and cultural factors) which might also influence the 
profitability of micro-life insurers. Hence, the generalisation of the research 
findings has to be made with caution taking into account the potential impact 
of these other qualitative factors. However, the study employs a panel data 
design which has the advantage of controlling for the omission of country, 
firm and/or time-specific variables. 
Second, the panel data design employed in the present study could produce 
potential sample bias. Specifically, the three-year consecutive data 
requirement for each insurer produces an unbalanced data sample arising 
from the new entry and exit of insurers into the micro-insurance market as a 
result of the consolidation exercise conducted in the Nigerian insurance 
industry in 2007. The unbalanced panel data sample could affect estimated 
regression estimates and the observed inferences. Nonetheless, panel data 
design enables the present study to observe the determinants of profitability 
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across insurers, as well as within an insurer over time which cannot be done 
using either cross-sectional or time series data. 
Third, because of a relatively small number of firm-year observations, the 
present study was unable to employ other alternative estimation techniques 
such as the generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation which helps to 
control for potential econometric problems such as endogeneity (reverse 
causation) and unobserved firm and time-specific effects (e.g., variations in 
managerial talent) that could confound interpretation of results. However, the 
sample of micro-life insurers examined in the present study represents a 
comprehensive snapshot of the industry. In addition, the reported empirical 
results are robust and reliable as the robustness tests conducted (see chapter 
6, section 6.6) did not reveal significant discrepancies in the computed 
coefficient estimates. 
7.6 Areas for Future Research 
Based on the empirical results and research limitations, there are several 
prospective areas for future research emanating from the present study. 
First, the implications and insights arising from the analysis of the factors 
that influence the profitability of micro-life insurance firms could be extended 
to the non-life segment of the micro-insurance market. Indeed, the research 
implications could be employed in the analysis of profitability in other sectors 
of the micro-finance industry such as banks and credit unions. 
Second, a further step for future research would be to expand the data-set in 
order to provide a better basis for the analysis of the profitability of micro-
life insurance providers. For example, Mayers and Smith (1988) contend that 
mutual insurers (including friendly societies and co-operatives) are more able 
to control agency conflicts  (and subsequent agency costs) due to the merger 
of the owner-policyholder functions, thus a larger set consisting of both stock 
and mutual firms would enable future research on the potential impact of 
different organisational forms on profitability. Furthermore, Biener and Eling 
(2011) find that offering group policies could help reduce the information 
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asymmetry problems that are widespread in micro-insurance markets. 
Therefore, using a broader data-set which captures the different types of 
micro-insurance policies offered, future research could examine the most 
appropriate policy-type or mechanisms for the control of information 
asymmetry problems (i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard). Finally, 
future research using a larger data set consisting of more countries or a 
single country with more micro-life insurers (e.g., India) could enable the 
refinement of the research methodology and estimation techniques. 
Third, the empirical evidence obtained from the pooled data-set of Nigerian 
and South African micro-life insurers suggests that the increasing purchase 
of reinsurance results in a reduction of the profitability of micro-life insurers. 
However, due to data limitations, the study does not distinguish between the 
different types of reinsurance arrangements that result in maximum 
profitability. Therefore, future research which examines the impact of 
different types of reinsurance arrangements (e.g., proportional vs. non-
proportional reinsurance) on the profitability of micro-life insurers could yield 
interesting insights. 
Fourth, the use of innovative distribution methods (e.g., mobile phone 
network) have been shown to alleviate some of the issues associated with 
relatively high transaction costs in micro-insurance. Indeed, Swiss Re (2010) 
reports that the achievement of economies of scale through the identification 
and selection of a cost effective distribution model is crucial to the long–term 
success and sustainability of micro-insurance, given the high administrative 
and operating costs involved in micro-insurance markets. Thus, future 
research could examine the most appropriate and cost efficient distribution 
system for the effective supply and sustainability of micro-insurance. 
Fifth, the empirical results in the present study reveal no significant relation 
between the regulatory environment and profitability of micro-life insurers. 
However, Koven and Zimmerman (2011) describe the ideal regulatory 
environment for micro-insurance as one which neither over-promotes the 
market nor creates barriers through the rigid enforcement of traditional 
guidelines, and contend that a supportive regulatory environment is crucial 
for the business success of micro-insurance. Therefore, future research could 
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expand the current study by employing alternative measures of regulation 
and/or eliciting the views of insurance industry participants as to the 
appropriate regulation for promoting micro-insurance business. 
7.7 Final Remarks 
The huge potential market for micro-insurance has captured the attention of 
local and multinational insurance and reinsurance firms, and multinational 
investors. However, despite its great market potential - estimated to be up 
to 2-3 billion policies globally with annual growth rates at 10% or higher – 
the penetration rates for micro-insurance are currently much lower than 
predicted. The long-term viability of many micro-insurance schemes 
currently in place particularly in developing countries is also being 
questioned. The extant literature on micro-insurance highlight the supply and 
demand factors affecting the penetration and viability of micro-life insurance. 
However, few studies have quantitatively examined the factors that drive the 
profitability of micro-life insurance firms. Drawing a framework from the 
micro-insurance and financial economics literature, the current study extends 
prior research by examining the determinants of the profitability of micro-life 
insurers in Nigeria and South Africa.  
The present study employs the two main frontier efficiency estimation 
techniques (i.e., DEA and SFA) in the computation of the cost efficiency 
estimates in a first-stage analysis. This was followed by the use of the 
feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) panel data estimation design  to 
empirically test the research hypotheses put forward in the fourth chapter. 
The FGLS estimation was employed as it helps to control for the 
simultaneous presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the 
sample data. 
The empirical findings of the pooled data-set of Nigerian and South African 
micro-life insurers support some of the research hypotheses and the results 
of prior research but contradict others. In line with the results of prior 
research (e.g., Choi & Weiss, 2005; Greene & Segal, 2004), the empirical 
findings reveal that cost efficiency is a significant driver of the profitability of 
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micro-life insurers especially given the relatively low average annual 
profitability. The results further indicate that risk management decisions such 
as leverage and the purchase of reinsurance are significant drivers of 
profitability. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Jensen, 1986), the benefits 
of leverage in providing tax-shield benefits and mitigating agency-conflicts 
result in higher profitability for micro-life insurance firms. On the other hand, 
in line with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Jean-Baptiste & Santomero, 
2000), the increasing purchase of reinsurance results in a reduction in 
profitability due to the costly nature of reinsurance for primary micro-life 
insurance providers.  In addition, contrary to previous studies (e.g., Adams 
et al., 2008; Garven & Lamm-Tennant, 2003), the empirical findings for the 
interaction between leverage and reinsurance results in a negative impact on 
profitability, suggesting that the high costs of reinsurance outweighs the 
potential bankruptcy costs induced at high leverage. The present study finds 
no support for the relation between all the ownership structure variables 
considered and profitability. Furthermore, institutional differences such as 
firm size, product-mix, and age of the micro-life insurer were also found to 
be significant drivers of profitability. In addition, macro-economic indicators 
such as the average annual interest  rates in the economy was found to be a 
significant driver of the profitability of micro-life insurers’ while  statistically 
significant support  was found for the influence of the regulatory 
environment (Mayers, Shivdasani, & Smith 1997) 
The present study contributes potentially valuable insights on the 
quantitative factors that drive the profitability of micro-life insurers in Nigeria 
and South Africa, and therefore makes an important contribution to the 
dearth of the literature on micro-insurance. Furthermore, the empirical 
results of the present study could be of interest to local and multinational 
insurance and reinsurance firms, industry regulators, and other stakeholders 
such as multinational investors and international aid agencies. Finally, the 
present study provides a useful basis for the conduct of future research on 
other factors surrounding the viability and effective supply of micro-
insurance. For example, future research could focus on issues such as the 
determination of the most appropriate organisational forms for the control of 




and Description of Dependent, Independ ent and Control Variables.  
Appendix A : Comparison of Actual vs. Estimated Expenses of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria, 2005-2010.  
Comparison of Actual vs. Estimated Expenses of Micro-Life 
Insurers in Nigeria, 2005-2010. 
 
 
Source: Research Data. This appendix presents the tabular and graphical analysis of the 
actual versus estimated expenses of eleven micro-life insurers in Nigeria. The actual expenses 
are the expenses for which actual micro-insurance data is available while the estimated 
expenses are those calculated using the proportional method of expense allocation – see 












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
$USD 
('000) 
Actual expenses Estimated expenses
USD($’000) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
Observed/Actual 
expenses 178.24 182.98 161.01 613.87 407.88 716.55 376.76 
Estimated 
expenses 111.94 147.75 167.72 679.06 342.18 574.05 337.12 
% Difference 37 19 -4 -11 16 20 11 
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Appendix B: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Inputs, Input Prices, and Outputs employed in the Estimation of Cost Efficiency.  
 Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Inputs, Input Prices, 
and Outputs employed in the Estimation of Cost Efficiency. 
Panel A : Definition of Inputs and Outputs 
Variable Proxy 
Inputs  
Labour and business service Operating expenses/price of labour 
Debt capital Total liabilities 
Equity capital Capital plus surplus 
  
Input Prices  
Price of labour Regional ILO wage per year 
Price of debt capital Long-term government bond rates 
Price of equity capital 5-year average of yearly total return rates of 
regional MSCI EM indices. 
  
Outputs  
Premiums Net Premiums 
Investments Investment income 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Inputs, Outputs and Efficiency Estimates. 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Inputs      
Labour and business service Quantity 1329.29 2369.97 3.38 14035.05 
Debt capital $million 125.31 243.69 0.16 762.24 
Equity capital $million 10.02 15.77 0.12 50.73 
      
Input prices      
Price of labour $ 6338.74 4327.13 1816.79 14449.84 
Price of debt capital % 7.63 1.68 3.85 9.10 
Price of equity capital % 16.90 6.45 10.59 30.74 
      
Outputs      
Net premiums $million 24.28 38.19 0.10 112.17 
Investment income $million 8.20 17.04 0.001 54.15 
      
Operating expenses $million 7.75 11.93 0.12 34.91 
Total costs $million 7.93 11.91 0.21 35.02 
      
Efficiency Estimates      
DEA: Cost Efficiency  0.31 0.29 0.01 1.00 
        Technical Efficiency  0.65 0.32 0.08 1.00 
        Allocative Efficiency  0.48 0.29 0.01 1.00 
      
SFA:  Cost Efficiency  0.79 0.09 0.17 0.94 
        Technical Efficiency  0.78 0.10 0.09 0.91 
        Allocative Efficiency  0.35 0.24 0.01 0.97 
Source: Research Data. Following prior research (e.g., Cummins & Zi, 1998), to ensure direct 
comparability, all monetary values are deflated by the consumer price index to the base year 2005. 
Country-specific consumer price indices were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (2012) 
indices. The values were further converted into U.S dollars using the exchange rates available from 
the Thomson DataStream. Negative and /or zero values for input and output variables are 




Appendix C: Definition and Description of Dependent, Indep endent and Control Variables. 
Definition and Description of Dependent, Independent and 
Control Variables. 
Variables Definition and Description 
Dependent Variable: 
Profitability (Profit) Following Wipf & Garand (2010), the 
annual profitability, Profit is the return on 
assets (ROA) which is measured as the 
ratio of net income before interest and 
taxes for insurer   in year   to the 
average of total assets in years   and 




                 
         
 
 
where   denotes the     -year,    
represents net income;     represents 
premiums earned (net of reinsurance);    
is investment income (net of fees);      is 
incurred claims (net of reinsurance 
recoverable),     is management 
expenses ,     is commissions paid, and 
    is total assets.  
Independent Variables: 
Cost efficiency (Efficiency) As in Greene and Segal (2004), this 
variable is measured as firm-specific cost 
efficiency estimates derived using the 
DEA and the SFA.  
Ownership Structure (Ownership) Consistent with He and Sommer (2010), 
ownership structure is represented by 
dummy variables for each share 
ownership class considered, namely: Dp= 
1 for public (widely-held) stock micro-life 
insurer, and 0 for private (closely- held) 
stock micro-life insurer. For the variation 
of private (closely-held) stock micro-life 
insurers, Dpm =1 for shareholdings 
closely-held by management, 0 
otherwise; Dpb = 1 for shareholdings 
closely-held by banks, and 0 otherwise; 
while Dpo=1 for shareholdings closely-
held by others (e.g., insurance 
companies, financial companies, and 
mutual funds), and =0 otherwise. 
Leverage (Leverage) Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
leverage is measured as the ratio of [net 
(of reinsurance) life insurance liabilities + 
other liabilities] and surplus. 
Reinsurance (Reinsurance) As in Adiel (1996), the quantity of 
reinsurance purchased by micro-life 
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insurer   , in year  , is measured as the 
ratio of annual gross premiums ceded to 
total gross premiums written.  
Control Variables:  
Regulatory Environment (Regulation) As in Biener et al. (2013), regulation is 
measured as the country-specific annual 
percentile rank of the regulatory quality 
index compiled by the World Bank 
(2012). The index captures the 
perception of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that 
promote the development of the private 
sector. The percentile rank indicates the 
percentage of countries world-wide that 
rank lower than the indicated country. 
Thus, higher values reflect better 
regulation. 
  
Firm size (Size) Firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of annual total admitted 
assets. This approach alleviates the 
possible effects of extreme values 
confounding the empirical results (e.g., 
see Hardwick, 1997) 
 
Product-mix (Product-Mix) As in Mayers and Smith (1994), the 
product mix is measured by a Herfindahl 
concentration index that is computed 
using the three major lines of products 
sold by micro-life insurers: life insurance; 
credit life and funeral insurance. The 
Herfindahl index is computed for each 
firm as: 
            ∑(
    
   
)
 
   
 
 
where      is the amount of direct 
premium written in the     line of 
insurance, and     is the amount of total 
premiums written across micro-life 
insurance lines. The closer the Herfindahl 
index to one, the more concentrated is 
the production function of the micro-life 
insurer. 
Length of time in  
the market (Age) 
Following, Biener and Eling (2011), age is 
measured as the number of years a 
micro-life insurer has been operating in 
the market. The natural logarithm of the 
number of years (lnAge) is employed to 
alleviate the possible effects of extreme 
values which might confound the 
empirical results. 
Interest rate (Interest) This is measured as the country-specific 
average annual commercial bank lending 
rate (e.g., see Doherty & Garven, 1995). 
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Country-Effects (Country) To control for country effects (e.g., 
cultural factors), a dummy variable 
Country is employed, where 1 represents 
Nigerian micro-life insurers, and 0 
represents South African micro-life 
insurers. 
Time-Effects Dummy variables for each year (time 
effects) are employed to proxy for 
changes in unspecified macroeconomic 
factors, which are cross-sectionally 
constant (e.g., change in underwriting 
cycles, prices, inflation etc.) 
Interaction-term  
(Reinsurance x Leverage) 
 Based on (Adams et al., 2008), an 
interaction term, Reinsurance x Leverage 
is included in the model to capture the 
possible interaction effects between 
corresponding variables. The centering 
procedure is applied in the computation 
of the interaction terms to prevent 





Appendix D:  
Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: Feasible Generalised 
Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation- Using the Technical Efficiency Estimate. 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
Intercept 0.218 0.041*** 0.236 0.037*** -0.528 0.046*** -0.535 0.042*** 
Efficiency- Technical 0.073 0.012*** 0.069 0.013*** 0.426 0.037*** 0.428 0.038*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.006 0.013 - - -0.003 0.012 
Dpm 0.005 0.017 - - 0.005 0.015 - - 
Dpb 0.015 0.014 - - 0.003 0.014 - - 
Dpo 0.002 0.022 - - 0.007 0.021 - - 
Leverage 0.014 0.002*** 0.014 0.002*** 0.009 0.002*** 0.009 0.002*** 
Reinsurance -0.223 0.042*** -0.222 0.041** -0.191 0.032*** -0.199 0.022*** 
Regulation 0.046 0.049 0.031 0.049 0.011 0.047 0.017 0.046 
Size -0.005 0.003* -0.006 0.003* -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.003* 
Product Mix -0.076 0.026*** -0.099 0.025*** -0.059 0.024** -0.060 0.021*** 
lnAge -0.019 0.008** -0.024 0.008*** -0.015 0.009* -0.016 0.008** 
Interest -0.439 0.283 -0.454 0.284 0.149 0.267 -0.187 0.254 












159.02***   241.68*** 
 
458.57*** 
Obs.   282   282   282   282 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) regressions. The DEA column gives the results for the regressions in 
which the technical efficiency (Efficiency-Technical) are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in which the 
technical efficiency (Efficiency- Technical) are derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate the 






Appendix E:  
Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: Feasible Generalised 
Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation- Using the Allocative Efficiency Estimate. 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
Intercept 0.285 0.048*** 0.273 0.041*** -0.156 0.040*** -0.169 0.032*** 
Efficiency-Allocative -0.008 0.021 -0.006 0.014 0.187 0.019*** 0.186 0.019*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.016 0.014 - - -0.008 0.011 
Dpm 0.003 0.018 - - 0.023 0.014 - - 
Dpb 0.019 0.016 - - 0.002 0.013 - - 
Dpo 0.023 0.024 - - 0.003 0.018 - - 
Leverage 0.015 0.002*** 0.015 0.002*** 0.012 0.002*** 0.011 0.002*** 
Reinsurance -0.222 0.042*** -0.212 0.037*** -0.174 0.034*** -0.179 0.029*** 
Regulation 0.017 0.053 0.028 0.052 0.083 0.045 0.759 0.043 
Size -0.008 0.003*** -0.009 0.003*** -0.026 0.003* -0.003 0.002 
Product Mix -0.088 0.027*** -0.088 0.024*** -0.055 0.023** -0.050 0.020** 
lnAge -0.017 0.009* -0.016 0.009* -0.019 0.008** -0.019 0.007** 
Interest -0.415 0.297 -0.427 0.291* 0.331 0.264 -0.350 0.253 












112.68***   247.06*** 
 
255.78*** 
Obs.   282   282   282   282 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) regressions. The DEA column gives the results for the regressions in 
which the allocative efficiency (Efficiency-Allocative) are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in which 
the allocative efficiency (Efficiency-Allocative) are derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. All remaining variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate 






Appendix F: Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation (Omitting the Regulation variable).  
Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: Feasible Generalised 
Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation (Omitting the Regulation variable). 
  I.                            DEA  II.                          SFA  
  Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error  Coeff. Std. Error  Coeff. Std. Error  
Intercept 0.236 0.043*** 0.236 0.039*** -0.397 0.062*** -0.382 0.061*** 
Efficiency 0.078 0.018*** 0.073 0.017*** 0.741 0.055*** 0.726 0.056*** 
Ownership: Dp - - -0.014 0.013 - - -0.003 0.012 
Dpm 0.003 0.017 - - 0.015 0.012 - - 
Dpb 0.021 0.015 - - 0.014 0.013 - - 
Dpo 0.015 0.024 - - 0.004 0.023 - - 
Leverage 0.017 0.002*** 0.016 0.002*** 0.013 0.002*** 0.013 0.002*** 
Reinsurance -0.218 0.042*** -0.208 0.041*** -0.167 0.033** -0.169 0.033*** 
Size -0.005 0.002*** -0.005 0.002*** -0.005 0.002*** -0.005 0.002*** 
Product Mix -0.084 0.027*** -0.091 0.025*** -0.042 0.022** -0.037 0.019* 
lnAge -0.022 0.009*** -0.023 0.008*** -0.017 0.008** -0.019 0.007*** 
Interest -0.531 0.289* -0.567 0.291** 0.195 0.252 -0.202 0.254 












134.38***   357.26*** 
 
312.93*** 
Obs.   282   282   282   282 
Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the FGLS regressions. The DEA column gives the results for the regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) 
are derived using the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the 
stochastic frontier analysis. The dependent variable   is the annual profitability, Profit -the return on assets (ROA) which measured as the ratio of net income to the average 







Appendix G Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation. 
 Analysis of the Profitability of Micro-Life Insurers in Nigeria & South Africa; 2005-2010: Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) Estimation. 
  I.                                 DEA    II.                                   SFA    
  Coeff. 
Robust Std. 
Error   
Coeff. 
Robust Std. 
Error   
Coeff. 
Robust Std. 





















































































































































Source: Research Data. This table reports the results of the pooled OLS. The DEA column gives the results for the regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using 
the data envelopment analysis, while the SFA column gives the results for the regressions in which the cost efficiency (Efficiency) are derived using the stochastic frontier analysis. The 
dependent variable   is the annual profitability, Profit -the return on assets (ROA) which measured as the ratio of net income to the average of total assets in years   and    . All 
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